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CHAPTER

I

FORMALISM AND KANT’S TABLE OF LOGICAL FUNCTIONS
§ 1 - On

the Character of Kant’s Logic of Judgments

Kant’s general logic is a logic of judgments, rather
than of

sentences or of propositions in the modern sense of
hypostatized
meanings.

unity in

A judgment, according to Kant,
a

cognition.

judgments into

a set

representation of

is a

Judgment involves bringing concepts or other
of relations in order to represent how they

belong to one another in an objective unity.

Therefore, in all cases

judgment is the mediate knowledge of one representation
or a judgment) by means of another.

(a

concept

In a subject-predicate judgment,

for example, the knowledge of the subject is mediated by means of the

predicate.

The relation through which this mediation takes place is

the form of the judgment.^
The form of the judgment rests upon what Kant calls the

logical function of the understanding involved in making the judgment.
In

the "Transcendental Analytic’’ of the Critique of Pure Reason,

^

displays these logical functions, grouped under four headings, by

means of

a

table (B95):

Quantity

Quality

Un iversal

Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

Particular
Singular

1

Kant

2

Relation

Modality

Categorical

Problematic
Assertoric
Apodictic

H^^pothetical

Disjunctive

A function is ”the unity of the act
of bringing various

representations under one common representation"
(B93).
then, much like

a

A function

function in mathematics,^ is an operation ("act")

upon arguments (for Kant these arguments are
either concepts or other

judgments) which is law-governed in uniquely determining
those arguments.

For Kant, this value is

a

unity of

a

a

value for

specific kind

consisting in the relation which is thought between the
arguments.
Each kind of unity is called

a

moment of unity.

For instance, the logical function of universal quantification

yields the moment of unity thought between two concepts by uniting
them in a universal judgment.

This unity is expressed by the relation

of the predicate’s pertaining to the whole extension of the subject

without exception.

Similarly, the logical functions of particular and

singular quantification yield, respectively, the unity of the predicate’s pertaining to some of the extension of the subject (the

particular judgment) and that of the predicate’s pertaining to an
individual (the singular judgment).
The other logical functions yield unity in judgments in a

similar manner.

The moment of unity of the affirmative judgment is

represented by the function of affirming the relation between the
subject and predicate; that of the negative judgment, by the function

of denying this relation; and
function of

a

tliat

of the infinite judgment, by the

negative predicate in an affirmative judgment.

Tlie

unity

3

of the categorical judgment is represented
by joining

tnvo

concepts

together in the relationship of subject
and predicate by the copulative function (the copula); that of the
hypothetical, by joining
two judgments in a conditional relation
by the function ’if. ..then
and that of the disjunctive, by joining two
or more judgments by
the function ’either... or

last

tv-70

’.

(One should not think of these

functions as the corresponding truth-functional
connec-

tives of the

modem propositional

calculus.

Kant defines the functions

of the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as yielding
kind of unity in consciousness,

a

a

specific

way of thinking the judgments to

be related, and not as yielding a truth-value.

)

Finally, the unity

of the problematic judgment is represented by a function expressing
the possibility of the cognition; that of the assertoric, by

a

function expressing the actuality (truth) of the cognition; and that
of the apodictic, by

a

function expressing the necessity of the

cognition.
A judgment is a unity constituted by the moments of unity

resulting from each logical function comprising the judgment.

How

the unity of the whole judgment is constructed from these moments

will be, in

a

broad sense, the topic of this dissertation.

Kant believes that this set of logical functions corresponds
to the logical forms appropriate for a general, or formal, logic.

The

table itself is based upon Kant’s own v7ork and lectures on general
logic.

In

presenting the table in the Critique , Kant claims that it

does not differ ”in any essential respects” from the classificatory

table of judgments commonly provided by logicians (695-96).“^

General

4

logic IS formal in the sense that it
treats relationships between

concepts in

a

judgment or beliveen judgments themselves in
inferences

irrespective of the content of that which is
related.

Kant says,

General logic
abstracts from all content of
knowledge
and considers only the logical form in
the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge
(B79).
.

.

.

.

.

Moreoever, general logic has universal applicability
to all areas of
thought.

In

characterizing general logic, Kant maintains,

The sphere of logic is quite precisely delimited; its
sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and
a strict proof of the formal rules of all thought (Bix).
Thus, general logic deals in a precise manner with the

traditional question of logic, "What is correct reasoning?"

Kant,

in

following the practice of his own day, divides general logic into two
separate disciplines:

the Analytic, which deals with the principles

of the formal assessment and criticism of all reasoning, and the

Dialectic, which exposes dialectical illusion (fallacy) in reasoning.
Hence, by the analytic of general logic Kant intends to mark off what
is considered today as the domain of elementary formal logic; namely,

the specification of logical forms and of the formal principles of

valid inference.
Hence, we can interpret each function as a logical constant of
a

possible judgment.^

lating

a

Where a modern logician would speak of trans-

sentence into a symbolic notation to reveal what he wishes

to consider its logical form, Kant would speak of classifying a

judgment according to the table of logical functions.

The point of

both procedures is to specify the logical constants of the sentence
or judgment.

Although the point may be the same,

tlie

resulting

5

formulations will naturally differ owing to
the special character of
a

logic of judgments.

Not only is the set of logical constants
used

and defined in a different manner, but
the forms into which a sentence

may be translated are more flexible than
the forms by which a judgment
is to be interpreted.

Various formulations of the logical form of

a

sentence are compatible with others, depending upon
the argument in

which the sentence occurs as premiss or conclusion;
whereas, the form
of

a

judgment is determined by just those constants provided
by the

analysis of judgment.
One notes the following difference between the Kantian

conception of what constitutes the investigation of

a

formal logic

with regard to judgments and the modern delimitation of formal logic.
Since the construction of judgments involves the employment of thought,
or reasoning, we can raise the question of what is correct reasoning

not only with regard to inference-making, as is done in modern logic,

but also with regard to the making of judgments themselves.

reasoning correctly in

a

judgment is to construct

means of acts of the understanding.

is indicated

judgment by

Hence, the Analytic, in the

investigation of logical constants, makes
to the notion of truth in judgment.

a true

To employ

a

distinctive contribution

The nature of this contribution

in the following passage from the ” Introduction” to the

Logik, as quoted by Norman Kemp-Smith,

Analytic discovers, by means of analysis, all the
activities of reason which we exercise in thought.
It is
therefore an analytic of the form of understanding and of
Reason, and is justly called the Logic of Truth, since it
contains tlie necessary rules of all (formal) truth, without wliicli truth our knowledge is untrue in itself, even
apart from its objects.

6

Because the Analytic is formal, it attempts
to expose only those
forms and principles which are necessary
conditions for the correct

employment of reason and understanding, those
elements and principles

without which our understanding and reason would
not truly be understanding or reason.
Thus,

in classifying a judgment according to the
table of

logical functions, the logician is, according to Kant,
specifying
the forms necessary for the true employment of thought
in

struction of the judgment.

tlie

con-

The logician is not merely classifying the

judgment according to its possible use in an inference, but is telling
us something about the internal structure of the judgment itself
as

regards the formal determination of its truth.
The modern reader may think that this extension of the study

of general logic into questions of truth will introduce unwanted
epistemological considerations into the logical analysis of judgment.
However, such

a

criticism misses the point of

a

formal analysis of

judgment, for formal considerations pertaining to truth legitimately

enter into the analysis of the correct use of reasoning in the construction of

a

judgment.

I

hope to demonstrate, through presentation

of Kant’s theory of the unity of judgment, that Kant’s formal analysis
of judgment is conducted in

a

manner wholly appropriate to the logical

analysis of the structure of judgment.

§

2

- Some Modern' Puzzles

Nevertheless, Kant’s set of constants presents perplexing
features, unneiving to the modern logician.

The following problems

7

will be dealt with in this
dissertation.
Although Kant lists three forms of
Quantity and Quality, he
hastens to add that the singular and
infinite forms are not "coordinate” forms of judgment in general
logic (B96-97).

In the theory

of the syllogism in general logic,
singular judgments "can be treated

like those that are universal," since
in both the predicate pertains
to the whole or entirety of the subject.

Also, the infinite judgment,

according to its logical form, is really
affirmative, for "general
logic abstracts from all content of the
predicate (even though it be

negative)."

Notice, however, that Kant does not question the
existence

of singular quantification as

predicates as

a

a

form of quantification or negative

form of negation in general logic; he is specifying

how these forms are to be handled in the syllogism.

Only in the

Critique does Kant argue that the treatment of these

form.s

in trans-

cendental logic requires them to be fundamentally distinct forms,
because they make
object.

a

distinct contribution to the conception of an

A consideration of these arguments, however,

is out of place

in this study of the general logic.

Nevertheless, in being a theory of valid argumentation, general

logic would seem to require just universal and particular quantification with regard to Quantity and affirmative and negative quality

with regard to forms of Quality.

Thus,

it is unclear in

V'jhat

sense

there is singular quantification and infinite quality in general logic,
if these forms can be treated on a par with others in the syllogism.

What must be shown is the logical distinction belnveen these forms and
others under

tlie

respective headings, while their treatment in

8

syllogistic Inferences parallels that
of other constants.
Secondly, the copula, which expresses
the relationship between

subaect and predicate in the categorical
judgment, has proven to be a
useless logical constant in modern
logical theory.
I am reminded here
of Frege's confession in the
Begriffsschrlft that in an early draft
of the work he had attempted to
distinguish between the subject and

predicate of

a

judgment only to find that it was "obstructive
of [his]

special purpose and merely led to useless
prolixity
employment of the copula as

a

Indeed, the

logical constant has stood in the way of

stating the logical form of propositions involving
relations and

multiple quantification.

It is safe to say that modern logic has been

able to extend the theory of validity far beyond
what was ever accom-

plished in the subject-predicate logic of categorical
propositions
by seeing that the categoricals do not contain one common
internal

structure

the copula

^namely,

—

^but,

in fact,

differ with regard to

the function representing the grammatical copula just as much
as they

differ with regard to their quantification.
i.e.. Chapter II,

§

But we shall see (II.

2,

2) that Kant utilizes a conception of judgment for

which the copulative function is necessary.
What this conception of judgment is and what counts for or

against its use in logical theory can only be answered by looking at
Kant’s conception of

eacli

logical function which is alleged to charac-

terize some formal aspect of judgment.

Unfortunately, where they count

most, Kant’s definitions of these functions obfuscate matters rather

than illuminate them.

of

tlie

One gets this feeling first in Kant’s definition

copula as expressing the relationship

beti\;een

the subject and

9

predicate:

What, after all, is the relationship
expressed and why

is it necessary to have a
function to express it?

especially the definition of the modal
forms.

But consider

These forms are the

most important of the Kantian t^velve in
contributing to Kant’s con-

ception of judgment (see

IV. 1).

Kant says that modality concerns

only the value of the copula in relation
to thought in general”
(BlOO).

At least one commentator has maintained that
this definition

of modality is ’’almost meaningless.’’^

What has

’’the

judgment?

What does ’value’ mean here?

value of the copula” to do with the logical form
of

a

And what has this value of the copula to do with
modality

and modal concepts?

Even the meaning that could be given to these

forms through their association with the modal categories
of possi-

bility, existence, and necessity in the metaphysical
deduction is

obscured by this definition.
Failure to come to grips with these problems has resulted
in the modal forms being the least understood of the Kantian
forms

of judgment.

Jonathan Bennett contends

’’the

concepts associated with

the modal features are supposed to be pretty much our ordinary con-

cepts of possibility and necessity.”^

If Bennett means by ”our

ordinary concepts of possibility and necessity”

’^’

and ’Q’, then we

cannot associate these concepts, as formalized in modem modal logic,

with the problematic and apodictic forms of judgment (see
over, Bennett’s attempt to establish

a

IV. 3).

More-

relation between Kant’s modal

forms and ”our ordinary concepts” is bound to break down over any

association of the assertoric form with the concept of existence
expressed as an existential quantifier, for Kant distinguislies the

10

quantification of

a

Judgment from the assertoric form
which is

associated with the concept of existence.
Bennett’s interpretive procedure here
is wrong-headed:

One

cannot approach the modal fomis of
judgment from a preconceived notion
of modal logic.

Indeed, Kant’s modal logic-the logic
of possibility,

existence, and necessity— can be understood
only in terms of the logic

of the modal forms of judgment which must
be acquired through the
general logic itself.
The misrepresentation of the modal forms is
lamentable, for

Kant’s theory of the logical forms of judgment
culminates in the theory

of the modal forms, since these forms take on
the nature of judgment and in distinguishing
a

sentential logic (see

IV. 1).

Kant, too,

I

a
a

major role in defining
logic of judgments from

believe, would have consi-

dered his most distinctive contribution to the theory of the
forms of

judgment to lie in his theory of the modal functions.

Against the

prevailing division of judgments into those that are modal, or ’’impure”,
and those that are non -modal, or ’’pure”, Kant comments that without

modality no judgment is possible (N 3111).^*^

Furthermore, Kant’s most

fi'uitful and interesting thinking concerning the logic form of judg-

ments occurs in his theory of modality.
the modal forms. Chapters IV and

V,

For these reasons my study of

will be the most extended in this

monograph
Finally, there is an inherent shortcoming in displaying the
forms of judgment in an array on
us of

hov^;

a

ta1)le:

The table does not inform

the forms relate to one another in

a

judgment.

A mere array

of logical constants tells nothing about the grammar or syntax of

11

these constants in constructing

a

well-formed judgment.

Perhaps Kant

assumed that his readers would know
how quantifiers and negation fit
into a judgment, but, as a matter
of fact, the logical grammar of
these constants is not obvious to the
modern reader.
rnent

holds

In The

Develop -

of Logic, William and Martha Kneale
contend, ”[Kant] apparently
.

.

.

that each division under one heading
can be combined with

each division under each of the others.

They go on to point out

that the hypothetical judgment cannot
combine with negation, for then
the judgment would no longer by hypothetical.

But this obvious fact

should indicate that Kant does not hold the
belief that any function
can combine with any other function of the- others
headings.

However,

Kant’s method of presenting the forms by means of an
array provides
no rules for their syntax.

Whenever questions like these are raised in the current
literature, they are dismissed with the implication that Kant’s
table
of logical functions is

v\?rong

to begin with and tliat the existence of

such problems only shows Kant’s failure to develop the logical theory
he employs.

The feeling is that the table plays a specious role in

Kantian thought by being artificially introduced at

a

point where Kant

did not know how to proceed, that it was introduced for the misguided

purpose of proving the finality of
is of little

logic.

a list

of categories, and that it

philosophical importance in these days of mathematical

For such reasons little serious work has been done in English

on Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment

Yet in view of

tlie

general logic.

recent rise in Kantian literature,

especially on the Transcendental Analytic, the absence of such

a

study

12

represents a serious lack in Kantian
scholarship.

Kant claims that

his distinctive contribution to
categorlal analysis is the systemization
of the categories in relation to each
other, which is accomplished

through their association with the logical
constants of general logic
(B106).

He believes that forms of general logic
supply the logic

of the categorial forms.
by

a

modem reader

But this logic is not readily discernible

to whom the general logic itself is a
mystery.

Hence j a study of Kant’s general logic is in
order as, at least,

a

necessary prolegomenon to Kant's categorial analysis
and, thus, to

assessing the importance of Kant’s philosophy to
philosophical problems
today.
In this monograph,

therefore,

I

shall examine Kant’s set of

logical constants with an eye toward developing logical syntax
or

grammar for these constants.

By a logical grammar

rules by which these constants define

a

I

shall mean the

well-formed judgment and the

formal operations that are possible by means of the constants.

The

latter problem concerns the grammatical interrelations of the constants
to each other and pertains to the doctrine of immediate inference.

A

consideration of Kant’s syllogistic will be provided only in so far
as it pertains to issues raised with regard to the grammar of the

logical constants.

I

shall show how Kant lays down

a

gramm-ar for these

constants by which he spells out the formal mechanisms of judgment
how the unity of the whole arises from the unity of the parts

—and

of

its logic.
In conclusion,

I

of logical tlieory (VI. 2).

shall say something about Kant’s conception

13

§ 3

- A Method of Investigation
It

^ ipp^ossible ^ understand

9Hly. ?^r_ce is

Kant^s general logic if one

Critique of Pure Reason

.

's

There he defines general

logic only to distinguish it from his main
concern of transcendental
logic and considers the logical functions mostly
in terms of their

treatment in transcendental logic.

writings outside of the Critique

.

Instead, we must turn to Kant's

Unfortunately, little of the

pertinent material is presently available in English.
The most important such source in volume 16 of the Prussian

Academy edition of Kant's complete works.

The volume contains notes

Kant made to Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, which Kant
used as
his text for his lectures on general logic.

These notes have been

numbered, and it is customary to refer to the passages by the notation
'N'

followed by the appropriate number.

with Meier's Auszug and

I

The volume is also published

shall make reference to this work where

Meier helps to explain Kant or where Kant's theories significantly
differ from Meier's.

written over

a

The notes themselves, often mere jottings, were

period of some dozen years and show the development of

Kant's thinking on logical theory during this period.

I

shall use

only those notes which represents Kant's final thinking in his so-

called critical period.

It is interesting to note that Kant continued

to write and think about general logic well after the publication of

the Critique

.

A second, and perhaps better known, source is the Logik, a

compendium of

tlie

lecture notes compiled in 1800 by Kant's student

Gottlob Jasche, and published in volume

9

of the Academy edition.

14

According to Jasche’s own preface, the
compilation was made to present
Kant’s thinking in a field which he
would not have othen^ise prepared
for publication with the required clarity
and systematization.

Al-

though having Kant’s blessings to carry
out the project (Kant gave

Jasche his own lecture notes for the purpose
and assured Jasche of
the latter’s competency to handle the
task), Jasche was evidently

given

a

free hand in his treatment of the notes.

Thus it is diffi-

cult to determine whetlier those passages which
are original in the

reflect Kant’s own communications to Jasche in 1800
or are

Jasche’s own interpolations.

Care must be taken, therefore, in

accepting this work as Kantian.

Only the "Introduction", which is the

most obscure part of the work and the most remote from
contemporary
logical tlieory, is available in English.
A third source for Kant’s logic is volume 24 of the Academy

edition.

This volume contains student notes taken during Kant’s

lectures on general logic from about 1771 until after 1792.

These

notes include the pre-critical Blomberg (1771) and Philippi (1772)
notes, as well as those falling within the critical period, Politz
(1789), Busolt (1790), Dohna-Wundlacken (1792), and the Wiener Logik

compiled by

a

group of students probably sometime after 1792

.

I

shall

refer to these notes by means of the student’s name from whose notes
I

am quoting.

Although there is no way to determine the faithfulness

of these notes to Kant’s lectures, the notes themselves are impressive
in their coherency.

They are helpful in explaining the short, some-

times cryptic, passages of volume 16 and in

shov^/ing

notes are organized and developed in lecture form.

how Kant’s

ov\?n

15

But

philosophically secure understanding of Kant's
general

a

logic requires a philosophical analysis of
the material itself in

addition to an extensive investigation into Kant’s
notes and lectures.
For this purpose

formalization.

I

propose to utilize

By a formalization

I

a

technique of modem analysis

mean^^ the construction of an

artificial language system consisting in precise rules
over
symbols for the rigorous study of an area of discourse.

language system is called

a

formalism.

In the

set of

a

Such

a

formalization of

a

dis-

course the choice of expressions or symbols and the rules for
their
use are governed by the meaning of the expressions in the area being

formalized.

One renders this meaning as clearly as possible by means

of formal rules governing symbolic expressions in the formalism.

Areas which have recently undergone formalization are arithmetic
(by Frege,

in Principia Mathematica

,

and by Quine), semantics (by

Tarski), pragmatics (by R. M. Martin), and the traditional syllogistic
(by -fcukasiewicz

).

But in these formalisms the constructed language-

system has always been that of first-order quantification theory with

additional operators and predicates.
is the

First-order quantification theory

basic formalization of elementary formal logic.

Kant's logic, on the other hand,

I

shall construct

a

a

totally

Instead of employing an already

existing formalism to study Kant's general logic,

radical procedure for developing

formalizing

special language-

a

system designed to render the particular mechanisms of

different elementary logical system.

In

I

am proposing the

special formalism.

Thus, my

procedure is analogous to the translation of arithmatic into

a

malism, since Kant's general logic is an area presented without

for-

16

formalization; but it is also analogous to the
more fundamental

treatment of elementary logic by means of

a

special set of symbols

and rules.

Kant's general logic is formalj but has never
been stated as
a

foriTialism.

developing

In

shall introduce

a

formalism for Kant's general logic,

I

special symbol for each logical constant in Kant's

theory of judgment.

function yielding

a

a

Since Kant defines

a

logical constant as

a

unity, we may take the expression

(F)

0p(x, y

)

rz

Up

as representing the general form of a logical constant.

Here '0p'

is the symbol for a logical function with arguments x and
y,

'Up'

is

the moment of unity which is uniquely determined by this function
0p.

We may express this moment of unity in ordinary English, or as close
to ordinary as possible:

Up tells us how the arguments x and y are

thought to be related in the judgment.

Thus, Up will be a proposition

(sentence) involving a two-place relation.

To complete the construc-

tion of the formalism we require the grammar, in the sense defined
above, of each 0p introduced.

forth

a

Here the procedure will be to set

formal counterpart to what Kant says infonnally about the

grammar of each constant.
This kind of philosophical theory -building to explain another's

theory may be called constructive explication

.

Tlie

acute analysis that

the theory undergoes by being incorporated into a formal language

system provides
theory.

being

a

a

philosophical explication of

tlie

concepts of that

Explication is not meant here in the Mooreian sense in which

male sibling serves as an explication of being

a

brother, but
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in the sense in which
philosophers speah of rational
reeonstrcotion.
In such

explication of a discourse

a

given subject is transformed

into a language-system
which is clear and precise
and technical.
(F) above, for Instance,
serves as a helpful, if
rudimentary, expli-

cation of Kant's somewhat
obscure definition of
'function'.
Brevity, clarity and exactness
are, therefore, natural

by-products of the systematization
brought about in such constructive
explication.
But herein lies both the
problems and the insights of
such explication.
Making a theory precise through
formalism will
naturally involve some distortion
of the original material where
that
mBtoirisl is itsGlf nor
not precise.
dtpptqo

tt-i/-*
The
generalt question of what to do

about inexactness in one’s material
and distortion in one’s theory
is
far too broad for a complete
discussion here.l^ p,,- succinctly
in
terms of the problems to be
encountered in the forthcoming study,

inexactness must be mirrored as problems
in constructing
formalism.

a

desired

Attempts, of course, must be made to
construct an adequate

formalism to do justice as far as possible
to one’s material.
Distortion, thus, must be kept to a minimum
and recognized and assessed

where it necessarily occurs.
But here we find the great insight afforded
by formalistic

analysis:

The method provides a concrete means of
expressing v^hat may

be inexact or problematic in one’s material.

In short,

constructive

explication gives us an objective point of reference
for the philoso-

phical exploration of

a

theory.

language-system, problems of
and explicitly formulated.

a

By means of the rigor of

a

formal

philosophical nature can be uncovered

Indeed, constructive explication may be
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able to express clearly
what was previously
believed unclear or
uncover problems hitherto
unacknowledged.

Constructive explication, then,
constitutes philosophical
analysis in the dual sense
of rational reconstruction
and critique.
The presentation of the
logical grammar of Kant's
logical
functions will parallel that
of rne
the cyntactical
svntar-i-Tnti-i or
axiomatic statements
of modern logic.
The syntax and formal
operations of the logical

constants will be given as an
uninterpreted system of logic.

No formal
semantics in terms of a domain and
truth predicate will be provided
for the Kantian conception of
judgment.
Such considerations belong
to
the transcendental logic of
judgments, rather than to formal
logic.

The intended meanings for these
symbols will be provided through
the

unity which each function specifies.

Such an interpretation will

consist in the association of the logical
functions with such concepts
as

'all',

'not', etc.

This presentation of Kant's logical
functions

is in keeping with Kant's own
statement of his general logic,

for he

himself develops an Interpretation for
these logical constants only
through the unities which they specify In
thought.

derations in general logic pertain to what

I

All other consi-

have called

tile

logical

grammar of the constants.
Fina.llVj

I

add that the guiding principle of constructive

explication, and the principle upon which its value
as

piece of analysis is judged, is:

a

successful

faithfulness to the material.

Constructive explication of the kind envisioned for this study
involves,
foremost, scliolarship in order to preserve the philosopher's
meaning
witliout misrepresentation of the material.

In

constructing

a

suitable
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formalism, the theorist is expressing
his own understanding and
analysis of the material and is to
be held responsible on this
account
lor his construction.

CHAPTER

II

THE LOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
TRADITIONAL
CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS

Traditional, or Aristotelian, logic
specifies the logical
form of categorical (subject-predicate)
judgments along the two axes

of Quantity and Quality.

According to Quantity,

a

judgment may be

either universal, if something is said
about the entire membership of
Its subject (S), or particular,

of Its members.

if something is said about only
some

And according to Quality,

a

judgment may be either

affirmative, if the predicate (P) is affirmed
of the subject, or
negative, if the predicate is denied of the
subject.

These two axes

provide the following analysis of the logical form
of categorical
judgments

Quantity
Universal
Universal
Particular
Particular

Quality

Traditional
Name

Form

Affirmative
Negative
Affirmative
Negative

All

S

is P

No S is P
Some S is P
Some S is not P

"A"
"E"
TI

Jtt

”0"

(To tills classification is sometimes added the singular

judgment, n is P whore

’n’

is a proper name, whose logical form,

it

was thought, was to be construed in terms of the axes involved in the

categorical judgments.

Traditional logicians often regarded the

singular judgment as universal with respect to quantification.
Kant fosters

a

misconception of his own logic when he claims
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that no significant additions have
been made to logic since Aristotle
(Bviii).

However, his judgment is based upon
inadequate historical

sources

It is doubtful that the important
medieval work in logic

:

was even available for Kant’s study.

Moreover, from

a

formalistic

perspective, the difference between Kantian and
Aristotelian logic
could not be more significant.

Standard foimalizations of Aristotle’s

logic^ employ four two-place predicate-constants whose
variables

range over terras.

These constants express the Quantity -Quality rela-

tion in each of the A, E,

formalizing

a

I,

0 categoricals

.

But this method of

logic of the categoricals is insufficient to express the

logical complexity of Kant’s theory of the logic of the categoricals.
It is helpful to think of the Kantian theory as an attempt
to

display the internal structure of the four constants used in Aristo-

telian logic.

Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment attempts to

take apart the categoricals into their constituent logical particles,
to separate their quantity and quality into different logical constants
in order to exhibit more of the categorical’s internal, logical

structure.

§

1 - The Universal and Particular Quantifiers

Whereas traditional logic recognized only two forms of
quantification, Kant recognizes three:
singular.

universal, particular, and

Kant defines these three forms of quantification as follows:

In universal judgments the spliaera ^extension] of a
concept is comprised entirely V'^ithin tlie sphaera of
another; in particular judgments a part of the first is
comprised under the sphaera of the other; and in the individual, a concept which has no sphaera is comprised merely
as a part under tlie sphaera of tlie other (N 3068).^
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ThuSj the three forms of
quantification deal with a comparison
of

concepts in which the extension
of one concept is related to
another
either entirely or only partially,
or, in the case that the
concept
lacks an extension, only singlely.
U-hen no extension is involved
in
the comparison, we have what may
be called the limit of the
quantita
tive comparison of one concept with
another.

One can do no more

than to compare the concept in one
instance with this other concept.
Howeverj Kant maintains that this case
can be treated like

those of the first in syllogistic inferences
(see 1.2), because in

both cases the relation is maintained
without exception.
for, since [the latter case has] no extension
at all the
predicate cannot relate to part only of that which
is contained in the concept of the subject, and be excluded
from
the rest.
The predicate is valid of that concept, without
exception, just as if it were a general concept and
had an
extension to the whole of which the predicate applied
(B96).

We are, therefore, im.mediately confronted with the
question of whether
to introduce two quantifiers or three.
The exact nature of Kant's claim must be understood.

maintaining only that the syllogistic rules governing

a

He is

singular

quantifier in inferences correspond to those rules governing the universal quantifier.

Such a claim is compatible with

a

conceptual

difference between the universal and singular judgments which would
show up in other areas of the logical investigation of these forms of

judgment.

Indeed, the singular judgment includes aspects of the meaning

of both the universal and particular judgments, for in it
included entirely (universal quantity) as
in the extension of a concept.

a

a

concept is

part (particular quantity)

Yet, because a singular judgment lacks
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an extension it cannot be
identified logically with either a
complete

universal or particular judgment.

While a universal judgment has

contrary, a singular has none; and while
trary, a singular has none.

a

particular has

a

a

subcon-

Nor can a singular judgment be
contraposed

as a universal affirmative or particular
negative can be.

The failure

of contrariety and subcontrariety to hold
for singular judgments can
be explained directly by tbe fact that

a

singular judgment takes no

thought of an extension, for, as we shall see
in

II. 3,

these relation-

ships are valid in Kant's logic because of his
conception of the

extension of

a

concept and how general quantification (universal
and

particular quantification) functions with respect to
extensions.
Hence, oneness or singularity is

a

quantitative comparison that is

logically distinguishable from the other quantitative comparisons.
Thus, the forms of quantification can be said to rest
upon

different acts of the understanding (W^ p. 929 );^ that is, to involve
*^iffsrent logical functions.

Kant's argument, quoted above, concerns

only how these functions are to be treated with respect to syllogistic
inference, and here Kant maintains that the singular, which is different from the universal in other respects as

a

can be treated or thought of as universal.

Thus, let us adopt two dis-

tinct functors

'y'

and

'y'

form of quantification,

as representing the logical functions of

the universal and singular judgments respectively.

quantifier

I

shall employ the symbol

For the particular

'C|'

The topic for tliis section is the syntax of the universal and

particular quantifiers.
investigated in III.l.

The logic of singular quantification will be
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In

medieval logic, quantifiers, or
syncategoreraatic words,

were thought to express the manner of
supposition (see
subject in

a

judgment.

II. 3)

of the

Quantifiers, on this view, operate in
gram-

matical relation to only the subject of the
judgment.

Albert of

Saxony formulated the following view of
quantification:
To further exemplify syncategorematic terms,
let us
consider the following proposition: "Every man
is
running." "Man" is the subject.
"Every" is neither
the subject nor predicate, nor is it part of
either
subject or predicate. Rather, it is a modification
of
the subject and signifies the manner of
supposition of
the subject itself.^

This theory of quantification, and the correlative
theory of supposition
has been formalized by P. T. Geach in Chapter

Generality

.

3

of Reference and

Following Geach, we can give the syntax of the medieval

conception of quantifiers as
B(VA),

where

A

and

are variables which take the names of concepts as

substituends.
However, Kant views quantifiers as functions which take both
the subject and predicate of

a

judgment as their arguments.

This view

follows from Kant’s general conception of the role of logical functions
in a judgment (I.l).

To speak of quantification as a form of judgment

is for Kant to speak of a specific kind of connection between the

subject and predicate (N 3084).^

Thus,

following the schema (F) (1.3)

for the representation of logical functions, we specify the grammar of

Kantian quantifiei's as.

V(A,

B),
<^(A, C).
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The unity which these functions
determine concerns how one

concept IS compared with the extension
of the other.
II. 1.1.

Hence,

UNITY OF QUANTIFICATION

V(A, B)
S(A, BJ

= D is compared with all of the
extension of A
= B IS compared with some of
the extension of A.

Specifying the manner of this comparison
is the role of the other
logical functions of the categorical judgment
(II. 2).

In this sense

the quantifiers themselves fail to
yield a complete thought in

a

judgment.
In an early

Kantstudien article,^ Professor

0.

Sickenberger

reports that Kant’s conception of quantifiers as
expressing

a

ship bet^^;een concepts is entirely new in the history
of logic

relation(p.

92).

Sickenberger, argues, moreover, that this conception
of quantification
is mistaken and that something like the traditional
view of the grammar

of quantifiers is correct.
is not a

Sickenberger contends that quantification

form of judgment but only the form of

because "the additions of ’one’,
subject judged"

(p.

’some’,

a

subject in a judgment,

’all’ limit and determine the

96).

It is easy to

rephrase the Sickenberger argument in terms of

the formulations of the unity yielded by quantifiers in II. 1.1.

In

universal and particular judgments, the relation of comparing remains
the same and only the terms i^

relation differ.

Since the role

of the other logical functions is to specify the nature of this

comparison, quantification concerns only
However, Sickenberger
the relations

’x

’s

tlie

subject in this relation.

point is really quite artificial.

is compared witli all/some of the extension of

In

it
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is just as plausible to view

’all’ and

(common) relation ’is compared with’.

distinct relations
some

— ’is

’some’ as belonging with the

The result is, of course, two

compared with all’, and ’is compared
with

in which the common relation is absorbed
as a syntactical part

of each relation and is not expressed
independently of its occurring
in the relation.

A practical point is gained, moreover,
in that these

quantitative relations take as values of their
variables the same
things; namely, general concepts.

Otherwise, one is forced into the

un-Kantian position that the other forms of judgment take
as their
arguments

a

concept and

a

quantified concept (see III.l).

Sickenberger himself acknowledges that the forms of

quantification can be relationally expressed by presenting such formulations of universal, particular, and singular quantification wherein
the subject is an unquantified general concept:

Men are all capable of being educated.
Insects, in part, are designed for communal life.
The trench, in the case of one man, have surpassed other nations.
But he dismisses these formulations as not being the ’’ordinary sense”
of quantification (p. 96).

However, he fails to show any logical

incoherency in viewing the structure of quantification in the A,
0 categoricals in this Kantian manner.

view of quantification provides

a

E,

I,

Furthermore, the relational

formally adequate explication of the

structure of categorical judgments as the following sections will
demonstrate.

Thus, there is not good reason for maintaining that this

view is to be dismissed as

a

theory of quantification for categoricals.

Kant states only one formal rule of immediate inference

governing

llic

use of quantifiers:

the rule of subalternation.

As

a
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general schema for expressing immediate
inferences,
(S)

0p(x, y)

where

'

>Kp(-^ y

0 ^' and ’0p’ are logical functions

shall employ

I

),

The arrow,

„

can be

'

read as ’implies' to distinguish it from the
truth -functional connective

’=)’
;

its antecedent is everything written to
its left,

its

consequent, everything written to its right.
The rule of subalternation which states that a
judgment of

particular quantity follows from one universal quantity

—9P^.

^hlgemeinen gilt der Schluss auf da

(Subal.

V(A, B)

)

>c^(A,

Resondere”

)

(

Logilc,

§

46:

can be expressed

B).

Furthermore, in his own notes Kant writes.

All the particular and singular judgments are contained
under the universal; however, not all the singular judgments are contained under the particular (N 3171).
"7

Here Kant lays down rules concerning the logic of quantification which

incorporate all three kinds of quantifiers.

According to Kant,

a

singular judgment follows from the universal but not in general from
the particular.

This logic should be intuitively clear:

men are mortal’ it follows that
of any man, whereas such

’n

is mortal’, where

’n’

from ’All
is the name

judgment will not logically follow from

a

particularly quantified judgment, ’Some men are intelligent’.
of the singular to follow from the particular can be seen as

a

The failure
a

species

of the failure of the particular to imply in general a universal:

partiality does not imply exclusiveness.
is compatible

But particular quantification

with universal quantification, for the pax’ticular judg-

ment does not exclude

tlie

truth of the corresj)onding universal.

Kant fails to state

tlie

8

inference from singular judgments to
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one of particular quantification.

But this inference can be

countenanced as valid by considering
singular judgments in such
inferences as universal, as Kant claims
singular judgments are to be
treated with regard to the theory of
inference.
from the1.singular to the particular
is

a

Thus, the inference

species of subalternation.

Quantification, therefore, specifies the
following formal relationships:
A.

)

Universal and Singular:
2.

)

2.

B.

)

)

)

)

II. 3

From the universal singularity follows
From a singular judgment one of universal
quantification
can be expressed (N 3080: ”Gott ist ohne fehler.
Alles.^
Gott ist, ist ohne fehler.!')

Particular
1.

Exclusiveness - through the presence
of an extension
- through the abscence
of an extension

:

Partiality

From exclusiveness partiality follows
(Partiality, therefore, means at least one and possibly all)
From partiality no form of exclusiveness logically follows.

and III.l will present further development of the Kantian theory

of quantification.

§

2

- Quality and the Copula
In the meantime,

it is necessary to develop Kant's theory of

the logical functions of Quality and the copula to complete the theory

of the traditional categorical judgments.

My procedure will be to

present these functions as discrete logical functions and then to
show how they are to be incorporated into the formal representation
of a complete judgment.
Only the affirmative and negative forms of Quality need to be

considered; infinite quality will be considered in III.

2.

To represent
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these

fo^s

I

shall use

and

>~^-the former being the sign of

affirmation; the latter, the sign of
negation which must be distinguished, as we shall see, from the truth
-functional tilde of the
modern, propositional calculus.
II. 2.1.

The unities of these functions are:

UNITY OF QUALITY
-(A, B) = B is affirmed of A
~(A, B) = B is denied of A.

§

22 of the Logik presents Kant’s definition
of affirmation and denial:
In the affirmative judgment the subject is
thought under
the sphere of the predicate, in the negative
it is posited
outside of the sphere of the predicate.^

Thus the thought of affirmation is the inclusion of
the subject under
the predicate.

On the other hand, denial is the exclusion of the

subject from the predicate.

Affirmative quality, then, provides

a

means of conceiving of the subject by locating it within the
sphere,
or extension, of another concept.

of another provides

affirmation is
means of

a

a

a

In this sense affirming one concept

determination of the second concept.

Thus,

means of specifying in some detenninate manner by

concept the knowledge that can be had of another concept.

Negative quality provides the opposite thought:

no determination of

the subject is made, for the thought of negation is the placing of the

subject outside of the sphere of the predicate.
In a judgment quality must function with respect to a

quantitative relationship between the subject and predicate, for the
logical functions of Quality yield the thouglit of wliether the quanti-

tative comparison is made affirmatively or negatively.
of

and

in a judgment may be given as:

Thus the grammar

30

-(K)(A, B)
-'(K)(A, B),

where

is a quantifier.

However, to express the unity which results,
Kant’s logic

requires

a

copula, for it is only by means of the
copula that rela-

tionships between concepts can be expressed at
all in

categorical

a

judgment.
In the categorical judgment the subject and
predicate
constitute the matter of the judgment; the form, through
which the relation (of agreement or opposition) between
the subject and predicate is expressed and determined
’
is the copula ( Logik, § 24). 10

As the copulative function

I

shall use the functor ’(is)’.

makes the distinction between subject and predicate in

a

The copula

judgment:

the expression ’(is)(A, B)’ is meant to designate A as the subject

and B as the predicate of a comparison.

Tables II. 1.1 and II. 2.1 take the liberty of expressing the

unities of the respective functors by means of
relcitionship

.

a

subject - predicate

Technically, though, no thought of copulation is taken

with regard to these functions in Kant’s logic.

For Kant, copulation

in the categorical judgment is a special thought, not included in

Quantity and Quality, which must be yielded by its own logical functor.
The problem is. What is this special thought added by the copula?

What

more is added to the quantitative/qualitative comparison by the copulative functor?
P.
tliat

a

T. Geach,

following Frege’s theory of predication, maintains

the copula is not a separate piece of logical apparatus but really

grammatical part of

tlie

predicate.

But how we consider the copula
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in logic depends upon our
theory of predication.

Frege imbedded the

copula into the predicate in
order to explain predication
as a
function whose domain is objects
and whose range is a truth-value.
In this theory,

the predicate is expressed
by means of an "empty

space" so as to require completion
of its sense by an argument

referiing to elements in the range;
for example,

’...is red’,

however,

another theory of predication would
require of different means of
treating the copula.
in Kant’s logic,

If concepts are considered terras,
as they are

then one might wish to follow J. S.
Mill in callinc.

the copula "the sign of Predication’’13
in v^hich case it becomes part

of the logical apparatus of the judgment.
The principal difficulty of this alternative
is that of

defining the relation of predication.

Those who hold that the copula

is not a logical constant, will argue that
the copula "has no special

content" (Geach, p. 34) and thus fails to express
any relation at all.

Mill himself leaves us unsatisfied on this point.

Since we have only

one copula, the same relation of predication should
occur in both sin-

gular and generally quantified judgments.

Yet Mill’s view of conno-

tative concepts (names that denote objects and imply an attribute)
lays
the foundation for distinguishing "direct predication" in

a

singular

judgment from "indirect predication" in generally quantified judgments.^'^

Predication in

a

singular judgment means that the individual

denoted by the subject possesses the attribute connoted by the predicate; whereas predication in generally quantified judgments is

a

formal relationship between two connotative concepts in which it is
said that objects possess an attribute only in virtue of their
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possession of another attribute.
Nevertheless,

I

believe we can find

a

hint in Kant as to the

thought that is expressed by the copula
of any Judgment.

In the

Critique (B626) Kant writes.
Being
is merel^^ the positing of a thing
or of
certain determination as existing fas such].
Logically
®
^
It IS merely the copula of a
judgment.
.

.

.

The small word ’is’
only serves to posit the
predicate in its relation to the subject.
.

.

.

We may think of the positing expressed by
the copula as

a

unifying act

which places concepts in subject-predicate
relation in the consciousness of the judger.
II. 2. 2.

Hence, we may define copulation as:

UNITY OF THE COPULA

(is)(A, B) = A as subject
(Tlie

double hyphen,

’

’,

judgments under Relation.

—B

as predicate is posited

shall be used to express the unity of
The meaning of the resulting relation will

be contained in the explanation of how the elements of the
judgment
are posited.

)

The copulative unity of positing concepts in a subject-

predicate relation is the act of thinking them in
ment or opposition.

To posit Ball as subject

—

^Red

a

relation of agreeas predicate is to

think of these concepts in agreement or opposition with regard to

possible object of
Positing in

cognition.

a
a

judgment must conform to logical principles of

the agreement or opposition among concepts.

In his formal logic,

lays down three such principles
(1)

a

The Principle of Contradiction:
no positing (or
cognition) can contain that which is selfcontradictory.

Kant
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Compliance with this principle determines
the logical possibility, or
p ossihjjn^ of the truth, of

a

subject-predicate relation; no

positing is even logically possible which
contains an agreement or
opposition that is self-contradictory.
concepts in

a

If the connection between the

cognition is possible, then there is at least
the

formal possibility of the truth or correspondence
of the cognition

with its object.
(2)

Secondly,

The Principle of Sufficient Reason:
logically a
cognition is actual (true) if, and only if, (a) it
rests upon grounds and (b it has no false conse)
quences.

This piinciple concerns the reasonableness of the
cognition in its

connection with other cognitions and with its own consequences.

According to Kant, we can reason from the truth of

a

hypothetical

ground to the truth of the cognition as its consequent.

However, we

cannot reason conversely; rather, we can reason from the falsity of

cognition to the falsity of its ground.

a

Compliance with this principle

determines the logical actuality, or forma 1 truth, of the positing of
t\^7o

concepts in its logical relationship to other cognitions.

principle determines the truth of the comparison only from

a

This

formal

or logical perspective, but not necessarily from the perspective of
its correspondence with its object.

It says only that on the basis

of certain hypotheses we are justified in positing the two concepts
in a subject -predicate relation.

Finally,
(3)

The Principle of the Excluded Middle: necessarily
cognition is true if, and only if, its contradictory
is false.

a
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This principle dictates that the
positing of

concepts is necessary

if the contradiction of this agreement
or opposition is (hnown to he)
false.

Through this principle the truth of
the posited agreement or
opposition is provon
The third principle is the excluded
middle:
tne talsity of the opposite truth is
proven

since through
(N 2178). 16

Thus, by this principle we establish
the formal necessity of the truth

of the cognition and of its actual truth or
correspondence with its
object.

The copula, thus, is the function through which
the conformity

of a connection of concepts with logical principles
of agreement or

opposition is expressed.

Copulation means that at least the connection

contains nothing self-contradictory; though we may later determine
that
the connection is logically actual (conforms to the principle
of

sufficient reason) or even necessary (conforms to the principle of
the excluded middle).

It is obvious, moreover,

that positing concepts

in a sub ject—predicate relation takes place with regard to
quantitative/

qualitative comparison of these concepts.

The copula itself, though,

is most intimately connected with functions of Quality,

for in virtue

of affirmation agreement in a quantitative comparison of a subject and

predicate is determined; and in virtue of negation (denial) opposition
in a quantitative comparison is determined.

an affirmative copula or

a

negative copula,

Hence, we may speak of

and represent their

grammar as
(is)0(/(A, B)),

where

’0’

is a

function of Quality and ’0’, as above, is

a

quantifier.
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We can now formulate explicitly
the distinct logical role
of
copulation in a judgment: Copulation
can be thought of in a manner

parallel to the process of changing

propositional function into

a

proposition in the predicate calculus.
neither true nor false but becomes

a

a

A propositional function is

proposition (an expression that

may be either true or false) through
quantification.

provides an analogous role in Kant’s logic,
for when

Copulation
a

quantitative

qualitative comparison is posited in accordance
with the formal

principles of agreement or opposition, we can
speak of the possibility
of its truth (correspondence with its object)
or falsity.

A mere

quantitative/qualitative comparison cannot.be thought of as
true or
false unless it is at least posited in accordance
with the formal

principle of possibility.
These five logical functions combine to provide the
following

analysis of the traditional A,
II. 2. 3.

A:

E,

I,

0 categorical judgments.

UNITY OF THE CATEGORICALS
(is)-(y(A, B)) = B is affirmed of all of the extension of A
(All A s are B ’s
(is)~(V(A, B)) = B is denied of all of the extension of A
(No A ’s are B ’s )
(is)-(^(A, B)) = B is affirmed of some of the extension of A
(Some A ’s are B 's )
(is)~(^(A, B)) = B is denied of some of the extension of A
(Some A’s are not B’s)
’

E:
I:

0:

One notes that each of the A, E,

I,

0 categoricals contains the logical

function it is alleged to possess in virtue of its traditional classification.

For instance, the universal affirmative is constructed from

the universal quantifier and affirmative copula;
tive,

from

tile

tlie

particular nega-

particular quantifier and negative copula.
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Witli

regard to the subject-predicate relation
that is posited

in these judgments, the immediate
inferences of conversion, or the

interchange of subject and predicate, becomes
po sible.

In §§ 51-53

of the Logik, these inferences are presented
in their traditional
form which may be formalized as follows

(^. si^cito

B))—>(is)~(V(B,

(is)~(V(A,

1)

A))

(Conv. simpliciter 2)

(is)-(q(A, B))

>(is)-(<^(B, A))

(Conv. per a ccidens

(is)-(y(A^ B))

>(is)-(<q(B, A)).

)

Furthermore, we can state the relations of the traditional

Square of Opposition for the A,
II. 2.4.

E,

I,

0 categoricals (Logik, §§ 47-50).

SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

(is)-(^(A, B))

—

subcontraries

—-(is )~(C|(A,

B)).

Kant restores the distinctly Aristotelian notion of opposition

developed in

^

Interpretatione

.

Opposition concerns the way in

which truth and falsity can be opposed to each other
tvs?o

proposition in virtue of their formal relations.

v^ith

regard to

Boethius added

the vertical lines, the lines representing subalternation, to the

Square of Opposition.

But subalternation is not

a

relation of oppo-

sition in the Aristotelian-Kantian sense, for subaltemation pertains
to two true judgments.

These relations give rise to the following immediate inferences

with respect to the trutli and falsity of

tlie

categorical judgments:
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(a) from the truth of one contrar'
y one can infer the falsity of
the other;

(b) from the falsity of one
subcontrary one can infer the truth
of the other;

(c) from the truth or falsity of
one contra
contradictory one can infer
the opposite truth value for the other.

Kant

s

theoiy of logical functions allows us to
state the formal

relations of opposition in

a

purely syntactical manner

(ii) Subcontrary judgments result through
interchanging the

function of Quality in particular judgments;

(iii) Contradictory judgments result through
interchanging both
the quantifier and the function of Quality
in judgments.

From this formulation of the Square of Opposition
we see that
for Kant negation is not truth-functional, for with
regard to universal

judgments it produces only

a

contrary and with regard to particular

judgments it produces only

a

subcontrary.

This, of course,

is not to

say that the sign of negation functions ambiguously, for in both

instances the meaning of negation is similar (11.2,1),

The nontruth

functional character of negation derives from Kant’s use of negation
in a sense which attaches to the copula.

Aristotle once noted that

by affixing negation to the copula one does not produce the contra-

dictory of a universal proposition, but only its contrary (De Interp .,
7,

17^ 26-36).

Frege once contended, on the other hand, that negation

properly applies to the quantifier; however,
tional or truth-functional negation.

merely exclusion is

a

lie

had in mind proposi-

Kant’s meaning of negation as

non -propositional sense of negation that provides

an explication of how negation functions within the internal structure
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of E and 0 categoricals.
The truth-functional sense of
negation is attained by Kant

only through

a

change of both Quality and Quantity
in

a

judgment.

We now turn to the problem of whether
the immediate inferences

presented in

II. 1

and .2 are valid for the Kantian
logical functions.

The mere correspondence of these
functions with such words as 'all’,
’is’, and

ences.

’not’ cannot serve to justify the validity
of these infer-

As modern logic amply makes clear, these
inferences can fail

for another set of logical constants which
are associated with the

same words.

Take, for instance, subalternation:

According to the

modern theory of quantification, one cannot infer an
existential

proposition of the fonn (Ex) (Ax & Bx) from
(x)(Axx:Bx).

a

universal proposition,

Similar failures can be observed with regard to con-

trariety and subcontrariety on the Square of Opposition.

Since these

failuies can be traced to modern logic’s theory of quantification,
the

investigation of this problem will, not surprisingly, involve Kant’s

conception of quantification.

§

3

— The Meaning of Quantification and the Theory of Extension

Kant’s theoiy of quantification cannot be identified with

either the theory of distribution or the medieval theory of supposition.
Tlie

theory of distribution is not even

a

theory of quantification; it

is a theory about the nature of temns in a proposition.

the tlieory is about the matter

about the relation or form

a

content of

bet\s?een

a

In this sense

judgment rather than

the judgment’s terms.

A consideration of tlie difference between Kant’s theory of

I

quantification and the medieval theory
of supposition is more important
owing to the reawakened interest
in the medieval doctrine.
According
to this doctrine, 19 supposition
concerns how one verifies that the

predicate is true of the subject in

a

proposition.

The quantification

of the proposition is alleged to
indicate the mode of supposition.
For instance^

B(some A) is true if, and only if,
B(ai) v B(a,) v B(a,) v
where
is the name of an object which is
j
A.
.

.

.

’B(some A)’ is said to "descend to" a
series of disjuncts in virtue

of the quantifier ’some'.
determinate supposition."

which descends to
quantifiers

containing

'a'

a

a

and

This mode of supposition was called

Other modes can be defined for B(any A),

series of conjuncts, and, as Geach shows, for
the
’every’ which descend to a single proposition

list of disjoined and conjoined names respectively.

Because Kant recognizes only two quantifiers, his logic
lacks
the sensitivity and subtle analysis which characterizes
the logic of

the medievals.

We fail to find in Kant the variety of subtle delin-

eation of quantification present in the medieval theory of supposition.
Furthermore, Kant would deny that

a

particular judgment is about

the objects falling within the extension of the subject.

judgment would not "descend to"

a

aU

A particular

list of singular propositions

employing the names of all those things comprising the extension of
the subject, for the particular judgment relates the predicate to only

some of this extension.
Finally, Kant’s theory of quantification cannot be compared
to a theory of reference, in terms of which Geach has understood the

40

medieval theory.
concepts in

a

Kant’s theory concerns only the
’’comparison” of

judgment.

Kant himself never explicitly stated

of this comparison.

a

theory of the nature

We must reconstruct his theory of
quantification

from contexts involving related notions,
most importantly from his

theory of extension.
reconstruction:

It

One formal requirement is placed upon
such

a

must provide for the validity of such
immediate

inferences as subalternation, syllogistic
inferences, and the relations

of Opposition.
When combined in

a

judgment with

a

function of Quality,

quantification places the whole or part of the extension
of the
subject within/without the extension of the predicate.
for

extension’ are

’

Sphare

’

and

’

Umfang

’

.

Kant’s terms

The former may be trans-

lated as ’sphere’ or ’domain’; the latter, literally as ’compass’.
We

m.ay

think of the compass of

area defined by the concept.

diagramming A, E,

I,

a

concept on the analogy of an enclosed

Kant was aware of the Euler method of

0 categoricals,

in which concepts are represented

by circles, and in N 3215 he presents such diagrams:

The problem remains, though, of making Kant’s notion of the

compass of

entirety

a

concept precise.

I

shall quote §

7

of the Logik in its
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par^

Each concept, as a
concept is encompassed in the
representation of things; ar^l^und
of cognition, that
s as a
[notaj, these things are encompassed
under
first respect, each concept has
a
content;
in
I
the second, a compass.
,

m^

•

Content and compass of a concept stand
in inverse relationthe more a concept encompassed under
itself ’ the .less it
encompassed within itself, and conversely
COMMLl^T.
The universality of concepts rests
upon the
concept’s being a ground of cognition rather
than a
partial concept 20
.

This succinct passage is not easy to
understand.

associates two sets of concepts with every concept.

Kant

The first, called

the concept’s content, consists of all those
concepts which make up
and define the given concept itself.

of as the concepts of
set,

a

These concepts may he thought

species - differentia definition.

The second

or compass, of a concept consists of all those
concepts which

have the given concept in common; that is, whose content
contains the
given concept.

Kant speaks of these concepts as being encompassed

under the given concept.
it,

By being contained within the concepts under

the given concept is considered

a

partial concept

;

it is partial

in the sense that it makes up part of the conceptual wholeness of

those concepts in its compass.
The concept Man is

a

partial concept of

a

number of other

conceptual representations, for example, of Caucasian and Negro.

The

concept Man, thus, is encompassed within these concepts as part of
their content.

The concept Man itself, on the other hand, has as

its content the concepts Rational and Animal.

concepts in

\\?hich

tlie

Furthermore, those

concept Man is encompassed

—Caucasian

and Negro

are said to be encompassed under the concept Man, or to fall within
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the compass of the concept Man,
The following diagram illustrates these
relationships:
C

B

In this diagram the balloons represent the compass
of a concept, while

’=df' specifies the content of each concept.
D,

E,

Thus, v^hen concepts

and F encompass a common concept, A, as part of their
content,

they themselves are encompassed under that common concept.

of the previous example, A is
Animal and Rational, and D and

tlic

E

In terras

concept Man, B and C are the concepts
are concepts Caucasian and Negro.

It is easy to see that tliis ordering takes place in accordance

with species and genera:
F,

while itself being

a

Man (A) is

a

genus to the species D,

species to the genus B.

the species of a concept are encompassed under

of that concept’s compass.

E,

and

According to Kant,
a

concept as members

This theory gives rise to a hierarchical

ordering of concepts and their extensions.

Within this ordering, the

encompassing concept (the genus'' is called the higher concept with
respect to those falling witliin its extension, while the encompassed
concepts are lower concepts with respect to the given concept (Logik,

§9).

A concept can be called liigher only with regard to those falling

under it, for it would be absurd to attempt to order hierarcliically
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two concepts which have nothing
in common.
The "Comment” of I^g ik §
,

makes the point that in being

7

ground of cognition, that is, in having
an extension,

universal or general.

a

concept is

a

The representation of many
representations

under one representation constitutes the
generality of

a

concept.

Indeed, according to Kant it is this
very generality that makes some

representations conceptual representations rather
than singular representations or intuitions (l^ p. 904

which are conceptual are common to
It is,

).

21

Thus, all representations

number of other representations.

a

in other words, impossible to have a concept
which is not at

the same time

a

genus to further concepts.

representations determine

a

Therefore, all conceptual

compass.

The important notions in the preceding discussion
can be

summarized through the following definitions and equivalences:
(Def.

font.)

the content of A =df. P(P is encompassed within A),

(Def.

Ext.)

the compass of A =df. f(P is encompassed under A),
B is encompassed under A = A is encompassed within B,

and finally,
B falls

under A = B

e

?(P is encompassed under A).

(To speak of a concept as falling under another is to say that the

former is

a

lower concept with respect to the former, or, conversely,

that the former is

a

lower concept with respect to the latter.

Furthermore, because of Kant's conception of the generality
of concepts,
extension.

it is possible to guarantee that every concept has an

This point,

is explicitly stated

in the student notes.

Each concept encompasses several possible concepts under
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itself

p.

910).

And,

With all concepts we indicate the
compass (Pol., p. 569).^^
Thus, we may state as an axiom of the
Kantian theory of extension that,
|*”(A)(EP)(P is encompassed under A).

Before employing this theory of the extension
of

concept

a

to elucidate the meaning of quantification,
some points of contrast

between the modern theory of extension and the Kantian
should be
noted.

In the modern theory,

the extension of a concept consists of

all those objects of which the concept is true.

apparently piesented
modern theory.

a

Kant on occasion,

theory of extension that corresponds to the

In the student notes one can find such definitions as

An extension is the compass of concepts and concerns the
set of things which are comprised under the concept ('WL
^
p. 911). 24
’

To speak of a set of things is to move toward a modern

conception of extension.

However,

I

believe this move is only apparent

two factor’s of Kant’s general philosophy prohibit it.

First, Kant’s

conception of general logic as dealing with acts of the understanding
restricts the scope of logic to the level of conceptualization.

distinction between the understanding and intuition draws

a

Kant ’s

gap between

concepts and the means by which an object is given in experience such
that

a

general logic can treat only the means of relating one concept

to another rather than the means of relating concepts to objects

themselves.

The investigation of this step in cognition is

of transcendental logic.

Secondly, the notion of Object

(

a

Ding

concern
)

required for its validity transcendental acts of syntliesis involving
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both conceptualization and

a

given manifold of Intuition
from which

an object corresponding to the
concept is synthesized.

are not treated by general logic.

But such acts

Hence, general logic cannot
employ

that concept Object which, to do
so, would be to presuppose
trans-

cendental logic.

Therefore, those passages in Kant
which defines an

extension as a set of things must be read
as meaning that an extension
is a set of conceptual representations
of things.

The importance of this view upon the
structure of quantification
IS that one cannot speak of ontological
commitment with respect to

quantification.

For Kant, the meaning of quantification is
not

explicated in terms of what exists in

a

domain of objects as is com-

monly done in the modern theory of quantification.

The Kantian

understanding of the nature of quantification is neutral
as regards
questions of existence.
The Kantian theory, on the other hand concerns how the

predicate is "compared" with the concepts in the extension of the
subject.

Kant formulated his understanding of quantification as ear]y

as the pre-critical period:
A Judgment is either:
a.
Universal, where the predicate is compared with
all concepts which belong to the extension of the
subject; or
b.
Where it is compared with only some, this is a
particular judgment (Phil., § SOl).^^

Consider the universal judgment that all cats are intelligent.
compare the predicate to all concepts within the extension of

To
tlie

sub-

ject is to say that
All X’s are intelligent, where X can be any concept encompassed
under Cat.
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•All cate are intelligent'
means

'All Siamese cats are
intelligent,

all Persian cats are Intelligent,
etc.'

Particular quantification

can be similarly explained as,
’Some A is B’ means 'Some X's are
encompassed under B'.

B,

where X is a cuncepr
i concept

In particular quantification
the comparison is made with at
least one

concept falling under the subject.
However, these explanations are imprecise.

The required

precision is provided by reconstructing the
Kantian theory of quantification in terms of

a

tl.eory of the truth-conditions for
categorical

judgments employing quantification.

Truth-conditions make explicit

the exact necessary and sufficient conditions
under which
is counted as true.

judgment

a

Kant's interest in the theory of truth of

a

judgment lies in his theories of the copula and of
modality (see

IV. 1).

Perhaps he felt that his formulation of the theory
of quantification
is sufficient to indicate the conditions under
which the presence of

quantification makes

a

categorical true.

The precise explication of

these conditions is, therefore, of crucial importance in
explaining

what is being maintained when one constructs

a

true judgment employing

quantifiers
For convenience in formulating this reconstruction
use

a raeta

-language whose names name sentences expressing

shall

I

tlie

content

of a categorical judgment.

The content of the judgment that all A's

are B's is expressed by

sentence 'All A's are B's'.

tlie

restate the Kantian theory of quantification os

a

I

shall

theory about the

truth-conditions of sentences which express the content of

a

categorical.
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To formulate this theory

I

require the following expression:

Sp
sentence which results from replacing

Spy

occurs in the sentence
p^^

concept) X.

’x’

'X'

wherever it

with the linguistic expression
for

(tile

in this expression is considered
a variable open

to quantification.
By means of (T) we can formulate the
meaning of quantification
in eacli of the categoricals as follows
II. 3.1.

ANALYSIS OF QUANTIFICATION

’All A’s are B’s’ is true =
(x)(x is encompassed under A

3
’All X’s are B’s’

’No A’s are B’s’ is true =
(x)(x is encompassed under A

is true)

is true

’No X’s are B’s'

’Somew XJ
A’s are B’s’
LJ
is
xo true
Ci uc =
(Ex)(x is encompassed under A &
•

\j>

Ct

c
Some
X’s are B’s’

is true)'

’Some A’s are not B’s’ is true =
(Ex)(x is encompassed under A &
'Some X’s are not B’s’

1

is true).

1

Kant’s imprecise notion of comparison can be reconstructed as
a

meta-linguistic theory of the possible kinds of substitutions that

can be made in sentences expression judgments.

What matters in the

analysis is the kind of quantification that occurs with respect to the

possible substituends in the sentence.

In this senssj

universal

quantification is about all the concepts falling under the subject;

particular quantification is about
under this concept.
for Kant,

a

concept (at least one) falling

This reconstruction reveals that quantification,

is concerned with the limits to which substitutions can be
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made with respect to the original,
afflntative or negative judgment
suoli tliat the judgment remains
true.
If all substitutions of the
linguistic expressions of concepts in
the extension of the subject
can be made, the judgment is universal;
if at least one can be made,
the judgment is particular.
The formal adequacy of this analysis
of quantification can he
shov^n by

proving the validity of the given immediate
and syllogistic

inferences.

The following proofs are abbreviated
in the sense that

where similar reasoning applies mutandis rnutandi
to negative judgments,
these proofs are omitted.

In these proofs an insight into the truth

and falsity of judgments with regard to their
Quality is presupposed.
(1)

Subalternation.

If all A’s are

B's—that

is,

if the

linguistic expression for any concept falling under A can
be substituted for

'X'

in

’All X’s are B’s’,

then it is obvious that the

linguistic expiession for
^ concept falling under A can be substituted.
But this is to say that some A’s are B’s.

Hence, from the judgment

that all A’s are B’s we can infer that some A’s are B’s.
(2)

Opposition.

(a) Contrariety;

it is false thac no A’s are B’s,

if all A’s are B’s then

for if the linguistic expression for

any concept falling under A can be substituted for ’X’ in ’All X’s are
B’s’, then these same substitutions would make

’No X’s are B’s’

false.

Hence, from the truth of an A categorical we can infer the falsity

of the corresponding

E.

However,

’All A’s are B’s’ and

’No A’s are

B’s’ may both be false, for there it might occur that a concept

falling under A would make

hotii

’All X’s are B’s’ and

B’s’ hotli false wlien substituted for ’X’.

’No X’s are
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(b) Subcontrariety:

then there is

a

linguistic expression for a concept
falling under A

which when substituted for
sentence false.

if it is false that some A's are
B’s,

’X’

in

’Some X’s are B’s’ makes this

This falsity may occur in either of
two ways:

because there is at least one linguistic
expression for

a

first,

concept

falling under A which cannot be substituted,
or because every

linguistic expression for concepts falling under
A cannot be substituted.

In the first case,

this linguistic expression would make the

sentence ’Some X’s are not B’s’ true when substituted
for ’X’; in
the second,

’No A’s are B’s’

is true from which it follows that some

A s aie not B’s by subalternation.

It is obvious,

moreover, that

both ’Some A’s are B’s’ and ’Some A’s are not B’s’ can be
true at the
same time.
(c) Contradiction (I shall consider only the contradictory

relation between A and 0 categoricals

)

:

if all A’s are B’s then the

linguistic expression for any concept falling under A can be substituted for ’X’, which is to say that it is false that there is

linguistic expression for

substituted for ’X’.
A is not B.

a

a

concept falling under A which cannot be

But this is to say that it is false that some

Similarly,

if it is false that all A’s are B’s then it

follows that there is at least one (and perhaps all) linguistic expressions for concepts falling under A which can be substituted for ’X’.

And this is to say that it is true that some A is not B.

Furthermore,

it is easy to verify that the contradictory relationsliip between A

and 0 con be proven if we begin with the 0 categorical.
(3)

The Syllogism.

A proof of all syllogistic inferences need
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not be given, for it is
known that the inferences
countenanced by the
traditional doctrine of the
syllogism are valid if the
assumption is
made that the extension of the
concepts occurring within tlie
Inference
has members.
This assumption, as we have
seen (Ax. ) is part of the
Kantian theory of extension.

CHAPTER III
SINGULAR QUANTITY, INFINITE QUALITY, AND
"COMPLEX" JUDGMENTS
^ 1

Logic of Singular Quantification
In

but omitted

II. 1,
a

I

introduced

'y'

as a symbol for a singular quantifier,

formal treatment of singular quantification.

I

presented

only the logical grounds for distinguishing
the quantitative compari-

sons of generally quantified and singular judgments
and an informal

statement of the logic of singular quantification with
respect to

universal and particular quantification.
1.

Singular Quantification

connection in

a

singular judgment as one in which "a concept which has

no extension is included as

cate

Kant defines the special

.

(see II. 1).

a

part within the extension of the predi-

A concept is used in a judgment without an extension

when it is not related to any concepts

\^?hich

may fall under it.

use occurs when it refers to just one object, an individual.

This

Judgments

of singular quantification, then, can include those expressed by means

of

a

proper name or those which use

a

general concept to refer to just

one individual instance of that concept.

sentences containing

a

Judgments expressed by

proper name comply with the definition of sin-

gular quantification, for proper names do not encompass an extension
in the Kantian sense but refer to an individual
Tlie

(Ij^,

p.

931).^

second kind of singular judgment is recognized in the
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Wiener Logik
^ concept can be singular.
For what holds
valid of many things can be applied
in an individual
case.
I think to myself a man in
individuo, that is
I use the concept Man in
order to hi^^TT-single entity.
In my judgment I can compare
the thing with all some
^
^
and one individual thing (WL,
p. 908).^

One may employ the (general) concepts
A and B to form the following

judgments:

All A is B, Some A is B, or, An/This
A is

B.

In the last

case, we encompass by our judgment only
an individual instance of A

rather than referring to the compass of A
either in whole or in part
Some recent commentators have noted that for
Kant singular judgments
may take the form of

However,

'Tliis A

and

’a'

’an’

quantifiers. in Kant’s logic.

is B’ or

present

’An A is B’.^
a

formal difficulty as singular

Kant denies (see II. 1) that singular

judgments follow from particular judgments, yet ’An A is B’
legitimately follows from ’Some A is B’.

The point is this:

Kant cannot

consistently maintain that singular judgments are to be treated as
universal in inferences and maintain that
quantifiers.

Universal judgments do not

ments but ’an’ does follow from ’some’.
’’any

one of a class",

’a’

and

follovv?

Since

’an’ are singular

from particular judg’a’

it seems plausible to treat

and

’an’

mean

’An A is B’ as

particular in quantification.
On the other hand,

’this’ can carry

tlie

burden of this formal

requirement of singular quantification, for while following from
universal judgment,
particular.

Indeed,

’This A is B

'

a

does not logically follow from the

in N 3173 Kant gives " Diese Welt ist die beste"

as an example of a singular judgment.
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A logical grammar for judgments
of the form

’This A is B’

parallels the grammar already developed
for quantifiers in

II. 1:

7(A, B).

Although 'this’ IS generally understood
as
than as

a

quantifier,

v;e

a

demonstrative rather

can construe the judgment that this A
is

B as containing the quantitative comparison:

one y.

x is compared with this

This relation is a comparison of singular
quantification, for

no thought of an extension of
y is taken.

Moreover, in this compari-

son, since x is compared with
y in only one instance, y is included
in X only as a part of the whole extension with
which x may be quanti-

tatively compared.
111. 1.1.

Hence, the unity of singular quantification is

UNITY OF SINGULAR QUANTIFICATION
*7 (A,

B) = B is compared with this one A.

Since singular quantification does not involve the tliought of
an extension, the kind of analysis appropriate for generally quantified

judgments (II. 3.1) fails to apply to this form.

Singular judgments

are fundamental in the sense that the predicate is compared with no

further concepts within the extension of the subject.

Thus, an

analysis of singular quantification would have to restrict the possible

substituends for the subject in the sentence which expresses the judgment to just that subject itself.
111. 1.2.

ANALYSIS OF SINGULAR QUANTIFICATION
’This A is B’ is true = (x)(x = A

3

Q

v„,-u

.

^

r,

,

is true)

(This analysis allows for the possible substitution of linguistic

expressions for concepts definitional equivalent to A.

)

The formal

adequacy of this analysis is shown in that III. 1.2 serves to prove
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the difference

ln_

a uantlflcatlon that we observed with regard to

Kant’s three quantifiers in the
relationships of opposition, for

contrariety and subcontrariety cannot
be defined when x = A (see
II. 3).

Finally j the immediate inferences
governing ’y’, stated only
informally in

II. 1,

may now receive their formial statement.

All singulars are contained under the
universal (N 3171 )•

V(A, B)

>7(A, B);

Suhalternation when the singular is taken as

7 (A,

>q(A,

B)

Tl^ Problem of Proper Names

2.

a

universal;

B).

.

However, most of Kant’s

examples of singular judgments employ proper names^
rather than the

demonstrative ’this’.
concepts.

For Kant, proper names express individual

But the formal representation of judgments containing

individual concepts involve

a

problem concerning the relationship

betw’een the singular quantifier and individual concepts.
Ihe problem begins when

inferences that

a

v^e

attempt to account for the immediate

logic of singular judgments should be able to treat.

A singular follows from the universal and implies a particular:

All men are mortal
>Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is wise
>Some men are wise.
Moreover, we must prohibit the inference

Socrates is wise

>A11 men are wise,

while maintaining that ’Socrates is wise’ can be interpreted
as the universal judgment that everytliing which is Socrates
is wise.

The question is,

How does an individual concept function grammatically
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in a judgment?

I

shall argue that Kant falls to provide

a

satisfactory

treatment of singular quantification and
individual concepts which

permits the formalization of these inferences.
Throughout his lectures, Kant speaks of an
individual concept
as a c on c ept^ singularly or singular
concept.

This association, while

being ohvious, is paradoxical, for concepts by
nature possess an

extension (II. 3); that is, they represent that which
is common to many
representations.

But a singular concept cannot be common to many

representations.

Kant

vjas

not unaware of this paradox, for in the

Politz notes we find,
It is an error in logic when one supposes general,
particular,^
and individual concepts, for there are no such things.
However, the use of concepts can be so divided.
Accordingly, we
shall not divide concept but rather judgments in this way,
because they are relations of concepts, for I can compare^a
concept with another entirely, or only in some part, or only
in one individual part.
However, this error is already so
widespread that we cannot avoid it (Pol. p. 567).
,

Technically there is no such thing as an individual concept; rather,
a

concept can be individual only within

fication.

a

The question is, therefore. Can

judgment of singular quantia

logic of singular

quantification account for the logical peculiarities of an individual
concept?

Only if this question is answered affirmatively can Kant

legitimately maintain that there is no need for singular concepts as
independent elements in logic, and that it is an error to consider them
as such.
To reconstruct a theory of individual concepts in terms of

singular quantification let us construe the singular quantifier as
function

\N?liich

a

takes concepts singularly as arguments and yields the
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thought involved in an individual concept.

(This liberty, since

speaking of individual concepts is an
"unavoidable error.")
Singularity, then, as applied to

a

concept is supposed to yield the

thought of one and only one;
(7A)

(1)

the one and only A.

However, treating concepts as individual in this
manner fails, for
the thought of the one and only thing which A does
not necessarily

constitute an individual concept.
lite of the Earth, NS.

Consider the concept Natural Satel-

’(7NS)’ is the concept of the one and only

natural satellite of the Earth, which is the thought of
cept

VN'hich

a

happens to be exemplified by just one object.

general conFor this

reason it is not an individual concept of that object, for an individual
concept is essentially true of one and only one object.
The problem does not lie in the functor of (1), but in its

argument.

In

(I ),

the burden of essentially being true of only one

object must be carried by the concept A itself:

The concept A must

be such that it describes only one object in virtue of its own content.

Quine recognizes this point when, in speaking of singular tenns of the
form ’(9x)Fx’, he says that
’F’

tlie

predicate which stands in

tlie

place of

"very frequently needs supplementary clauses to narrow it down to

the point of being true of only one object."^

Quine’s point makes the fundamental and independent character

of individual concepts clear.

If

’A’

is "narrowed dovv’n" in its content

to the point of being true of only one object, then it already functions
as an individual concept; and thus it becomes superfluous to incorporate

singular quantification on its behalf to make it singular.

If,

on the
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other hand, concepts are not so "narrowed
down", then no amount of

treating general concepts with singular
quantification will provide
an individual concept.

Thus, the "unavoidable error" of
considering

concepts to be singular apart from their
position in

(singular)

a

judgment turns out to be more unavoidable than
it is an error.
To account for singular judgments employing
an individual

concept, these concepts must be introduced as
items of the logic.
this purpose we shall use the small, Roman letters,
etc.
(2)

’a’,

’b’,

For

’c’,

ihe singular judgment would be represented by:

7(a, B

- B is compared with

(this one) a.

The plirase 'this one’ is superfluous, for there is only
one thing

named by ’a’.

Nevertheless, it would be too hasty to conclude that

the singular quantifier itself is superfluous.

Because

concept has no extension, the quantitative comparison

a

singular

betv'^een a

general

concept and an individual concept is just that the individual concept
is compared

a^

part with the general concept.

a

extension of the predicate as

a

part of it.

containing individual concepts still involve
expressed by

in the

Hence, singular judgments
a

quantitative comparison

As we have seen, "part" does not mean the same as

.

particularity in

It is included

a

generally quantified judgment, for subcontrariety

cannot be defined for it.
But,

the problem with (2) is that it fails to reveal the

intimate connection between a judgment employing an individual concept
and singular quantification.

This intimate relation bet^^^een individual

concepts and singular quantification reveals itself in the formal logic

of singular/immediate inferences.
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Singular-immediate inferences become possible
through treating
the individual concept in relation
with the general concepts under

which the name may be said to fall.

For instance, the inference from

'Socrates is wise' to ’Some men are wise’
can be accounted for on the

grounds that by including the individual
concept expressed ’Socrates’
as a part within the compass of the
concept Wise, we include

m

part

the concept Man under which this individual
concept is encompassed.
On similar grounds, any singular judgment
containing an individual

concept falling under

a

given general concept can be inferred from

universal judgment employing that concept as its
subject.

a

Finally,

the inference from 'Socrates is wise' to 'All men
are wise' is pro-

hibited, for the concept Man is not included

iii^

its entiretv within

the compass of Wise in virtue of only the individual
concept of

Socrates's inclusion in this compass.
Ihe point is that the formal logic of singular judgments

employing an individual concept involves more than simply an operation

with quantifying functions themselves.
lar quantification itself in such

a

The logical function of singu-

judgment operates intimately with

the individual concept employed in the judgment.

A judgment employing

an individual concept can be nothing but a singular judgment; whereas
a

judgment employing general concepts can be universal, particular or

singular.

But Kant's treatment of the singular quantifier in the same

manner that quantifiers are treated in generally quantified judgments
obscures this aspect of formal logic of singular judgments.
I

have argued in this section that Kant cannot maintain that

individual concepts can be treated adequately by means of (general)
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concepts and

a

function of singular quantification
within

singular

a

judgment, that individual concepts
are fundamental In logic.

However,

once individual concepts are Introduced,
then to account for the
special, formal logic of singular
judgments one must use more than
a

function which serves to represent singular
judgments employing

general concepts.
3

.

T1i£ Injterre lationship

of Universal and Singular Judgments

.

Although Kant distinguishes beti^een universal
and singular quantification as logical functions of judgments, he
claims that certain
interrelationships exist hetiveen the judgments that they
yield.

This

point is independent of the problems Kant incurs with
respect to

singular-immediate inferences of judgments employing individual
concepts
for these interrelationship depend upon the analysis
of universal and

singular quantification,
In his notes,

II. 3.1 and

III. 1.2.

Kant writes.

The singular judgment can be considered the same as the
universal, and conversely, a universal judgment can be
considered as a singular judgment in respect to its sphere.
Many, considered in itself, is a unity, a one-ness (N 3068 ).’^
The importance of this passage lies in this:

Although singular and

universal quantification are logically distinct forms of quantification,
in certain respects it is possible to characterize the one in terms of

the distinct, independent definition, or analysis, of the other.

What

makes this reciprocal characterization possible is the common element

of exclusiveness involved in the unities of

eacli

judgment.

While

exclusiveness is involved in the analysis of universal and singular
quantification, it differs in the two judgments.

The exclusiveness of
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the universal (II. 3.1) allows no
linguistic expression for a concept

falling under the subject to bo omitted
as a possible substituond in
’All X is B’, while the exclusiveness
of the singular (III. .1.2)

consists in the suhstitutahility of just
the linguistic expression
for the subject itself in the sentence
expressing the judgment.

We can show the adequacy of our analyses of
singular and

universal quantification by mirroring Kant's proposed
inter-

characterization of the two forms in terms of these
analyses.

The

proof that the universal can be considered as singular with
respect
to its (the subject’s) compass should be obvious.

By universal

quantification we mean that the predicate B is compared with any
concept X falling under the subject A.

comparison the totality of what is A.
suggests, A as

a

In this way we take into the

But if we considerj as Kant

unity, then that totality of A is just A itself.

Hence, we may think of the universal judgment as comparing B with A
itself, which is the analysis of singular quantification.

On the other hand, Kant maintains that for the treatment of

singular judgments in syllogistic inferences, the singular judgment
is to be treated as universal to account for valid syllogistic

inferences.

Why must singular judgments be considered as anything

other than singular in an inference?

The answer to this question is

that syllogistic inference concerns the quantitative/qualitative

comparison of three extensions in order to determine the validity of
the inference to the conclusion.
the extension of its subject.

But the singular judgment eliminates

Thus,

in order to corporate singular

judgments into syllogistic inferences,

tlie

singular judgment must be
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treated as if it possessed an
extension.
Kant claims that the singular
judgment can he compared to the
universal in this respect, because in both
judgments the predicate
IS compared with the subject in
such a way that no exception is

permitted or is possible (B96,
&

p.

931).

In the universal the

predicate is compared with the entire extension
of the subject, hence
no exception to this comparison is permitted,
and in the singular the

predicate is compared with just the subject itself,
where an exception
would be impossible.
singular judgment in

We can mirror this characterization of the
terras

of the universal through the reverse steps

of the argument presented above.

Since the linguistic expression for

A is the only permitted substituend for X in 'This X is
B', we can

consider A only with respect to its totality in the singular judgment.
But this totality of A is the compass of A in its entirety.

Thus, in

so far as we consider the singular judgment as possessing an extension,
it seems legitimate to consider it as universal.

I

shall return to

this argument in concluding this section.

Kant's thesis is that when

a

singular judgment appears in

syllogism we count the singular quantifier as

a

universal.

a

If a

valid syllogism results thought this substitution, then the original,

singular inference is also valid.
Quine has asserted that considering singular judgments as
universals if "artificial but not incorrect"

(p.

78).

It is

interesting to note, in defense of Quine’s contention, that the argu-

ment for considering singular judgments to have an extension for
their treatment in

tlie

syllogism could support the opposite conclusion;
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namely, that singular inferences belong
to

because of the special features of

a

a

class by themselves,

singular judgment.

special features originally dictated the
introduction of

Indeed, these
a

distinct

logical function of judgment to express the
logical form of singular
judgments.

The view that singular judgments

singular inferences

deserve special treatment was taken by the
sixteenth-century logician

Peter Ramus.

^

Thus, Kant might have pursued even further
the con-

sequences of the logical distinction between universal
and singular
judgments, which he perceived and formulated, to the
point of

recognizing

a

fundamental difference in the character of singular-

syllogistic inference.

Nevertheless, this further step is not

logically necessary, for the treatment of singulars as universals
is a defensible procedure.

this consideration for

a

However, the question is. How crucia]

is

theory of singular-syllogistic inference?

The procedure turns out to be trivial for those syllogisms

which immediately come to mind; namely, those syllogistic inferences
employing singular judgments as minor premiss and conclusion, as

in.

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
Since proper names cannot appear as the predicate of any judgment,
this kind of inference can occur only in the first and second figures

of the syllogism
1st Figure
M
P
M
S
S

P

2nd Figure
P
M
M
S
S

But now consider the valid moods of tliese figures:

P.
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Figure:
2nd Figure:

AAA, EAE, All, EIO
EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO.

If we consider singular judgments
as universal, that is,
E categoricals,

then the first

valid singular inferences.
ds

I

and 0,

ti^o

as A and

moods of these figures represent

But if we consider singular judgments

that is as particular, then the last

represent valid singular inferences.

ti^o

moods will

Thus, the claim that singular

judgments function as universals serves no purpose,
for one attains
the same results by considering them to be
particular.
No other singular inferences are possible with
regard to

first two figures.
the

tlie

Moreover, singular inferences cannot occur within

Figure,
P

_M
S

M

S_
P,

for the proper name would have to occur once as the predicate no matter

whether it is the major, minor or middle term.
The only place where it is important to consider singulars as

universals is in the

3 rd

Figure,

M
M

P

S

P.

S

Here singular inference can occur only if the middle term is
name, as in the medieval syllogismus expositorious

a

proper

:

Socrates is running.
Socrates is white.
.•.
A white thing is running.
Here the premisses must be considered as universal, for no syllogism
is valid witli two particular premisses.

Previously we have seen that
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’a’
3

Is to be considered particular;
thus, this Inference becomes
AAI,

vsXid mood in ihis figurG,
However, Kant’s logic of singular
quantification is designed

best to reveal the logical form of
the judgment that this A is

B.

If we consider judgments of this
type, an interesting paradox arises.

Kant’s thesis countenances some further
possible singular inferences
in the Third Figure which are,

it turns out,

invalid.

Some cats are intelligent.
This cat is sly.
Some sly things are intelligent.
This cat is intelligent.
Some cats are sly.
Some sly things are intelligent.

These inferences become, respectively,

of this figure.

lAI and All, both valid moods

But consider the first argument.

who is sly but not intelligent.
cats are intelligent.
does not necessarily

a

cat

And it is certainly true that some

But from these
follov^7.

Boots may be

t\^o

premisses the conclusion

Hence, the thesis that singulars can

be treated as universals is acceptable with respect to judgments

expressed by proper names, but these judgments are not adequately
treated as regards their form by Kant’s theory of singular quantification.

On the other hand, this same thesis is unacceptable with

respect to those judgments which are most easily treated by the theory

of singular quantification.
Kant’s argument that singular judgments can be treated as

universals is valid only for singular judgments expressed by proper
names.

Even though

tlie

subject concept of all singular judgments is

considered witliout an extension, and

tlius

tlieir

quantification is
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exclusive, the singular judgment still
refers to an individual.

singular judgments expressed by

a

In

proper name one and only one indi-

vidual is referred to; however, in judgments
of the form ’This A is
K’,
to.

there are many other individuals which
are A than the one referred
Thus, an exclusiveness with regard to
reference occurs in the

former which is absent from the latter.

Moreover the validity of

treating singular judgments as universals depends
upon this referential
exclusiveness, for the comparison of the singular
judgment to the

universal can take place only if there is

a

true exclusiveness with

regard to v.’hether the judgment is about an extension
or an individual.

Kant

s

error lies in his overlooking that exclusiveness in
judgments

is not just a matter of the presence or abscence of an
extension of

conceptual representations (see

II. 1 & *3),

but is also

what is ultimately referred to by the judgment.

a

matter of

In this matter,

judgments of the form ’This A is B’ are best compared to particular
judgments.

To summarize:

Kant provides

a

logically successful account

of the difference in logical form between generally and singularly

quantified judgments only in the sense that he can explicate grounds
for introducing a singular quantifier.

that

a

These grounds for maintaining

different quantitative relation in universal and singular

judgments lie in distinguishing these judgments in the relations of
opposition.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Kant penetrated deep

enough into the differences in logical form between singular judgments,

especially those expressed by means of

a

proper name, and generally
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quantified judgments.

In the first place,

Kant fails to account

adequately for the unique logic of singular
judgments with respect to
generally quantified judgments.
Secondly, Kant’s account of singularsyllogistic inference is paradoxical.

Undoubtedly, Kant’s analyses

of universal and singular quantification
is sufficient to justify

the interrelationships he claims to exist
between these forms of

quantification, but his analyses falls too short for
them to be of
value in his treatment of syllogistic inference.

§ 2

- The Infinite Judgment:
1.

The Unity

^

An Alleged Subtlety in General Logic
Infinite Judgment

.

Kant classifies as

infinite judgments those containing an affirmative copula
and

negative predicate, as ’All souls are non—mortal’.

a

The special

characteristic of this kind of judgment is that negation affects only
the predicate.^
In the Critique Kant characterizes the unity of the infinite

judgment as follows,
These judgments, though infinite in respect to their logical
extension, are, thus, in respect of the content of their
knowledge, limitative only (B98).
This dual characterization of the infinite judgment as infinite in one

respect and limitative in another is, to my knowledge, original with
Kant.

In

classifying judgments as infinite, both Kant and Meier have

in mind judgments which Aristotle referred to as containing ’’inde-

finite terms”, or negative terms.

Boethius was

the term ’infinite’ for these terms, but

mistranslation of Aristotle.

Kant,

tiiis

tlie

first to introduce

was probably as

a

in liis tlieory of the infinite

67

judgment, apparently wants to find
some truth in Boethius' terminology
while keeping close to the Aristotelian
notion of Indefiniteness.
Infinite judgments are "Infinite in
respect to their logical extension", but their limitative character
can be associated with a kind

of indefiniteness.
But Kant’s conception of what counts as an
infinite judgment

raises

(I

—

a

questions.

t\<io

does Kant restrict this classification of
judgment

)

subclass of judgme nts containing negative term s?

nor Meier consider judgments with negative terms and
as infinite judgments.

Neither Kant
a

negative copula

But Meier classified judgments with negative

subjects^ or negative subjects and predicates, as infinite
(Meier,
§

294).

Kant’s restriction of the infinite judgments to those in

which negation affects only the predicate is curious, for his own
logic requires the other t}^pes of judgment recognized by Meier.

The

rule of conversion could lead to judgments with negative subjects:

conversion per accidens of the infinite judgment ’All A is non-B’ is,
for example,

’Some non-B is A

’

.

Indeed, Kant himself gives examples

of such judgments throughout his lectures, but never while discussing
the infinite judg m ent
(II

)

.

Why does the infinite judgment constitute

a^

qualitative

form , that is, a special qualitative relationship beti'^een concepts ?

Since forms in Kant’s general logic concern only the relationship

between the content of the judgment and since negation in the infinite
judgment does not affect this relationship but only the predicate,
Kant claims that in general logic infinite judgments are classified
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as affirmative (B97).

This claim cuts deeper than the
apparently

similar claim about singular quantification,
for while it can be shown
how singular quantification constitutes

a

specific kind of quantitative

comparison, it is difficult to imagine forms
of qualitative comparison

other than affirmation and denial.
the infinite form is to be treated

Kant does not speak merely of how
,

but of how judgments with negative

predicates are to be classified, that
are to be identified in general logic.
a

is,

how their logical constants

Thus, grounds for introducing

special function of infinite quality seem superfluous in
general

logic
The solutions to these problems are not unrelated; an answer
to the second will provide a basis for answering the first.

Wiener Log ik

judgment to

In the

the claim is made that the elevation of the infinite
a

form of judgment is

a

mere subtlety in general logic,

which becomes important only in metaphysics (WL^ p. 930).^^

The

answer to (II) lies in the nature of this subtlety and the reasons for
introducing it.
In

being affirmative, the infinite judgment yields

a

determination of the subject; it conceives the subject as laying

within an extension (see

II. 2).

Yet in virtue of the negative pre-

dicate, we can expect that there is

of this subject.

a

special kind of determination

In his logic notes Kant says,

r In an infinite judgment] the determination of the [subject]
concept is through the limit of the Ipredicate] concept

(N 3066). 12

The determination which is made of the subject in the infinite judgment

merely places

a

limit on what the subject is by saying what it is not.
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To say that A is non-B is to limit
what A is with respect to its

being

Kant calls

B.

a

negative concept of the form non-B a
limitation

or the limit of the concept B.

By placing a limitation upon the subject,
we do two things.
First, we exclude the subject from the
extension of the predicate, B.

Moreover, we make

a

special kind of determination of A by placing
it

within that which is not

B.

In the Wiener Logik,

is given of the infinite judgment

the following account

’The soul is non-^nortal’:

If I say that the soul is non-mortal, then I say
not merely
that the soul contains nothing mortal but that it is
also
contained in the extension of all that which is not mortal.
Hereby sometliing special is maintained, namely, that
I
exclude a concept not merely from the extension of another,
but that I also think the concept under the entire remaining
extension which does not belong under the concept which is
excluded (WL, p. 930).-^'^

The special character of this determination is revealed by
the logic of negative terms.

logic of negative terms is

However, we must recognize that the

part of the theory of the logic of

judgments, for it does not concern the possible connection of concepts.
The logic of negative terms belongs to the logic of concepts.

Thus,

it must be remembered that negative terms may function along with

positive terms in judgments other than what Kant classifies as
"Infinite”.
TTie

symbolic representation of

negative term is, obviously,

~P.

(3)
In

a

II. 2.1,

we defined the sign of negation when applied to two terms

in a judgment.

But in (3) negation takes

fact raises

question of whether there is one common meaning to

tlie

a

single argument.

This
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negation or whether negation is an ambiguous concept
in Kant's logic.
The common meaning lies in the notion of exclusion,
for in each use

of negation the logical function yields

thought of one thing from

a

another.
In denying a quantitative comparison of concepts by
means of

judgmental negation, we exclude the extension of the subject from
that of the predicate.

In

applying negation to

a

single concept,

P,

we exclude all that which is P from the extension of the new concept
~P.

Thus, we may formulate the extension of a negative term as

follows,
(Def.

Nega-Ext)

the compass of ~P =df. Q(It is false that Q is
encompassed under P).

With regard to (Def. Nega-Ext), we must exercise care,
is implicitly maintained by Kant.

a care

which

The failure of a concept to fall

under another could arise if the first is itself encompassed within
the second; namely,

if the concept is part of the definition or con-

tent of the given concept.

This possibility is undesirable.

The

concept Non-man does not include, as part of its extension, the concept
Animal, for men themselves are animals.

The sentence 'All non-men are

less than rational', would othenvise employ (II. 3.1) 'All animals are

less than rational', which in turn implies

rational'.

'All men are less than

Thus, the compass of ~P will not include any concepts which

are already encompassed within P itself.

This restriction is observed

informally by Kant, for in excluding P from all that is, one is not
only excluding the compass of P from the new extension but P itself,
tliat

is,

the content of P.

Thus, membership in the compass of

a
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negative concept must be formulated
as
It is^false that
Q is encompassed v^ithin P r)
Q e S(S is encompassed under ^P) = it is
false that Q is

encompassed under P]

Moreover, Kant contends that the
extension of ~P is infinite.
•

In the logic notes,

Kant writes,

The remainder is infinite, if one takes
away from the infinite
determined part (N 3069). 14

a

And in discussing the infinite judgment
'The soul is non-mortal’ in
the Critique, Kant says.
The infinite sphere of all that is possible
is thereby only
so limited that the mortal is excluded from
it
But ^
even allowing for such an exclusion, this
extension still
remains infinite (B97-98).

....

The cogency of Kant's argument is easily determined:

By "removing"

any number from the infinite series of natural numbers,
the total set

®1111 remains (denumberably ) infinite.

Since the terms of

a

logic are

denuraberably infinite, this same argument applies mutandis
mutandi to

Kant's conception of extension.
This infinite structure of

comparing what is involved in
a

(positive) concept.

a

a

negative term can be expressed by

negative term with what is involved in

A concept has a determinate extension; anything

falling under the concept falls within one of

possible other concepts.

a

determinate list of

This notion can be expressed through

a

finite list of disjoined concepts which are encompassed under the given

concept
P =

(Sp V S2 V...V

On tlie other liand,

Sj^ )

where each

Sj’

is encompassed under P.

the infinite extension of the negative concept

involves an unending or infinite list of disjoined concepts:
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~P

(4)

-

V Qj V...V
Q„ V...

)

where each
Qj is neither
encompassed under nor within

This consideration of negative terms
would dictate that

P.

tlie

proper formulation of the grammar of the
infinite judgment is,

m.2.1.

UNITY OF THE INFINITE JUDGMENT (I)
(is )-0^(A,~B) = A is conceived within the
compass of ~B.

Alternatively, this unity may he expressed by an
equivalence with the

affirmative copula and the meaning of negative
III. 2. 2.

terras

(4),

A FORMULATION OF THE INFINITE JUDGMENT
(is )-(^(A,~B

)

=

(is)~0:^?(A,

(Qp v Qp v...))) where each Qp

is neither encompassed under nor within B.

To say that A is conceived within the compass of ~B is to
place
it within the inf ini lie extension of all that which is not B,

Moreover,

to do this is to allow the concept A to float, metaphorically, as if
it were in an empty space.

One cannot say where in the infinite

extension A does lie, for even excluding A from other concepts falling
under ~B will not serve to delimit the position of A with respect to
the infinitely disjoined concepts in the extension of ~B.
is made in the Wiener Logik

This point

:

[These] judgments are called infinite because they are
unbounded '"un-deliraited]
They say only what is not, and
I can make such predicates innumerably, for the sphere of
the predicate, affected by 'non’, which can be said of a
subject, is infinite (l^, pp. 930-931). ^-5
.

Hence, we see the legitimacy of Kant's dual characterization

of the infinite judgment:

In

placing

a

limit on

a

concept, we place

it in an infinite extension wliich yields an indefinite determinatic>n of
vHiat the

subject is.
2.

The

" Subtlety"

of

tlie

Infinite .Judgment

.

But this tliought
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is something special,

for the relationship bet^veen
the subject and

the positive predicate B is
different from that which exists
between
a

subject and positive predicate in an
ordinary affirmative judgment.

In the infinite judgment the

(affirmative) relation between the sub-

ject and positive predicate is modified
in
the subject within an infinite extension.

subtlety of the infinite judgment as

calling it

a

a

a

special way by including

Here is the heart of the

special form of judgment.

subtlety Kant means that the use of

a

By

special function

to express infinite quality is gratuitous
in the sense that the unity

yielded by the infinite judgment may be accounted
for by mechanisms
already present within the logic.

But,

if we consider the relation-

ship that is yielded bet\v/een the subject and the
given, positive

predicate, we see that the affirmative relationship is modified
in

unique and distinct manner.
fication involves

a

a

According to Kant, this special modi-

limitation, or limitative comparison between the

subject and the given, positive predicate.

This limitative compari-

son constitutes the third form of qualitative comparison in

judgment.

a

We may express the infinite judgment by means of two concepts,
,

A and B, and a special relationship

bet\-v»een

them in which the subject

A is compared in a limitative manner with the predicate B.

qualitative function to represent this limitative comparison
introduce the star,
a

subject consisting of

or the sign of limitation.
a

As the
I

shall

Its grammar with

subject and predicate is the same as that

of the other qualitative functions.
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III. 2.3.

THE SYNTAX OF LIMITATION
(is>v(K(A, B)).

Kant often speaks of the infinite
judgment in terns of

involving

a

comparison

positive predicate, for instance in N
3065:

a

The infinite judgment indicates that
[a subject] is
somewhere outside the sphere of the predicate
in the
infinite sphere; consequently, it represents
the sphere
oI the predicate as limited. io
In Kant’s metaphysics, where tliis
special relationship becomes

important because of the special knowledge of
the subject yielded by
such

a

judgment, Kant defines

contains realit}A'
terms of

a

.

Or,

a

limitation as

to put this definition into the logical

comparison of two concepts,

which contains

a

negation.

"negation which

a

a

limitation is an affirmation

A limitation is an exclusion of one concept

from all that is, thus determining an infinite extension
to which the

subject is affirmatively related.

Hence, the comparison yielded by a

function of limitation can be expressed by the relation x is affirmatively compared with the (infinite) limit of y.

The unity of the

infinite judgment is, therefore,
III. 2.4.

THE UNITY OF THE INFINITE JUDGMENT (II)
(is)*()I(A,

B)) = A is affirmatively compared with the limit of

B.

The subtlety of the function of limitation is revealed through
a

comparison of it with III. 2.1.

III. 2.1 employed the standard quali-

tative comparison which may be expressed by

with

In the case of the infinite judgment,

tive concept.
is

’x

is affirmatively compared

becomes

the

a

nega-

But in the case of III. 2.4 the notion of being negative

absorbed by the function itself and is expressed as

a

syntactical
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part of the relation.
Finally, the special kind of comparison
between

a

subject and

predicate which is expressed in an infinite
judgment, in virtue of
which a function of judgment may be
introduced, provides grounds for
answering question (I), Why does Kant restrict
this classification of
judgment to just those in which the predicate
is negatively expressed?
It IS only in these kinds of judgments
that an interesting or

special kind of quality results.

In the other types of judgments

containing negative terms, no special qualitative
relationship exists

between the given subject and the predicate of the
judgment.
an affirmative judgment with

a

negative subject.

Consider

The unity yielded

by such a judgment is just that of affirmation; namely, the
determi-

nation or location of the subject is within the extension of the
predicate.

Within such

place and that is all:

a

judgment, affirmative determination takes

one does not have

a

special qualitative

relationship of locating the subject under the predicate.

judgment with negative terms is still

yields

a

thought of the exclusion of

a

ti-;o

A negative

negative judgment, for it
extensions from each other.

Again, there is no special way in which the subject is conceived in
such

a

judgment.

Finally,

a

judgment wherein both subject and predi-

cate are negative and the copula is affirmative is an infinite judgment,
but is so only in virtue of the negative predicate.
3.

^ Assessment

of the Infinite Judgment

.

of This Subtlety

the Logical Importance

:

In this section,

I

shall argue that Kant

himself did not fully appreciate the logical differences between the
unity of the affirmative and infinite judgments.

If he had developed
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logic of the qualitative forms
of judgment more completely,
he
might not have referred to the
infinite form as just a mere
subtlety
in general logic, but would
l.ave realized its special
character, and

hence treatment, even in general
logic.

The distinctive character

of this function shows up v^hen we
consider its logic in inferences.
Since limitation as

a

logical function is

a

true species of

affirmative quality and since general logic
does not concern itself

with the negative character of terms in
thought of as
ences.

a

However,

a

syllogism,

’

can be

function of affirmative quality in syllogistic
infera

special logic of limitation can be developed with

regard to immediate inferences.

The special combination of affir-

mation and denial wliich is brought together by the
function of
limitation effects special inferences which are not
reducible to the
immediate inferences covering the other functions of
Quality.
Uufortunatel.y , Kant himself did not develop a logic of

qualitative inference.
of such

a

Therefore, what follows is

a

reconstruction

logic for Kant, based upon the meaning of the functions

involved
The formal relationship of infinite judgment to other judgments

of different Quality has been called obversion in traditional logic.

Obversion is an immediate inference which allows the interchange of

negative and affirmative categorical judgment by dint of operation
with negative terms.

According to what

I

shall call the full theory

of obversion, an equivalent categorical judgment results from

a

given

categorical judgment by changing the quality and making the predicate
negative, while keeping the quantity the same.

’All men are mortal'
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is said to be equivalent to

^No men are nonHT>ortal^ and

men are
mortal’ is said to be equivalent to
'All men are non-mortal'.

Obversion in the full sense

is said to be valid

'No

for all categorical

judgments.
However, there are two traditions concerning
obversion in the

history of logic.

While the standard theory of traditional
logic is

the full theory of obversion, it is well
known that Aristotle pro-

hibited inferences from negative to affirmative,
possibly infinite,
judgments.
to (ii)

For Aristotle,

(i)

'All men are non-mortal’,

'No

men are mortal' is not equivalent

though one could infer (i) from (ii).

Interestingly, neither Meier nor Kant makes explicit
use

of the term ’obversion’ with regard to immediate inferences
of Quality.
Nevertheless, formulations of obversion can be found in these
logics.
Meier, for instance, foimulates

tlie

full theory of obversion:

One can change all negative judgments into affirmative ones,
if one posits the negation from the copula to the predicate^
(Meier, § 294).19

Here Meier explicitly is recognizing the inference denied by Aristotle
from negative judgments to affirmative, infinite judgments.
However, one can reconstruct evidence' which seems to indicate

that Kant would have accepted only the strictly Aristotelian conception

of obversion.

In the Politz notes,

for instance, we find.

Through the infinite judgment one thinks more than through
the negative judgment (Pol., p. 578).^^

Negation serves only to exclude

a

concept from the compass of another,

but an infinite judgment also involves affirmation or the inclusion of
a

concept within

a

compass of

a

(limited) concept.

Inclusion is
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something more than what is thought
in the mere exclusion of

negative judgment.

a

Hence, an infinite judgment cannot
be entailed

by the less complex negative
judgment.

judgment can entail

a

On the other hand, an infinite

negative judgment with the same subject
and

predicate, for in the infinite judgment,
we exclude the subject from
the compass of the predicate.
III. 2.5.

THE LOGIC OF LIMITATION
(is)*(^(A,

B))—>(is)-QI(A,

B)).

The reason why Kant apparently omits obversion
in his general

logic is that the general logic of judgments
concerns only the

relationship between concepts, and obversion arises
through operation

with negative terms

infinite judgment as
that as
a

a

However, had Kant more fully recognized the

.

a

part of general logic, he

function of judgment it was not

a

\-jould

have realized

mere subtlety but required

logic of Quality to relate it to the other forms under this
heading.

While this realization would not have provided

a

full theory of

obversion, its inclusion in general logic is necessary and interesting
in treating the formal relationships, which rest upon qualitative

comparisons, between judgments.

Thus, there is more to the logic of

limitation in general logic itself than its being

a

mere ’’subtlety”.

I

shall return to the importance of obversion in VI. 1.

§

3

- The H}^potlietical and Disjunctive Judgments

Kant’s classification of judgments under Relation is often

criticized for overlooking that hypothetical and disjunctive judgments,

along with copulative judgments (judgments with two subjects and two
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predicates), are species of complex
judgments 21
.

a

It is argued that

correct classification of judgments
under Relation is;
Simple judgments:
Complex judgments:

Categorical judgments
Hypothetical judgments
Disjunctive judgments
Copulative judgments.

(Ihis criticism usually is made to provide
the commentator with

a

reason for maintaining that Kant cannot derive
the three categories

of Relation from the logical forms of judgments
of Relation or that it
IS the Table of Categories that Influences
the Table of Logical

Functions.

)

But the preceding classification of judgments is
spurious for

Kant's purposes in formulating

a

table of logical functions, for the

simple/complex classification is merely grammatical rather than
logical.
Complexity is not

a

logical constant of

grammatical classification of
as constitutive parts.

a

a

judgment, but merely

a

judgment which employs other judgments

There is no specific unity that is yielded in

thinking judgments to he related in

a

complex manner.

On the other

hand, the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments do contain special

logical constants which yield distinct ways of relating judgments in
consciousness.

Moreover, since logic abstracts from the content of

judgment, the so-called copulative judgment (see III. 4) may be classified as categorical.

judgment to be

a

In N 3089,

Kant himself considers the copulative

(grammatically) complex judgment arising througli

copulation.
Thus, Kant is justified in dismissing this simple/complex

division of judgments under Relation as gratuitous in general logic.
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To represent the functions of the hypothetical
and disjunctive

judgments,

I

shall introduce the variables

’a’

formulations of judgments as suhstituends.

and

'

wliich take the

The functions of the two

judgments themselves will be respectively represented by the functions
’

(

0

)

^

and

’

(fU')

’

.

Thus

:

The form of the hypothetical judgment:
The form of the disjunctive judgment:

(0)(a,

b)

(fcPKa,

B,

(0) provides the analysis of judgments involving

so

).

.

.

.

’If... then

)•

’

(

Wenn

.

.

Hence, we may call it the sign of conditionality which

expresses the relation of Consequenz

(

Logik

,

§

25).^^

Similarly

(^j^)

will be called the sign of disjunction that provides the analysis of
judgments involving ’Either... or

’.

Disjunctive judgments may con-

sist of two or more judgments.

There are at least two reasons for guarding against thinking
that these functions have the same meaning as the horseshoe and wedge

of the modern propositional calculus simply because they provide the
analysis of the ostensibly same kinds of judgments or propositions.
First, Kant’s functions are not truth-functional; they do not yield a

unique truth-value given the truth-values of the component judgments.
And, as we shall see, the relationships that the functions express

cannot be expressed by truth-functional concepts.
Secondly, because these are functions involved in the analysis

of judgment, Kant makes no distinction betv;een true hypothetical or
disjunctive judgments and the well-formed use of ’(^)’ and
true hypothetical or disjunctive judgment is identical to

hypothetical judgment or disjunctive judgment, and

a

’(OP)’.

a

A

well -formed

false hypothetical
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or disjunctive judgment is one which is ill-formed.
we can speak of the well-formed use of

In Kantian logic,

and ’(v)’ insofar as they

can yield a hypothetical or disjunctive thought, or unity,
between
the constitutive judgments.

But this unity can occur onl3 when the
^

constitutive judgments can enter into such

a

relation, or, in other

words, only when a true hypothetical and disjunctive judgment can
occur.

If the constitutive judgments fail to form a hypothetical or

disjunctive unity, then the judgment is false, and indeed, cannot be
counted as

a

well-formed hypothetical or disjunctive.

On the other

hand, in modern logic one can distinguish between the well -formed use

of

and ’v’, which may be either true or false depending upon the

truth-values of the constitutive propositions, and the ill-formed use,
for example,
1.

’pq=^% which has no truth-value.

The Hypothetical Judgment

.

In the

Logik

,

we are told that

the hypothetical judgment rests upon the "way of combining" the con-

stituent judgments so that the principles of modus ponens and modus
tollens obtain

(§

26).^'^

as well-formed in yielding

Thus the hypothetical judgment is counted
a

hypothetical relation between judgments

when, and only when, the truth of the consequent follows from the truth

of the antecedent, and only when the falsity of the antecedent follows
from the falsity of the consequent.

Hence, the truth or falsity of

the constituent judgments does not matter in the hypothetical judg-

ment; only the relation between the
importance.

t\<Jo

judgments is of logical

However, this notion of "following from" is vague and

requires explication.
In the unity of the hypotlietical judgment,

a is conceived of

82

as the ground (antecedent), Grand
(P ol.,

p.

578

).

24

for the consequent or Folge,

,

Hence, the unity of the hypothetical
judgment can

be formulated on the model of the unity of the
copula,
III. 3.1.

b

II. 2. 2.

UNITY OF CONDITIONALITY

(®(a,

6

)

= c is the ground

—

3

is the consequent.

Just as copulation posits the relationship of the subject
and predicate
in a judgment,

’(O' posits judgments

in the relationship of ground to

consequent.
In the Vorlesungen uber d ie Metaphy sih V’jhich is a
compilation
,

of Kant

s

notes on metaphysics, much as the Logik is

a

compilation of

the logic notes, we find the following explanation of the notion of

ground
The ground is that wherefrom something follows in an
entirely necessary way; or, the ground is that wherefrom something follows according to a universal rule
(P.

Thus,

30). 25

in the hypothetical judgment,

then the second necessarily follows.

if the first judgment is accepted,

Kant also characterizes this

relation of ground to consequent as one of dependency

(D-IV,

p.

763

),

for the truth of the consequent depends upon the truth of the ground.

Formal evidence, relating to the possible inferences in which
’($)’ can function,

indicates that the unity of the hypothetical

judgment is to be correlated with

a

concept of causal conditionality.

Transitivity, for instance, fails to hold for the notion of causal

consitionality , that is, if ^ causes b and b causes
follow that

a

causes

c.

2^

0^

it does not

There is no evidence that Kant would accept

the validity of transitivity for

'

,

for he makes no mention of
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transitivity in laying out the rules of the
hypothetical syllogism.
Kant mentions only n^dus ponens and modus
tollens as valid hypothetical

syllogisms.

Furthermore, these are the only two inferences
which are

valid for causal conditionality.

Finally, contraposition is invalid

for causal conditionality and Kant does not admit
contraposition for
(see IV. 4 for

’(0)’

tlie

theory of contraposition).

However, there is only

a

formal correspondence or analogy

between the unity of the hypothetical judgment and causal
conditionality and not an identity.
judgments, but

a

Causality is not

a

relation between

relation between temporally successive events.

Thus,

Kant's metaphysical theories concerning the concept of cause can be

only

a

clue to the relationship expressed

bet\^/een

judgments in the

unity yielded by
In the

Vorlesungen / Metaphysik

.

Kant divides grounds into two

kinds depending upon the two ways in which one cognition can, of
necessity, follow from another:

grounds are either logical or real.

Kant says.
The logical ground is that through which something is
posited or denied according to the principle of identity.
The real ground, however, is that through which something
is posited according to the principle of contradiction.
The first is analytic, and the other is synthetic
The logical connection, to he sure, can also be conceived
according to the principle of identity.
I derive the
concept from the other, according to derivation, which
occurs through analysis.
The consequent lies, therefore,
in the ground, and is implicated in and for itself with
it, hut not explicitly.
Consequently, the difference is
not real, but only according to the form. A real ground
is that whose consequent is a real consequent (pp. 31-32).^”^

....

The relationship bet\v'een judgments involving

a

logical ground is

analytic; thus, wo can speak of it as logical entailment.

However, in
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the real groundj the relationship is
far more complex.

Kant’s reference to the principle of
contradiction in this
context is perplexing.

causation represents

a

Its use,

believe, lies in the fact that

necessary order.

and to deny its real consequent
sary.

I

v.;ould

Thus, to posit a real ground

be to deny that which is neces-

The problem here is to explain how necessity
enters into our

conception of causal relations.

The explanation here lies in trans-

cendental logic and especially in the proof of the
principle of

sufficient reason

(

zureichende Grund

).

In the section of the Critique

on the second analogy, Kant argues

But in the perception of an event there is always
that makes this order in which the perceptions
follow upon one another a necessary order (B278).

a

rule

Ihis rule turns out to be nothing other than the principle of sufficient

reason in its empirical application, which is the only application of
the principle which can be subject to a transcendental proof;

This rule, by which we determine something according to
succession of time, is that the condition under which an
event invariably and necessarily follows is to be found
in what precedes the event.
The principle of sufficient
reason is thus the ground of possible experience (B246).
A necessary connection between events becomes- possible in a succession

of time only through the principle of sufficient reason in determining
the consequent moment of time on the basis of the antecedent one.
A judgment which expresses such a causal relationship must be

hypothetical in form, for the antecedent event
ground for the succeeding one.

Thus, to mediately represent

a

causal

judgment, the judgment that tliese events exist must be

connection in

a

joined by

function of conditionality.

tlie

is thought of as the
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In being concerned with whether one judgment
follows from

another, the hypothetical judgment expresses

a

may be either logical or the representation of

real relationship rests upon

a

relationship which
a

real connection.

causal connection which itself is

necessary in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason.

hypothetical judgment expresses
consequent.

Tliis

The

Thus, the

formal relationship of ground to

a

relationship can occur in various ways in

a

judgment.
The

tivo

inferences

Vv'hich

are common to the relationship of

ground to consequent are modus ponens and modus tollens
following,

(MT)

a

(In the

will express propositional negation.

(MP)

(GHa,
2.

.

3),

a

>3

3),

~3

>-a

The Disjunctive Judgment

.

The peculiar characteristic of

disjunctive judgment is that the members of the disjunction have

common subject.

Thus, each member refers to the same extension.

notes the example of

Critique

:

a

a

One

disjunctive judgment which Kant gives in the

”The world exists either through blind chance, or through

inner necessity, or through an external cause- (B99, see N 3093).
Therefore, the disjunctive judgment must be expressed as

a

series of categorical judgments having the same subject:
III. 3. 2.

THE SYNTAX OF THE DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT

(V)^(is)-(V(A, B)),
Tlie

(is)-(V(A, C)),

(is)-(V(A, D))J.

example from the Critique indicates that we may abbreviate the

formulation of the disjunctive judgment by relating the list of predicates to one subject.

This may be done as follows:
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('V')^is)-(V(A,

(B,

C,

D)))]

The role of the affirmative copula in
(III. 3. 2a) is to place the

(entire) extension of A within the
predicates

(B,

C,

D); however,

in

virtue of the sign of disjunction, these
predicates are thought in
a

special way, namely, disjunctively.
Kant expresses the unity of disjunction in the
Critique as.
Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a
relation
of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of the
one
member excludes the sphere of the other and yet at the
same time community, insofar as the propositions taken
together occupy the whole sphere of the knowledge in
“
question (B99).

According to Kant, the judgments making up the disjunctive judgment
are thought of as parts making up

a

whole; each is part of the total

knowledge of the extension of the subject.
a

These judgments constitute

logical division of the subject
(^, p. 933 ).“®

Such

a

division

occurs when the relation between the judgments is one of contradictory

opposition
The disjunctive judgment consists of two or more judgments,
which have the relation of opposition, which must be contradictory; however, together they must diversely be equal
to the concept (Bus., p. 666).^^
By this notion of logical division, then, Kant means that the members

of the disjunctive judgment are mutually exclusive, i.e. no more than
one can be true at the same time, and exhaustive, i.e. nothing more

can be said about the extension of the subject than what is contained
in the disjuncts themselves.

Thus, we may formulate the unity of the disjunctive judgment as
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III. 3. 3.

UNITY OF DISJUNCTION

III. 3. 2a =

B--C— D are posited in
with respect to A.

relation of logical division

a

Closely associated with ’either... or
The propositional calculus expresses

of a disjunction, ~(pvq
'^•~q.

),

or

a

is

’

’neither.

’Neither p nor q’ as

.

.nor

’

negation

a

conjunction of negative conjuncts,

But these propositional connectives are not
available for use

in reconstructing a Kantian theory of
’neither.

.

.nor

’.

Instead, we

must interpret this idiom by means of the logical
functions provided
by Kant:

making
a

What kind of acts of the understanding are involved
in
judgment of the form ’neither.

a

.

.nor

grammatical one of representing ’neither.

'?

.nor

.

The problem is

with the special

’

Kantian logical functions of judgment.
Kant never defines negation with regard to disjunction.
have seen
logic:

tiv-o

We

uses to which negation can be legitimately put in Kant’s

termal negation (III. 2) and judgmental negation (II. 2).

In

both uses, negation means the exclusion of one thing from another
But what can negation mean when applied to the unity of

(III. 2).

disjunction (III. 3. 2)?

Were it to mean that the concepts B,

C,

D are

not a logical division of A, this would neither include any sense of

exclusion nor render the ordinary meaning of judgments expressed with
’neither.

.

.nor

’.

And to say

’(<\/')~’

yields a unity in which A is

excluded from the logical division B, C, D is nonsense, for then A

would be nothing.

A logical division, by definition,

constitutes all

the possibilities for what A may be.

Moreover, the members in

a

’neitlier.

.

.nor

’

judgment do not

r
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constitute

a

complete logical division.

In a negative disjunction,

there is always at least one other
possibility which is the case.
To say that it is neither raining nor
snowing is to leave open the

possibility

tliat

some other weather condition is the case.

Hence,

the members are not mutually exhaustive; negative
disjunction is not

even

proper disjunctive thought for Kant.

a

Thus, in terms of the

theories developed for negation and disjunction in
Kantian logic,
these functions cannot combine to render the sense of
’neither...

nor

How we are to understand this idiom in Kant’s logic must

be gleaned from the context in which it functions for Kant;
namely,
in his theory of the disjunctive syllogism.

Since the disjunctive judgment is defined as representing

logical division, two syllogistic inferences become possible.

a

These

are modus ponendo tollens (MPT) and modus tollendo ponens (MTP):

All members of the disjunction, except one, taken together
constitute the contradictory opposite of that one. A
dichotomy occurs here according to which if one of the two
is true, the other must be false and conversely (Logik, § 77
’
Anm no. 1).30
.

These inferences may be expressed in terms of the judgmental variables
a

and

8

:

(MPT)

('I/')

(MTP)

(V)(c,

Where

’a’

is

’A

is B’ and

(a,

’

3

’

^3

3 ), a

3),

is

~a
’A

>3.

is C’,

to assert that A is included

in one member of its logical division (A is B) is to exclude it from

the otlier; that is, to entail the negative judgment

tliat A

is not C.

Similarly, to say that A is not included in one member of its division
(A is not B

)

is to say that it is included

in the other (A is C).
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Neitlier.

.

.nor

^

enters when the disjunction consists
of

more than two component judgments.
the form
(MPT)

(

MTP take

Logik, § 77):^^

A is B or C or D

—

(MTP)

A is neither C nor D

In the Logik,

no.

In this case MPT and

A is B or C or D
A is neither B nor C
a"

these inferences are called polysyllogistic

2), by which it is meant that these inferen

of syllogistic steps.

MPT may be rendered as

•

-s

tlie

(8

proceed in

77, Anm
a

.

series

derivation of two

conclusions
A is B or C or D
A is B
A is not C
A is not D,

for by including A in one member, we exclude it from each of the
(^*

remaining members, so that two negative judgments follow in the dis-

junctive syllogism.
Thus,

’neither.

judgments

.

A parallel rendering of MTP should be obvious.

.nor

’

can be understood as

set of negative

a

.

(^^PT)

(T/')(a,

3,

y,,..),

TP)

('l/')(a,

3>

Yj***)?

a

>{~3j

~y<>}

~3...}

>y.

A set of judgments is a conjunction of judgments.

Kant does not provide
chapter,

I

a

function of conjunction.

Unfortunately,

To conclude this

wish to say something about the status of conjunction in

Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment.

§ 4

- On Conjunction

Kant probably omits

a

conjunctive classification of judgments

because one does not add any special relationship

bet\\?een t\^o

judgments
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by thinking them in

conjunction.

a

We have seen that, for Kant,

logical functions involved in relating
judgments to one another yield
the thought of some specifiable,
non-truth functional relationship
het;^;een

these judgments.

But no more is thought in relating
judgments

in a conjunction than is thought in
making each judgment separately.

Hence, conjunction fails to characterize
a special act of understanding

Any function which attempts to define conjunction
in Kantian logic is

vacuuous.
However, there are tliree areas in the analysis of
judgment

where Kant himself employs, either implicitly or explicitly,
the notion
of conjunction.

nor

',

The first of these is in the analysis of ’neither...

where its use is not explicitly recognized.

Areas where use

of conjunction is explicit is in the analysis of copulative and (what
Kant calls) exponible judgments.

The question is:

What is the status

of conjunction in each of these cases and how important is its omission
from general logic?

I

shall consider exponible judgments first.

These judgments contain quantitative relations which require
for their explication two judgments of different quantification

affirmative, the other negative (Meier,

§

310).^^

—one

Such quantitative

relations are those expressed by ’alone’ (God alone is immortal),
’few’ or

’only’.^

are learned

Kant provides the follov^;ing analysis of ’Few men

’

(1)
(2)

Some men are learned.
Many men are not learned.

(While this is Kant’s favorite example, as evidenced by his use of it

throughout his lectures, it, curiously, leaves unanalyzed

tlie

notion
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of

iiisny

j

wliicli

itsolf must bo sn Gxponiblo (|U3ntifiGi‘,

UowgvgiTj

thG SUCCGSS or failuro of any particular analysis is not at issue

here.)

Exponible judgments, thus, essentially involve the notion of

the conjunction of judgments.

Indeed, this conjunction is taken up

in a single act of the understanding as in the act of judging that

few men are learned.

Kant apparently holds that the job an analyzing exponible
judgmients belongs only to the empirical study of the grammar of a

language and not to the study of logical form.

This idea appears in

the Logik and Politz notes, for instance, in the Logik the following

argument is given:
Since the nature of exponible propositions depends upon the
conditions of the language, according to which t\-Jo judgments
can be expressed in a short fonii as one, so there belongs in
our language judgment which must be analyzed not in logic
but rather in grammar (§ 31, Anm. ).34
It is purely an accident of German,

or English, that it contains

judgments constructed from comparisons which require
parts for their analysis.

tnvo

separate

The explication of these notions, hence,

must belong to the empirical study of the language v^hich contains them,
and in no way concerns a theory of the logical functions involved in

the making of any judgment.
Thus, the task of analyzing the role of conjunction in making

judgments seems to be assigned to

a

merely grammatical study of

language, rather than being placed within

a

a

theory of the logical

functions underlying judgments expressed in that language.

That judg-

ments may be combined conjunctively, Kant seems to be saying, is

grammatical accident of the expression of judgments in

a

a language.

mere
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Moreover, this same type of reasoning
also may serve to

explain Kant’s failure to provide
judgments.

In N 3088,

a

logical analysis of copulative

Kant presents the following examples of

such judgments:
God and the most liigh should he loved.
God has created and rules all things.

We have seen at the beginning of III.

3

(Two subjects)

predicates).

(Tv;o

that Kant analyzes the logical

form of such judgments by means of the copula.

With the copulative

judgment, we move from judgmental conjunction (conjoining

t^^o

or more

judgments) to the conjunction of terms within the internal
structure
of

a

as

’(A,B)’.

judgment.

A conjunction of concepts A and B can he represented

Hence, copulative judgments can be expressed,
(is )-(J^((A,B

(is)-(^(A,

G))
),
(B,G)))

(Two subjects)
(Two predicates

).

But Kant does not carry the analysis of such judgments further.
This lack of further analysis makes sense if we take judgmental con-

junction to belong to the grammar of language and not to logic, for
copulative judgments are equivalent to categorical judgments thought
conjunctively,
(is)-(K((A,B), G))<

>(is)-((^(A, C)) and (is)-Q^(B, G)).

(There is a further possible reason consistent with the

presuppositions of Kantian logic for this lack.

It is

possible that

such an analysis has no place in general logic, for the conjunction

of subjects and of predicates would pertain only to the content of the

judgment rather than to its logical form.
belong, therefore, to

tlie

Such an analysis would

logic of concepts.

But this procedure would

obscure the important logical difference between the conjunction of
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subjects, on the one hand, and of
predicates, on the other.

The

grammatical conjunction of subjects represents
the disjunction of
their classes rather than their union.

In the

copulative judgment

that apples and oranges are delicious, one
does not place the class

of apple-oranges in the class of what is delicious,
but says that

anything which is an apple or an orange is delicious.

On the other

hand, the grammatical conjunction of two predicates
represents

conjunction or union of two classes.

a

true

Hence, assigning the analysis

of copulative judgments to the logic of concepts would
obscure the
fact that such conjunctions operate differently in
the}^

judgment

a

are in the subject and when they are in the predicate.

Kant employs
’neither.

.

.nor

’,

a

V'^hen

)

notion of conjunction in the analysis of

exponible and copulative judgments, but, in most

likelihood, assigns such an analysis to the level of the grammatical

analysis of the language which expresses the judgment.

However,

I

find Kant’s omission of conjunction from general logic indefensible

when critically analyzed in terms of the demands of

a

general logic.

Consider, first, the need of conjunction in the analysis of
the complex forms of disjunctive syllogisms.

'

Instead of being poly-

syllogistic, these inferences take the set of negative, categorical

judgments making up the second premiss or conclusion as
MPT the conclusion follows as

a

unity.

In

unity from the premisses, and in MTP

the second premiss must be considered as

conclusion.

a

a

unity in arriving at the

Thus, the construction of a complex disjunctive syllogism

requires an act of the understanding to conjoin the negative, cate-

gorical judgments into the

formi

of ’neither.

.

.nor

’,

tliat

is,

into
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a

conjunctive unity.

This act is not an accidental feature
of the

grammatical construction of the language in
which the syllogism is
expressed, but is logically part of the
argument hy expressing the
form of the premiss or conclusion of a
complex disjunctive syllogism.

Furthermore, it seems possible to provide

a

logic for

copulative judgments which involves inferences not
expressible in terms
of to separate judgments in Kant’s logic.
lative judgment

a

For instance, from

a

copu-

truth-functional disjunction of judgments fo],lows.

(is)-0^((A,B), C))

>Either (is)-(f^(A, C)) or (is)-(^(B, C)).

(is)-O^(A,

>Either (is)-(J^(A, B)) or (is)-(J^(A, C)).

(B,C)))

Finally, the need for

a

special logic involving exponihle judgments

can he seen from the following example of a valid argument involving
an exponihle judgment.

Few cats are intelligent.
All cats are sly.
.T Some sly things are not intelligent.
This is an argument in the third figure; to consider it valid its major

premiss must be negative.

While

a

negative judgment is always involved

in the analysis of an exponihle judgment,
is involved

in the judgment.

It

it is only one part of what

must be said that the negative

judgment follows from the given exponihle premiss in virtue of the
judgment’s form.

Thus, conjunction functions as part of the logical

form of an exponihle judgment.

Indeed, conjunction expresses the

exponihle judgment as affirmative, while it actually functions as

a

negative judgment in the syllogism.
Hence, judgments involving conjunction constitute

classification of judgments.

a

special

Conjunction is not mereJ.y an aspect of
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the grammatical structure of language,
but has

a

place in the logical

analysis of judgments as they function
in inferences.

Kant’s failure

to treat the special features of
judgment involving conjunction is a

logical deficiency of his system of general
logic.

CHAPTER

IV

THE LOGIC OF MODALITY

§

1 — The Role of ijogical Modalities in
Judgment

Kant

s

theory of the modal forms of judgments is the
least

understood part of his theory of logical forms
(1.2).

Most commenta-

tors omit vHiat for Kant is the most crucial aspect of
these forms,

namely, their relating the content of

a

judgment to the manner in

which the judger, who makes the judgment, is conscious of this
content.
Judgments differ from sentences and propositions in that the latter
may he logically analyzed without reference to the manner in which

persons are related to them.

But judgments essentially involve

a

judger who stands in some relationship to that which he judges, to the
content of his judgment.

This relationship is specified by

judger judges or maintains this content.

^

the

Thus, the logical analysis

of judgment is incomplete unless an analysis is provided of how the
judger himself is related to the content of his judgment.
It is clearly Kant’s

this analysis.

In the Logik,

intention that the modal forms provide

modality is defined as follows;

According to modality, through whose moments the relation
of the entire judgment to the capacity of cognition is
determined, judgments are problematic, assertoric, and
apodictic (§ 30).
The moments of modality indicate only the kind and manner
of how in judgment something is maintained or denied (§ 30,
Anm , 1).^
.

96

97

And in the Pb'litz notes, it is claimed that
the word ’necessarily’

indicates the kind and manner of how something
is maintained or

denied in
p.

judgment ’All men are necessarily immortal’
(Pol.,

tlie

597).

Thus, the modal forms represent the modes
of judgment, the

manner in which

a

judgment is made.

The relationship bet\7een

emotive.

a

judger and what he judges may be

For example, he may judge rashly or timidly.

Such rela-

tionships may be considered psychological and, hence,
empirically
examinable.

But these types of relationships are unimportant in the

logical analysis of judgment.

structure between

a

To determine the nature of the logical

judger and what is judged we must ask what is

essential to judging itself.

The manner of judging is of formal

interest only when it is essential to the conception of judgment.
Therefore, consider the following definitions of judgment
from Kant’s own lecture notes:

Judgment is the representation of unity of the relationships
of grounds of cognition to the possible cognition of an
object (N 3045).
Judgment is the representation of objective unity (in the
cognition of an object) in the consciousness of various
concepts.
The objective unity (of consciousness) is
universally valid and necessary (N 3052).
Judgment: the representation of the way in \^;hich various
concepts belong objectively (for everyone) in a consciousness; that is, in constituting the cognition of the object
(N 3055 ).

Judgment is

a

representation of unity in concepts producing that

is objective or universally valid

V'^liich

Hence, the

(valid for all judgers).

logical relationship expressed by the modal forms deals with an aspect
of determining

tlie

objectivity, or objective validity, of

a

judgment.
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rather than

v^?lth

the psychological relationship
involved in

a

judgment.
This determination presents

judgment must attempt to solve.
a

Unifying concepts in

a

subjective activity on the part of the judger
himself.

problem:
a

problem which any theory of

a

judgment is
Here is the

How is it possible for the determination
of the content of

judgment, being

a

subjective act of the judger, to be universally

valid, or true, such that any judger can make it?

bution to the solution of this problem

a

To make a contri-

logic of judgments attempts

to disclose the forma involved in constituting the
objectivity of

judgment.

(A

sentential logic, on the other hand, analyzes the forms

of that in which objectivity is expressed but without regard
to how
this objectivity is constituted.)

According to Kant, the objectivity of judgment can be
constituted only through the judgment's conformity to

a

priori princi-

ples which are universally valid for constituting any representation
as objective.

This point is made in

§

19 of the Transcendental

Deduction in the Critique,
I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which
given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity
of apperception.
This is what is intended by the copula
'is'.
It is employed to distinguish the objective unity
of given representations from the subjective.
It indicates
their relation to original apperception and its necessary
unity.
It holds good even if the judgment is itself
empirical, and therefore contingent, as, for example, in
the judgment 'Bodies are heavy'.
I do not here assert
that tliese representations necessaril}^ belong to one
anotlier in the empirical intuition, but that they belong
to one another
virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuition, that is, according
to principles of the objective determination of all representations (B141-142).
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As we noted in II.

the role of the copula is to make
possible the

2,

truth or objectivity of

a

cognition by determining the unification
of

concepts in accordance with principles.

The three principles of

contradiction, sufficient reason, and excluded
middle (II. 2) are
principles which pertain to the general logic
of determining the
truth of

a

unification of concepts.

The modal forms, on the other hand,

relationship

het\^?een

in treating the

the judger and this content which is determined

to be true, express the relationship

to

a

judger bet^^een what he

judges and the foundation, or universal principles,
upon which this
content rests for its truth and objectivity.

Thus, the modal forms

are concerned with how, in the act of judging, the content
is consi -

b£ true by the judger with respect to principles which make

dered

objectivity possible.

The three moments of modality, the problematic,

the assertoric and the apodictic, represent three fundamental ways in

which

a

judgment can be related to universal principles.

A judger may

consider his judgment to be possibly true, actually true or necessarily
true.
It is obvious that

without modality

a

judgment cannot fully

be considered objective (such that any judger can make it), for without modal determination there would be no indication of how another

judger could make the same judgment with regard to its truth.

Thus,

in order to lift his judgment from its inevitable subjectivity and to

consider it objective,

a

judger must take cognizance of its relation-

ship to principles upon which its truth is based and express his

judgment in the appropriate modal fasliion.

Tlie

objectivity of
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judgment, therefore, cannot be expressed
merely by the copula, but

must also include

a

determination of how the judger considers
the

truth of what he judges.

That modality is concerned with this
relationship between the

copula of

a

judgment and the principles upon which the
determination

of truth rests explains the obscure definition
of modality presented
in the Critique

:

The modality of judgment is quite a peculiar function.
Its
distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing
to the content of judgment (for besides quantity,
quality
and relation, tliere is nothing the constitutes the content
of a judgment), but concerns only the value of the
copula
in relation to thought in general (B99-100).

Modality, according to this definition, is not a means of relating

concepts in

a

judgment— this

is the role of tlie forms of Quantity,

Quality and Relation in constituting the content of the judgment—but
represents the relationship between "thought in general" and the copula.
By

'thought in general' Kant means the thought that is essential to

the nature of judgment, thought that is constitutive of objectivity.

Thought in general must be contrasted with the merely psychological or
emotive aspect of judgment.

Undoubtedly, then, the "value of the

copula" is the degree and kind of objectivity (possible, actual or

necessary truth) that the content possesses with respect to thought in
general.

Hence, the value of the copula, which is expressed by modal

forms,

liov'7

is

the copula is considered (by

a

judger) as confoirming

with the general principles of truth.
Finally, since the modal forms pertain to the consideration

of trutli with respcjct to tliought in general, the modal forms determim;
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the degree of cert ainty which the
judger has in the truth of his

cognition.

In

determining how truth is considered
in

a

judgment, the

modal forms yield the subjective validity
of the judgment for

modal forms express the certainty that
of

tlie

a

a

judger;

judger can place in the truth

cognition as it is founded upon principles of
the determination

of truth.

The subjective certainty which a judger
has, then, rests

upon logical structures between the judger
and the content of his

judgment and, to this extent, would be valid for
any other judger.
Thus, by judging in some manner in accordance with
principles of truth

and expressing a judgment in some modal fashion,

a

judger becomes

subjectively certain of the degree of objectivity in his judgment.
Ibis chapter will deal with the logical grammar of the modal
forms, with their syntax and unity; the following chapter will take
up the topic of the certainty.

§

2

- The Syntax of Modal Forms

To formalize the syntax of modal forms we must take as our

fundamental unit of analysis the act of judging as represented by
the relation:

judged that (is)...,

S

which stands between

a

judger

(S

relation is to he represented by
making

a

judgment.

and the copula of his judgment.

)

a

This

function yielding the unity of

The symbolic representation of this relation is,

therefore,
S

which

v^;ill

J

(is)(

)

=

Uj

serve as the general pattern upon which to build

tlie

syntax
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of the modal forms.

would be

J(S,

represents

a

(is)(

’x

holds

)) =

Uj'.

1.3) the appropriate expression

However, the given formulation

mere morphological variation of (F)
and parallels the

natural reading
as

(In terms of (f,

^

(S

judges that

to be true’, or as

The relation ’xJy’ may be read

entertains

’x

^

as true'.

As we have seen, according to Kant, judging
occurs in one of

three possible modes, each representing

a

determinable manner of how

the content of a judgment is considered as true
by the judger.

One

may judge the copula either problematically,
assertorically, or apodictically.

Thus, the relation of judging must occur in

one of these three modifications.

a

judgment in

We can understand the nature of

these modifications as adverbial modifiers of the act of judging.
This grammatical feature may be expressed as:
IV. 2 . 1 .

THE SYNTAX OF MODAL FORMS
The problematic judgment:
The assertoric judgment:
The apodictic judgment:

S

S
S

Probj (is)(
Assj (is)(
Apj (is)(

(According to Kant, the judgments making up

)

)

).

a

complex judgment

are themselves problematical, while the connection betv^een the judg-

ments is judged assertorically (BllO).
may be expressed as follows, where

S

Tlie

full grammar of these forms

is understood as being related to

the component judgments as well as the complex judgment as a whole:

Full form* of the hypothetical: S AsSj ((P)(Probj (is) a
Probj (is) 3)
Full form of the disjunctive: S Assj (<V*)(Probj'^ (is )-(V(A, (B, C, D)))).)
,

The unity that each function yields with regard to

affirmative categorical judgment is

a

universal,
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IV. 2. 2.
S

THE UNITY OF MODALITY

Probj (is)-(V(A, B)) =
Assj (is)-(V(A, B)) =

S

S

problematically judges that B is

affii-med of all A

S assertorically judges that
B is
affirmed of all A
Apj (is)-(V(A, B)) = S apodictically
judges that B is
affirmed of all A.

Similar readings can be obtained for the other
categorical judgments
by substituting 'some’ and 'denied' in an
appropriate manner.
Kant defines these unities in terms of the
traditional modal

concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity.

Immediately fol-

lowing his definition of modality in the Critique, Kant
explains.

Problematic judgments are those in which affirmation or
negation is taken as merely possible (optional).
In the
assertoric judgments, affirmation or negation is viewed as
[actual^ (true), and in apodeidictic judgments as necessary
And from the Logik

,

The problematic [judgment] is accompanied by the consciousness
of mere possibility, the assertoric with the consciousness
of actuality, the apodeictic, finally, with the consciousness
of the necessity of the judgment ( Logik, § 30 ).^

Before going on to study the meaning of possibility, actuality and

necessity as expressed by the modal forms,

I

wish to explore some

consequences of the proposed formal representation of the grammar of
these forms.
We can understand Kant's theory as providing

a

canonical

analysis of judgments employing such modifiers as 'can be', and 'must
be', or of judgments expressed by

sarily'.

grammar

'possibly',

'actually', or 'neces-

Kant's theory draws the important distinction between surface

—the

language in which

a

judgment is expressed

—and

grammar or logical analysis which lays bare the acts of the

the depth
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understanding involved in making the
judgment,

Thus, modal judgments

are analyzed in the following
manner:
IV. 2. 3.

Surface Grammar
S
S
S

judges tliat
judges that
judges tliat

Arthur Lovejoy

—
—
—

Logical Analysis

can (may) he
is

—

—

S
S

—

must be

Probj (is)
Ass. (is)(

SAp/(ls)('

(

)
)

).

argued that Kant has taken over an
earlier

tias

theory of the modal analysis of Judgment
proposed by Lambert and
merely changed the names of the modal forms/'

Judgments can be divided into

tliree

According to Lambert,

modal classification as follows:

Modal form

Example

Possible (Kant: problematic)
Actual (Kant: assertoric)
Necessary (Kant: apodictic)
But to say that Kant merely introduces

A can (or may) be B
A is B
A must be B.
a

new terminology is to miss the

oiiginal contribution which Kant makes to the logical
analysis of these

judgments tlirough the distinction between surface and depth
grammars.
Lambert's analysis reveals no awareness that the modality of
judgment, its expression as possible, actual or necessary, concerns
how

tlie

copula is expressed

^

a

judger

.

Lamljort defines modality

simply as an addition to the copula
One lias still anotlier division of propositions, which originates
from certain very general deteriTiinations, which one adds to
tlie copula.
riiese determinations rest upon tlie differences
of possibility, actuality, and necessity."^

Lambert’s tlieory of modality concerns only
than

tlie

mode in which

to Kant, the verbs

with respect to

ho^^^

tlie

copula itself rather

judgment is made by the judger.

'can bo',
a

tlie

'is',

According

and 'must be' are to be analyzed

judger mak(?s the objective? determination of the
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copula.

Thus, Kant’s new terminology is
far from being ’’both

unnecessary and misleading”, as
Loveooy avers; it is intended to
make
a significant addition to the
logical analysis of judgments.
This

addition is that an operator like

’S

judges that... can be

’

is a

unit of logical analysis wherein the
’can he’ functions as representing
an adverbial modifier of the act of
judging the copula with respect to

thought in general.
In

providing this distinctive kind of analysis of
modal

judgments, Kant brings modal logic under the
purview of

theory of pragmatics.

a

formalized

The modal junctions of judgment occupy the

same grammatical position as pragmatic predicates in
recent formalized

studies in the pragmatics of

a

language.®

Pragmatics is the study of

the relationship beti';een users of a language and expressions
v;ithin

that language.

In its formalized structure pragmatics involves rela-

tions, persons, propositions (perhaps understood as sentences) and

usually times.

R. M. Martin has developed formal systems for the

primitive pragmatic relations of preference and acceptance,
S

Prfr p,

S

Ac p, t, a:

q,

t:

S

S

prefers p to q at (time) t,
accepts p at (time) t to degree

a.

Other concepts in modern logic have been formalized in

manner formally analogous to pragmatic relations.

a

Consider, for

instance, the primitives of epistemic logic (Hintikka):^
K p:

S

S B p;

S

S

knows that p,
believes that p;

or that of assertoric logic (resche!r ) :^^
S

A p:

S

assorts that p.

These logics involve operators

v\/hich,

in their formal representation.
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are characterized as relations beU^een
persons and propositions (or
sentences) which they entertain in
some manner in consciousness.
Reseller defines the goal of a
logic of assertion as the attempt
”to

systematize the theory of the logical
relationship between assertors
and the propositions they assert”
(p. 250).

Thus, there are formal

grounds for considering these logics as
also pragmatic in structure.
(G.

H.

von Wright refers to epistemic and assertion
logics as

modal logics, rather than as pragmatic logics.
terminology upon

a

Von Wright bases his

formal analogy bet^veen traditional modal concepts,

or alethic modalities, and epistemic, deontic
and existential concepts^^

that reveals important insights into common decision
procedures in

these logics.

However, von Wright’s use of the term ’modal logic’

cannot preclude drawing other formal analogies that provide
insights
into similarities and differences in grammatical structure.

clarity in dealing with Kant’s logic,
title

I

For

feel it is best to reserve the

Modal Logic” to the logic of alethic modalities, possibility,

actuality and necessity, and to use the term ’pragmatic logic

’

to

describe those logics employing relationships between persons and the

propositions they entertain.

)

Traditionally, modal logic has developed an unpragmatic analysis
of the operators ’It is possible that’ and ’It is necessary that’.
Lewis’ formalization of these operators by means of ’^’ and

unpragmatic in this sense.

In contrast to Lewis’,

’g’

is

Kant’s position is

that an adequate analysis of alethic modalities as employed in

a

judg-

ment must bring the judger and his relationship to what he judges into
modal logic.

The possibility or necessity of

a

judgment can only be
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constituted with regard to

liow

the cognition relates to the
principles

of thought in general, the principles of
objectivity, for the judger

making the judgment.

Thus, Kant wishes to construct the formal
study

of modal logic as part of

a

pragmatic logic.

These various kinds of logic, and their relationships,
may be

summarized by the following chart.
Quantification
Theory (Existential Modality)
Traditional Modal
Logic (Alethic
Modalities

Kantian
Modal Logic

’’Pragmatic Logics”

von Wright
’’Modal

Logics”

Deontic Logic

However, we must he careful

hov\?

we compare Kantian modal logic with

contemporary formal systems of pragmatic logics.
Only Thomas K. Swing among recent commentators has recognized
that Kant’s modal logic falls into what

I

have called

a

pragmatic logic.

To explain Kant's peculiar usage of modal terms, we will
employ G. H. von Wright's classification of modal functions.
Tlius Kant replaces the traditional modes with his
epistemic modes. Whereas the former have been given the
illegitimate function of characterizing the content of knowledge, lie means to maintain, the latter will be given the
only legitimate modal function of characterizing the modes
of knowledge.
.

.

.
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Kant recognizes three episteraic modes:
the problematic
the assertoric, and the apodeictic
(p. 17 ).
But Swing’s

i dentification

of Kantian modal logic with an

epistemic logic is grossly inadequate and
marred by confusions.

Swing

offers only one sentence to explain the
meaning of the modal forms:
The problematic judgment is one whose truth
is unknown or
undetermined the assertoric judgment is one whose
truth
IS known or verified; and the apodeictic
judgment is one
whose truth is guaranteed by the laws of thought
alone
j

(p.

18).

Ihese definitions omit how each modal form expressed
the copula to principles of objectivity.

In this

a

relationsliip of

respect the modal

forms are concerned with the possibility, actuality and
necessity of
truth, tliat is, with the alethic modalities.

Thus, that truth is

either undetermined, verified or guaranteed (the modes of knowledge)
is only part of what is expressed by the modal forms.

Swing’s concep-

tion of Kant’s modal functions as merely epistemic modalities fails
to incorporate Kant’s proposed theory of the alethic modalities.

For

Kant, the modes of knowledge would be expressed by the modal forms

only in virtue of their expression of the alethic modalities.
Hence, Swing cannot criticize Kant for illegitimately

"converting” an intrapositional function, one which characterizes the
content of knowledge as do the traditional modal operators, into

extrapropositional functions wliich are not "constituents of propositions" (p. 19).

According to Swing, Kant, in replacing modal

operators with epistemic ones, overlooks that he is converting

a

tion of judgment wliich characterizes the content of judgment into

function which does not pertain as

sucli to

funca

the content of judgment.
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However, Kant is not replacing modal
concepts with epistemic ones,

but is proposing to analyze possibility,
actuality and necessity in

judgments in
to assess.

a

new and incisive manner, which Swing
takes no pains

Moreover, in arguing that Kant’s modal
operators are not

constituents of propositions. Swing is using the
notion of

a

propo-

sition in a totally un-Kantian sense (see IV.
3).
The lelationship between Kantian modal logic and
contemporary

logic IS this:

While Kant’s modal functions are grammatically

analogous to pragmatic predicates, Kant’s conception of what
constitutes

a

modal logic differs significantly from the modern conception.

A formal system includes a predicate or set of predicates taken
as

primitive,

a

primitives.

set of definitions and axioms developed from these

Such a logic may be called an external logic, for this

kind of logic presents only the formal properties of

a

function, which

is taken as primitive, with respect to its operation in inferences.

Kant’s system of modal logic in this regard is exhausted by the theory
of immediate inference and syllogistic inference (see

IV. 4).

On the other hand, Kant develops what can be called an internal

logic for the modal functions,
in making

a

for his logic concerns what is thought

problematic, assertoric or apodictic judgment.

In this

way, Kantian modal logic is concerned with the contribution that the

modal forms to the possibility of

tlie

objectivity of the judgment.

This internal logic can be expressed by means of the unity which is

yielded by each modal function.

Thus, to formulate Kant’s modal logic

we must define those unities upon which the possibility, actuality and

necessity of

a

cognition depends.

no
Nevertheless, we shall see in the following
section that we
can provide

§

3

a

set of formal axioms for Kant's three
modal functions.

- Tlie Unities of the Modal
Forms
In biinging modal logic under the
purview of a pragmatic

logic, Kant precludes any attempt to define,
without violence, his

modal functions by means of
define

pragmatic concept by

a

S

(where

or ’q’

’p'

a

It is simply wrong-headed to

semantical one, as in

Apj (is)(

=df.

)

is the content represented by

Dp,
’(is)(

)').

This im.possi-

bility might suggest the following means of relating the
two systems
of modal logic
S

S
S

:

Probj (is)(
Assj (is)(
Apj (is)(

)
)
)

=:df.

S

judges that^p

=df. S judges that p
=df. S judges that Dp.

But how are we to construe the grammatical role of the alethic modal

operators in each definiens?
and

If

such that

’S

’q’

attach themselves to the propositional variables

judges that...' is a distinct syntactical part of each

definiens, then the relationship of judgment is similar in all these
cases.

Recall that with regard to quantifiers (II. 1), the relationship

'is compared v%’ith' would have been empty unless its meanings could be

distinguished according to the relations 'is compared with all' or
'is

compared with some'.

Thus,

if

'S

judges that...' is the same in

all these cases, then problematic, assertoric, or apodictic judgment

would not define any modification of the act of judging.
if,

on the other liand, the modal operators are viewed as

Ill

syntactical parts of the relation itself,
as, for example, in

'S

judges thatO...', then the meaning
of judging would be completely
determined by the semantical concepts
of possibility, truth (actuality),
and necessity.
But this conception of the modal
forms is un-Kantlan.
The semantical determination of the
truth of a judgment pertains to

just the content of

tlie

judgment.

However, modal forms pertain to

how that which is possibly, actually, or
necessarily true is considered
to be true by a judger.

Thus, Kant’s modal functions cannot
be defined

simply as judging that which is possibly,
actually, or necessarily
true with respect to the semantical determination
of the content of
a

judgment.
To define Kant’s modal functions we must evolve

a

new and

oiiginal conception of how the modal concepts of possihilityj
actualityj
and necessity are involved in judgment.

These concepts m.ust be defined

in terms of what is possible, actual, or necessar^^ for
a judger to judge

with respect to thought in general.

A problematic judgment expresses

the unity that the cognition is possible for

with respect to

.laws

a

judger to entertain

of objectivity; the assertoric, that the cognition

is actual with respect to these laws; and the apodictic, that the

objectivity of the cognition is guaranteed by these very laws themselves.
1.

Th£ Problematic Judgment

.

In the

Critique

,

Kant defines

the unity of the problematic judgment as follows:

The problematic proposition is therefore that which expresses
only logical (whicli is not objective) possibility a free
choice of admitting such a proposition, and a purely optional
admission of it into the understanding (BlOl).

—
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This definition combines the

Judging:

t;.;o

central aspects of problematical

(1) problematical Judging expresses formal or
logical

possibility and (2) it represents an
"arbitrary” or "optional" taking
up of a cognition into the understanding.

cannot be understood psychologically or
as
the case.

This arbitrary taking up
a

mere guess as to what is

The optional character of the cognition
must be understood

with respect to that which is objective or
empirically possible.
Kant’s First Postulate of Empirical Thought in
General is:
That which agrees with the formal conditions
of experience
that is, with the conditions of intuition and of
concepts ’
is possible (B265 ).
Here Kant is speaking of objective possibility as that
which agrees

with the formal conditions of intuition and of concepts in
that it
can be given in experience.

contains

a

The concept of the objectively possible

synthesis which belongs to possible experience.

Flowever,

it is Kant’s point in this discussion that mere

logical possibility in the concept of

a

thing is not sufficient to

determine the objective reality of the concept (B268-269).

Thus, many

conceptions are logically possible, but their mere logical possibility
does not guarantee their representation of

experience.

It is

a

possible synthesis of

precisely in this sense that one expresses an

arbitrary taking up of

a

cognition in

a

problematic Judgment:

the

cognition is arbitrary with respect to what is objectively possible.
Thus,

in problematical Judging,

the Judger has

a

free choice because

he is not concerned with the objective possibility of what he Judges.

This logical possibility of the cognition, while being

arbitrary witli respect to what constitutes objectivity, must conform
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to

rule in virtue of which it is logically
possible.

a

This rule is

the principle of non-contradiction
(see II.2):
A judgment is logically possible
if, and only if
it
’

contains nothing v^hich is self-contradictory.

In N 3099,

Kant himself v;rites,

Problematic judgments are those whose material
is given
with the possible relationship bet\N?een the
predicate
and subject.
Thus,

in problematical judging, the judger
considers his cognition as

l ogically possible,

an act which represents a free admission
of the

cognition into the understanding regardless of what
may be objectively
possible.
The unity of the problematic judgment is defined
in terms of

logical possibility in the following manner:
S

In

Probj (is)(

)

= S entertains (is)(
(only) logically
) as
possible ; i.e., (is)(
) is thought of only
in terms of its not containing a contradiction
in the relationship of subject and predicate.

judging problematically, the judger

ness the cognition in such

a

is

entertaining in his conscious

way that any other judger may make this

same judgment, but only as that which can be entertained as possible.
Hence, the contribution that the function of problematic judging makes

to the objectivity of the judgment is the minimum requirement that any

judger be able to accept the judgment into the understanding.
Although Kantian modal logic is concerned with defining the
unity of modal forms as elements in the constitution of the objecti-

vity of judgment, it is by no means an uninteresting endeavor to

provide
’p'

a

system of formal axioms for the modal forms.

stands for the unity ’(is)(

)';

In

what follows

this move facilitates the
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statement of the axiom as well as provides
an easy means to express
negation.

(Axioms prefaced by

modal functions.

’

are true for any of the three

)

First, since problematical judging rests
upon a principle of

logical possibility which excludes anything
self -contradictory cogni,
tion problematically judged possesses

a

content which is logically

possible.
Probj p

S

>

()

p.

From this it follows that

~^p

> ~S Prohj p,

or that problematical judging must conform to that which is
logically

possible.

In general,

p<

> ^ S Probj p

Moreover, since problematical judging represents an act which
can be made by any judger, we have
*

(Objectivity)

S

Probj p

>(x)^(x Probj

p).

Furthermore, every judger must make at least one problematic judgment:
(S)(Ep)(S Probj p);
and every judgment that

a

judger makes must be (at least) problemati-

cally judged:
(p)(S judges that p

Finally, it is possible

V'/ith

>S Probj p).

regard to any proposition for

a

judger to judge it or its contradictory as possible; hence,

^

(

S

Probj p V S Probj ~p

)

but, since a problematical judgment must be consistent,

judge

a

a

cognition and its contradictory at the same time.

judger cannot
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*

(Consistency)
2.

llie

Probj

Assertoric

(p

& ~p).

Judgn^.

This form of judgment expresses

what IS formally involved in making
an assertion.
taken in

a

Assertion can be

sense in which it is possible to assert
either what is

true (a true assertion) or what is false

(a

false assertion).

In

general, contemporary logics of assertion
treat assertion independently

of the actual truth or falsity of what is
asserted.

Kant's treatment

of assertion must be constrasted with this
conception of
assertion.

a

logic of

Owing to Kant's concern in his modal logic with
the inter-

nal logic of assertion and with what is required
to constitute the

objectivity or universal validity of

a

judgment, the logic of assertion,

for Kant, is a theory of what is formally necessary
in any act of true

asseiting.

Kant's sense of assertion, then, is

can be said that

a

sense in which it

a

judger asserts what indeed is the case.

In the "Canon",

Kant says,

I cannot assert anything, that is, declare it to
be a judgment
necessarily valid for everyone, save as it gives rise to
conviction.
Persuasion I can hold to on my own account, if
it so pleases me, but I cannot, and ought not, to profess
to impose it as binding on anyone but myself (B849-B850).

What is asserted is universally valid for everyone else to assert as
well (see the Axiom of Objectivity).

The possibility of the objectivity

of an assertion arises through its compliance in
the laws of thought in general.

a

specific manner with

For Kant, the determination of the

specific relation that guarantees the objectivity of making an assertion is the subject matter of

a

modal logic of assertion.

According to Kant, the assertoric judgment indicates that the

affirmation or denial of the cognition is posited in conformity with
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the laws of the understanding.

This principle emerges from BlOl
of

the C r itic
though Kemp-Smith mistranslates the
] ^^
appropriate passage
so as to obscure the priraciple of
assertoric judging.

I

shall trans-

late the passage correctly.
Ihe assertoric proposition deals with
logical actuality or
truth— for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the
antecedent is problematic in the major premiss,
assertoric in
the minor— and what the assertoric proposition
shows is
that it Itself is already bound up with the
laws of the

understanding (BlOl).-^^

Theie are two distinguishable principles of actuality
in Kant.
The principle which comes immediately to mind is
the Second Postulate

concerning the positing of the existence of things:
That which is bound up with the material conditions of
experience, that is, with sensation, is actual (B266).
In his

discussion of this postulate, Kant argues that the existence

of an object can be known only through its connection with some actual

perception in accordance with the analogies of experience "which
define all real connection in an experience in general" (B272).

Kant's

point is that positing an object as existing must proceed in accordance

with the principles of empirical reasoning.
The second form of positing is logical rather than material
and is expressed by the function of the assertoric judgment.

We may

rephrase the Second Postulate to correspond to the principle given
in BlOl:

That which is bound up with the formal conditions of the
understanding is logically actual.
Tlius,

the unity of the assertoric judgment is defined in terms of

logical actuality.
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^

~

(is)(
) as logically actual,
’
i.e., or being in accordance
with forint
laws of understanding and reason.

To be in accordance with formal
laws is to fulfil that which
IS formally demanded by the
understanding or reason for a cognition
to

be actual, and hence valid for any
other judger to assert.

If the

cognition is empirical then it must be
bound up with logical laws
concerning the empirical employment of the
understanding.
cular,

In

parti-

it must be in accordance with already
accepted cognition as

their ground and consequent.

Asserting, thus, is

a

procedure which in

its formal aspects involves the entertaining
of truth in virtue of its

conformity to the formal requirements of understanding.

Such

a

judg-

ment would be valid for everyone to assert.
By means of assertoric judgment, we leave the
realm of merely

relating concepts to that of making proposition (Satz), or
the

positing of the cognition.

judgment is the relationship of one

representation to another; all that is said is that the validity of
one concept depends upon the validity of the other.

However, since

a

judgment as such is concerned only with the relationship of these
representations, nothing is said concerning the actual validity of
the second representation.

Thus, judgment as such can be only

problematic
But through assertion, and the objectivity that is thereby

accomplished through conformity to the laws of understanding, we posit
the cognition as objectively valid, and hence move from the conception

of

a

mere possible object to the conception of that which is actual.
Tlius,

conformity to

tlie

laws of

tlie

understanding makes
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objective reference possible.

judgment can be understood as

Kant's theory of the assertorio
a

theory of how objective reference

becomes possible, and of how this
reference can be formally represented
in logic.

Thus, the formal theory of the
assertoric form of judgment

IS the study of the meclianisms
of reference insofar as a general
or

purely formal logic may consider them.

In the Vorlesungen Metapliyslk.
/

Kant characterizes the assertoric
judgment as involving the thought

of existential import:
In the assertoric judgment I add
a predicate to the object
outside of me, and not in thought
(p. 39 ). 15

What is said to distinguish the problematic
judgment from the
assertoric is that in the problematic judgment

I

conceive of the predi-

cate belonging to the object merely in thought
(logical possibility),

while in the assertoric the predicate is conceived
to belong to an
object "outside of me" (actuality).
An assertoric judgment must be also problematic.

axiom characterizing Kant’s conception of assertion
S

Assj p

Thus, an

is

>S Probj p.

Unlike problematic judgment, though, assertoric judgment is not possible

with regard to any (logically possible) content.

Not everything capable

of being judged can be asserted or declared to be

a

valid for everyone.

Hence,

~(p)

S

Ass
J

Reseller,

judgment necessarily

p.

in his system of assertion logic,

A2

(PP-

251-252),

includes two axioms wliich he calls the Axiom of Commitment and

Lincoln’s Axiom:
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Commitment
Lincoln’s Axiom

Pf~q, then S asserts
>(ES)~S asserts p.

~p

p^S

asserts

q.

The Axiom of Commitment specifies
that any assertor asserts all
logical

consequences of his assertions.
of assertion as

Commitment defines Reseller’s notion

^licit ration^

assertion

one asserts all logical

:

consequences of what he asserts even if these
consequences are not

consciously entertained.
axiom for

>

I

do not believe Kant would accept this

tor him, assertion is the conscious .judging
with

respect to laws of the understanding.

Lincoln’s Axiom, on the other

hand, states that every falsehood is avoided
by at least one assertor.

This axiom may be strengthened to include
~p

a

universal quantifier:

>(S)~S Assj p,

whicli says that if
p is false,

then no judger asserts it to be true.

From this axiom, it follows that
(ES)(S Assj p)

>p.

This axiom states that if one judger asserts

judgment is true.

a

proposition, that

This point corresponds to Kant’s contention that an

assertion carries existential import and is necessarily valid for
everyone to assert.

It is an

interesting question whether these axioms

can be strengthened further to include modal notions as follows
~p

>(S)~^ Assj

p,

(no judger can assert what is false), and

(ES)^(S Assj p)
3.

The Apodictic Judgment

.

>p.

The apodictic judgment is one in

which the judger conceives of the affirmation or denial as necessary.
Again, in BlOl of the Critique, Kant puts forth

tlie

principle of the
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apodictic judgment:
The apodeictic proposition thinks
the assertoric as
eterained by the laws of the understanding,
and therefore
as a firming a priori and in this
;
manner it expresses
logical necessity.

The apodictic judgment is defined in
terms of its relationship to the

assertoric:

the apodictic judgment takes up the
objectivity of the

cognition provided by the assertoric judgment
and maintains this objectivity on the basis of

describes such

a

standing itself.

a p_riori laws alone.

Kant often metaphorically

cognition as ’’inseparably” united with the underThus,

in an apodictic judgment,

objectivity or

universal validity follows directly from the universal laws
of the

understanding itself, and hence, expresses the logical necessity
of
the cognition.

Again, we may compare the thought of logical necessity in the

apodictic judgment with empirical or material necessity expressed in
the Third Postulate of Empirical Thought:

That which in its connection with the actual is determined
in accordance with universal conditions of experience is
(that is, exists as) necessary (B266).
In the same manner,

that which is determined by the universal logical

laws of understanding is apodictic.

reveals

a

Nevertheless, empirical necessity

marked distinction from logical necessity.

The former can

be only ’’comparatively a priori, relative to some other previous given

existence” (B279), in accordance with the empirical laws of causality.
Logical necessity occurs in connection of given concepts determined
merely by the logical laws of the understanding.

Such laws include

not only the laws of formal logic (for example, the principle of

tlie
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excluded middle In virtue of which
the formal necessity of the
copula
is determined) but also the
laws of transcendental logic.
Ibus, the unit 3 of the apodictic
judgment is
^

s

Apj (is)(

)

= s entertains (is)(
logically necessary.
) as
i.e., as constituted from the
a priori laws of

the understanding.

Kant’s conception of the apodictic
judgment allows empirical

propositions to be apodictically judged, if
they can be constituted on
the basis of the laws of

tlie

being wholly constituted

a

understanding.

priori, contain an

Scientific laws, while not
a

priori element in their

conception in that they can be known or verified
on the basis of the
laws of the understanding alone.
a

law in V.2.

I

shall provide an example of such

Hence, the objectivity constituted through
apodictic

judging is known to be universally valid through the
logical laws of
the understanding.

Since the apodictic judgment takes up the assertoric, all

apodictic judgments are also assertoric.

p—>S

S

Apj

S

Apj p

Assj p.

Moreover,
>~S Ass^ ~p.

To develop a system of axioms for ’Apj’ further, we note that

because of the inseparableness of the apodictic judgment from the understanding, it is impossible to judge

apodictic.

tlie

opposite of that wliich is

On this basis, we can introduce the following axioms:

p<
~p<
We can relate ’Apj

’

>

Apj ~p,

> ~^S Apj

p.

to the modern notion of necessity through the
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following axiom:

Up

Apj p

However, the entailment cannot proceed
from right to left because it
IS possible for S to apodictically
judge a scientific law,
p,

which It IS false that Dp.
is

for

Thus, Kant's notion of apodictically
judging

broader than the logical notion ofQ.

Negative Modalities and Contraposition

§ 4

This final section will deal with the problem of
expressing

judgments of the negative categorical modalities— impossibility
non,
actuality, and contingency—within the grammar of Kant’s
modal logic
and with the rule of immediate inference belonging to the
modal forms,

which Kant alleges to be contraposition.
f•

Judgments of Negative Modality

.

In the Table of Categories

in the Critique, Kant associates a dual listing of modal categories

with each modal form of judgment:

—

With the problematic judgment:
Possibility Impossibility
With the assertoric judgment: Existence Non-existence
With the apodictic judgment: Necessity Contingency.

—
—

T.

K.

Swing claims that this dual listing is procedurally incorrect.

Kant derives possibility and impossibil ity from the
problematic judgment, existence a~n^ n^onexistence from the
assertoric judgment, and necessity and contingency from
apodeictic judgment.
Here, however, has derived too many
categories because he obtains six from three forms of
judgment.
Moreover, he has no right to derive impossibility
from the problematic judgment, nonexistence from the assertoric judgment, and contingency from the apodeictic judgment.
The correct thing to do is rather to derive possibility
existen ce, and necessity and then to add the other three
categories as their upposities.
In spite of this procedural
flaw, Kant’s derivation of the modal categories is tlie least
questionable operation in tlie Metaphysical Deduction (p. 27).
,

,
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However, Swing fails to explain what
the problem is.

In this section,

shall develop what is misleading about
this dual derivation and how
modal categories relate to the modal
functions of judgment.
I

We have seen that when these functions
of judgment go with the

affirmative copula, the resulting unity
expresses the logical possibility, actuality, or necessity of
judgment.

Likewise,

it may be

thought that since the modal forms also
go with the negative copula,
the negative modalities are to be correlated
with problematically,

assertorically, or apodictically judging the
negative copula.
view would provide

a

clear justification for the dual listing.

This
However,

this view of the relationship betiveen negative
modalities and the modal

foims is incoherent.
Ihe following table would define the unity of the
modal

judgments with negative copulas:
Probj (is)~... = S entertains
p as impossible
Assj (is)~. .. = S entertains
p as non-actual
Apj (is)~... = S entertains p as contingent.

S

S
S

The problem is to specify

’p

’

in each case.

Consider the following

formulations of this table with respect to negative categorical judgments
S

S

^

:

Probj

(is)~(V(A, B)) =

S entertains that B is not possibly
affirmed of all A
AsSj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains that B is not actuality
affirmed of all A
=
(is)~(V(A,
B))
S
entertains that B is not necessarily
^Pj
affirmed of all A.

This table follows the suggested interpretation, for entertaining that
B is not

possibly affirmed of all A is equivalent to entertaining that

all A is B is impossible, and similarly for the other modal judgments.
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(Entertaining that B is not necessarily
affirmed of all A
does not yield the full equivalent
of entertaining that all A is R
IS contingent,

if we think of contingency as

’-Qp

&

~D~p’.

However,

for the purposes of stating Kantian
logic, it is sufficient for con-

tingency to mean

'<^~p

’

,

or equivalently

’~Dp’.

In the Vorles ungen /

I^taphysik, Kant defines contingency as that
of which the opposite
IS possible
’S

(p.

45

qj;.

),

that wliich is not necessary.)

Probj (is)~(V(A, B))’ is alleged to be the
logical rendering

of S's judging that all A is B is impossible.

By elementary modal

logic, this judgment is equivalent to S's judging
that Some A is not
B is necessary.
S

This second judgment would have to be rendered as

Apj (is)~(q(A, B)), which, on the suggested table, would
be the

judgment that Some A is B is contingent.

But it is obvious tliat Some

A is not B is necessary is not equivalent to Some A is B is
contingent.

Thus,

if

'S

Probj (is)~(V(A, B))' is taken as the rendering of All A

is B is impossible,
'S

a

coherent rendering cannot be given to

Apj (is)^-(q(A, B))’.
I

take the following table to be the correct version of the

unities yielded by modal forms and the negative copula:
IV. 4.1.
S
S
S

MODALITY AND NEGATIVE COPULATION (I)

Probj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains no A is B as possible
Assj (is)~fV(A, B)) = S entertains no A is B as actual
Apj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains no A is B as necessary.

This table reveals that in bringing

a

modal form into play with

a

negative copula, one entertains the negative cognition problematically.

assertorically
mative copula.

,

or apodictically

Vv;hen

he judges by means of an affir-
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But to hold a negative judgment as
possible is to hold its
contradiction, an affirmative judgment, as
contingent.
is no reason to associate the

Thus, there

modal forms with negative copulas with

the listing of the modal categories in the
Critique, for IV. 4.1 yields

the following table relating modal forms,
negative copulation, and

negative categorial modalities.
IV. 4. 2.
S
S

S

where

MODALITY AND NEGATIVE COPULATION (II)

Probj (is)~... = S entertains
p to be contingent
Assj (is)~... = S entertains
p to be non-actual
Apj (is)~. .. = S entertains
to be impossible,
p

'p

'

is the contradictory, affirmative form of the
cognition

represented by ’(is)~...’.

Kant himself justifies this reading in the

Vorlesungen/Metaphysik when he maintains that

a

necessary apodicticity represents impossibility
also that

a

negative judgment of
(p.

22).^”^

We may say

negative judgment held problematically represents contin-

gency.

These tables provide the appropriate logical coherency we
found lacking in the originally suggested view.

This coherency is

proven in the following tables in which each of the A, E,

I,

0 cate-

goricals is stated with either the problematic or apodictic form and
two translations are given.
in IV. 4.1;

The first is in terms of the unity yielded

the second, in terms of IV. 4.

2.

These two translations are

equivalent to one another by elementary modal logic.

In the second

column, the procedure is undertaken with regard to the modal forms and
the affirmative copula.
’

S

enterta ins

.
.

.

Each translation is to begin with the phrase
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MODAL OPPOSITION

IV. 4. 3.

.

.

.

.

.

.

S Probj (is)~(\y(A, B))
no A is B as possible
some A is B as contingent

S Probj (is)-(V(A, B))
9ll A is B as possible
some A is not B as contingent

Probj (is )~(q(A, B))
some A is not B as possible
all A is B as contingent
S

.

. .

.

..

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

..

Probj (is)-(q(A, B))
some A is B as possible
no A is B is contingent
S

S Apj_(is)~(V(A, B))
no A is B as necessary
some A is B as impossible

S Apj (is)-(V(A, B))
all A is B as necessary
some A is not B as impossible

Apj (is)~(q(A, B))
some A is not B as necessary
all A is B as impossible
S

IV, 4. 3

Apj (is)-(q(A, B))
some A is B is necessary
all A is B as impossible.
S

reveals that the logical relations of opposition can
be

formulated syntactically for modal judgments, as they
were formulated
for the categorical judgments in II.

2.

To state the contradiction of

a modal judgment of problematicity or apodicticity one not
only must

change the Quality and Quantity of the judgment but also its modality.
The contradiction of S's problematically judging (is)-(\/(A, B)) is
S’s apodictically judging (is
riet^^ for

hm,

B)).

Contrariety and subcontra

modal judgments can be formulated similarly

for contrary

:

opposition, one changes Quantity and Quality of the apodictic judgment; for subcontrary opposition, one changes' Quantity and Quality of
a

problematic judgment.
The recognition of modal opposition helps explain why Kant lists

the modal categories in the peculiar fashion that he does in the

Critique

.

As Swing points out, the members of the dual listing are

meant as contradictory opposite categories.

However,

physical deduction, each modal category is associated
unity of

tlie

judgment

tliat

in the metawitli the

is yielded by the modal form,

whole

and not with
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the modal form itself as an element
in the judgment.

Thus, the

category of necessity is associated with
the unity thought in cognition
expressed apodictically
tingency.

.

The opposite category of necessity
is con-

This category represents the opposite
of judging a

cognition apodictically; that is,
contingently.

judging

a

it

represents judging

a

cognition

Judging contingently, however, is not apodictically

negative copula, but, as IV.4.2 reveals, it is
judging

problematically.

Logically, we require the change in modal form to

express judgments of categorial opposition.
Thus, the logical form of judging the opposite of
apodictically,

that is, judging that something is contingent, is
judging that cognition problematically.

Kant's listing in the Critique represents the

logical relation of opposition betv^een categories; the general logic,
on the other hand, reveals the logical form of judgments expressing

such categories.
2.

Contraposition

.

The only immediate inference that Kant

provides governing the formal inter-relations of modal forms is
contraposition by which one proceeds from an assertoric judgment to
an apodictic one.

In the Auszug,

Meier presents the following view

of contraposition:
A universal affirmative judgment is contraposed when one

changes its predicate into a negative concept and denies
[of it] the preceeding subject of that universal.
All true
universal affirmative judgments can be contraposed, that is,
to what its predicate does not belong, to that its subject
also does not belong (§ 352).^®
This same doctrine is formulated by Kant in the Pblitz notes:
The contraposition of judgments.
There takes place a
metathesis, i.e., of relocation of terms, in whicli Quality
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is changed into a negative
proposition.

The Quantity
remains the same, because only universal
propositions
^
can be contraposed (Pol.,
p. 585 ). 19

To this forn.«la1;ioo, Kant acids that
once these formal operations are

carried out, the modal form of the judgment
is changed from assertoriCity to apodictlcity (N 3170).

This part of contraposition is

original with Kant.
The Kantian account of contraposition can be
stated as

a

me^-dies]^ or relocation of terms in an A categorical
negating the
original predicate and changing the quality from
affirmative to
negative; and thus affecting

a

change of modal form.

This inference

may be expressed formally:

(Contraposition)
In N 3170 the

S

Assj (is)-(v(A,

B))—>S

Apj (is)~(V(~B, A)).

contrapositive of 'All bodies are divisible’ is given

as What therefore is not divisible is no body.

(The account of contraposition in the Logik
,

Contraposition is defined as

a

§

54,

is in error.

formal operation affecting the change

in modal forms from assertoric to apodictic judgments involving

(1) a metathesis or relocation of terms in which (2) (universal)

quantity is retained but (3) affirmative quality is changed to negative
quality.

These steps take one from an (assertoric) A categorical to

an (apodictic) converse of the corresponding E categorical.

But this

procedure described by Jasche is clearly invalid, for an A proposition
does not entail its corresponding E proposition to which the converse
is equivalent.

negated in

tlie

Jasche has omitted that the original predicate is

process of relocation.

Tliere are two

)

separate questions regarding Kant’s tlieory of
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contraposition.

First, what is the relationship between
this theory

and the traditional one of contraposition?

position affect

a

Secondly, why does contra-

change in modal form?

Ihe formal operations involved in the
metathesis of the

Meier-Kant theory of contraposition do not correspond
to the inference
of contraposition as traditionally understood.

Traditional contra-

position is an inference that is valid for both A and 0
categorical

propositions consisting of an interchange of subject and
predicate, in
which both ore negated, while retaining the same quantity and
quality.
’All men are mortal’ has the contrapositive

men’.

’All non-mortals are non-

However, in the Meier-Kant theory, the contrapositive would be

’No non-mortals are men’.

Moreover, neither Meier nor Kant mentions

contraposition with regard to 0 categoricals.

Traditional contraposition is

a

derived inference involving

successive steps of obversion, conversion, obversion.
in III. 2,

As we discovered

Kant never states the inference of obversion in his logic.

But obversion partially is taken up in Kant’s theory of contraposition,
for the described metathesis yie].ds the converted obverse (the partial

contrapositive) of an A proposition.

Thus, the Meier-Kant theory of

contraposition takes contraposition through only the first two steps
of obversion and conversion.

(One can obtain the traditional obverse

of A in the Meier-Kant logic through re-converting the contrapositive.
But obversion can be only partially absorbed by contraposition.

Since we can obtain the obverse for only an A categorical, E.

I,

and

0 propositions are left without formally stated inferences of obversion.

Converted obversion is invalid for

E and

I

categoricals.

Moreover,
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the failure of the validity of
contraposition for E and 0 categoricals

has

tlie

formal

e ff ec^

of denying that negative judgments can
be

obverted (see III. 2), for the immediate
inferences which are part of
Kant’s logical grammar do not permit obversion
of negative propositions.
It may be thought that contraposition,

goricals,

is

traditionally valid for 0 cate-

invalid in Kant’s logic because the intermediate
step in

converting the obverse consists in obverting
However, in

a

a

negative categorical.

very early note, Kant formulated the following

succession of inferences (N 3187
Some men are not learned.
.’.
Some men are unlearned.
Some unlearned things are men.
The result of these inferences is the converted obverse, that is,
the

Meier-Kant contrapositive, of the original 0 proposition.

Without ever

formally recognizing obversion for 0 propositions in his theory of
immediate inference (see VI. 1), Kant, at one time, did countenance
the possibility and validity of obverting the negative, particular

categorical.

Nevertheless, the interesting question is, Why are these

inferences never recognized as constituting contraposition?

The answer

lies in Kant’s contention that the metathesis involved in contraposition

fails for 0 categoricals, we must explain why converted obversion will

not yield the appropriate cliange of modal form, which Kant contends to
be the concern of contraposition.

Kant’s explanation for why contraposition affects

a

change

of modal form is,
If the predicate as that which contains under itself the
subject is then denied of the entire sphere, so also must
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that is, the subject

(LoS,1

Kant is maintaining that if one
begins from the assertion fan

assertoric judgment) that
B,

a

subject, h, is contained under a
predicate,

and then proceeds to deny this predicate
of the entire realm of

being (as is done when the subject -concept,
~B, is negative) then one
deny the original subject of that negative
concept.

judgment is apodictic.

Hence, the

This point can be seen clearly from the
logic

of negative concepts, for the negative concept
’~B’ excludes any
concept

S

encompassed under B,

judgment places the extension of
of

The universal, affirmative assertoric
S

under

B.

Thus,

S

must be denied

-v^B.

Kant explains the apodicticity of the contrapositive
in
N 3170.“

Although his argument is not clear,

reconstructed in the following manner.
discussion of modal opposition that
impossibility of the opposite of

a

a

I

believe it may be

We have seen in the preceding

judgment which expresses

tlie

cognition is the same as one

maintaining the cognition apodictically

.

Kant contends that when an

assertoric judgment is posited, it is impossible to judge the opposite
of the contrapositive.
ticall)^

Hence the contrapositive is maintained apodic-

The assertoric judgment that all men are mortal expresses

the impossibility of some non-mortal’s being men.

But this judgment

shows the apodicticity of the judgment that no non-mortal is human.
The impossibility of some non-mortal’s being men follows from the

assertoric proposition that all men are mortal by means of the logic
of negative terms.

132

Thus, contraposition cannot affect

a

change of modal forms

unless the original assertoric judgment is
universal and affirmative,
for the whole subject must be contained under
the predicate.

Without

meeting this condition, the assertoric judgment will
not express the
impossibility of the opposite of the converted obverse
(the contrapositive).

Hence, the converted obverse of an 0 categorical,
even

iT is admitted into the logic as a legitimate consequence
of an
0 proposition, will not fulfil the conditions of being a true

contrapos itive
The remaining question is. Why is the operation of converted

obversion of an A categorical unique among immediate inferences in

affecting

a

change in modal forms?

Kant would argue that no other

operation is such that the opposite of that which is obtained is
represented by the original proposition as impossible.

I

CHAPTER
THE CERTAINTY OF JUDGMENT:

JUDCMENT’S SUBJECTIVE SIDE

In the preceding chapter

concerns how

a

objectivity of

I

argued that the modality of judgment

cognition is considered to be true by
a

a

judger.

The

judgment is accomplished, in part, by the (subjective)

act of bringing the unity of
a

V

a

cognition to the forms of considering

judgment to be true in relation to thought in general.

Such acts

are expressed by problematically, assertorically or
apodictically

judging.
a

Moreover, in considering

a

cognition to be true, there arises

degree of certa in cy for the judger in the truth (objectivity)
of this

cognition.
side of

a

This ceitainty may be called the subjective aspect or

judgment, for it pertains to how the judger is related in

consciousness to the objectivity of his judgment.
of certainty is,

Hov'^

The question

sure is the judger in his own consciousness of

the objectivity or the universal validity of his cognition for all

judgers?
Since the concern of modal logic is to lay out the logical
forms and unities by which

a

cognition is considered to be true, the

modal forms express and are concerned with the certainty of judgment
with respect to thought in general.

modal logic would bo incomplete if

assertoric and apodictic judgment
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Thus, the reconstruction of Kant’s
tlie

v-;ere

subjective aspect of problematic,
omitted.
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The certainty of a cognition
arises through

a

self-questioning

on the part of the judger as to
the grounds that he possesses for

maintaining the objectivity of his
cognition.

The sufficiency of

these grounds for allowing or compelling
his consideration of truth
gives rise to various possible degrees
of certainty, which are thereby

expressed through the modal form of judgment.

In virtue of the kind

of certainty the judger has in his cognition,
he may be said to opine,

believe or know that which he judges.
a

Thus, Kant’s modal forms play

central role in explicating the logical form of
this traditional

epistemological triumverate of opinion, belief and knowledge.
In this chapter

I

shall first reconstruct Kant’s general

theory of certainty in human judgment.

The second section will deal

with the application of this theory to the analysis of the
logical
structure of opinion, belief and knowledge.

§

1 -

Assent and the Theory of Certainty
Kant’s general term for the act of judging, subjectively

considered, is assent
the means by which

a

(

Filivahrhalten, or Vor\N?ahrhalten

).

Assent is

judger represents his judgment as true (N 2473 ),1

and rests upon the reasons that the judger has for considering his

judgment as objective.

Kant maintains.

Assent concerns only the ability to judge in respect to the
subjective criteria for subsuming a judgment under objective
rules

(N 2472 ).^

Assent, therefore, is concerned with the subjective validity of

judgment,
judgment.

i-jith

the judger

It is

’s

a

ability to come to know the truth of the

obvious that

a

judgment (the representation of that
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which is objective) is possible only if it
is subjectively valid for
the judger who makes it.
In pertaining to the subjective validity
of a judgment,

can be either certain or uncertain.

assent

Certainty and uncertainty of

assent arises from the different kinds of reasons
one may have for

entertaining

a

cognition.

Kant divides the reasons for which one

assents to a cognition into two general kinds (N 2489):^
(A) Subjective reasons:

these reasons pertain to the interests
of the judger and to what he must judge in his own particular
situation (N 2489)."^ Subjective reasons include reasons for
action, i.e., reasons for adopting a practical course of
action, and the demands of moral reasoning.
In general
subjective reasons which ciiaracterize the judging subject himself
in his own (subjective) situation.

(B) Objective reasons:
these reasons pertain to rationality
itself in the conceptualization of objects.
That is, these

reasons pertain to the object as such and in this they are
constitutive of the nature of the understanding itself.
Kant sometimes refers to objective reasons as logical
reasons, for they pertain to the inherent structure of the
understanding.
These reasons may be found in the process of self-questioning
to be either sufficient or insufficient for accepting the cognition
as true.

Reasons are insufficient when it would still be possible,

given these reasons, to accept the opposite of the cognition; that is,

when it would be possible to assent to or to represent as true the
opposite cognition.

Reasons are sufficient to represent

a

cognition

as true when, on the basis of these reasons, one could not accept the

opposite.

These reasons may be sufficient either to make representation

of the truth of

a

cognition necessary for the judger (hence attaining

apodictic certainty), or to outweigh any reasons for representing the

opposite cognition, though such

a

representation may still bo logically
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possible.
In the case of insufficiency the judger
is conscious of the

contingency or uncertain of his judgment; in the
case of sufficiency,
he is conscious that his considering the
judgment to be true is

certain.

Thus, certainty is the sufficient consciousness
of truth or

the subjective necessity of considering a judgment
to be true (Bus.,
p.

637).^

Certainty, therefore, consists in one’s consciousness that

in general it is impossible for him to entertain the
opposite of his

cognition (N2468).^

In this sense,

one is certain of that which he

is free from reason to doubt.
In

proposing

a

theory of certainty and of the sufficiency of

reasons to justify the consideration of truth, Kant is obviously

attempting to answer the radical philosophical doubt put forth by
Descartes.

In his First Meditation,

Descartes says he is going to

subject everything he formally believed (considered) to be true to
doubt.

For doubting to take place, there must be some reason to doubt;

hence, Descartes proposes

a

number of hypotheses

and the Evil-Genius Hypothesis

—to

—the

Dream Hypothesis

cast doubt upon the validity of

experience and mathematics as vehicles to describe and provide knowledge of reality.

Kant answers this scepticism by revealing the kinds

of reasons that provide certainty in experience, science, mathematics,
morals, and religion.

In his theory of certainty,

then, Kant is

discovering how certainty may come about in human cognition.
Moreover, complete or apodictic certainty in
the objective or universal truth of the cognition.
s ta t es

a

judgment yields

In N 2481,

Kant
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Objectively there is no difference betvveen Truth
and Certainty.
In

coming to have complete certainty in the consideration
of

one comes into the objectivity of what he judges.

tainty is

a

Thus,

trutli,

one’s cer-

universally valid certainty for all judgers when complete

certainty is attained.
Certainty can be either empirical or rational (N 2454

Empirical certainty arises
object.

a_

posteriori through the experience of an

Empirical certainty, therefore, involves objective grounds

(the judger's own experience of an object) in relation to sensible

representations.

This certainty in an empirical cognition rests upon

the representation of an object by means of sensibility through the

understanding (Pol., p. 543).®

Thus, we may be empirically certain

of that which we ourselves cognize through the understanding in sensible experience.

(If we base our empirical certainty upon the experience

of some other judger, the empirical certainty is ’’derived" certainty.)

But empirical certainty can be only
p.

544).^

a ssertorial

certainty (Pol.,

On the basis of experience one may be certain of the truth

of the given cognition but not that the cognition is necessary, or
must be.

This view of empirical certainty

is'

found in the Busolt

notes

Empirically I can be certain of a thing, but only that it
exists, not that it is necessary (Bus., p. 639).^^
The subjective necessity of considering the cognition relates only to

my experience of what is.

Thus, empirical certainty does not attain

to full certainty, which is the cognition that truth is necessarily and

universally valid for all judgers.
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Kant specifies two features of empirical
certainty by calling
It assertorial.

First,

it is called "assertorial" because the
repre-

sentation of the truth of the cognition is
well-founded for the judger
in his experience.

what he judges.

Thus, the judger possesses grounds for
maintaining

Secondly, to maintain that which is empirically
cer-

tain is to make an assertorical judgment.

Empirical certainty fulfils

the criteria of assertorical judgment in that such
certainty arises
in accordance with the laws of the understanding, for
the sensible

representation of experience is constituted in accordance with these
laws.

Furthermore, empirical certainty carries existential import for

the judger, since he is taking cognizance of an object.

Thus, on the

basis of the well-founded-ness of his cognition and its accordance with
the understanding, the judger can be said to assert that of which he
is empirically certain.

Hence, the logical form of the act of being

empirically certain in one’s assent or consideration of the truth of
a

cognition is expressed by the function ’Ass.’.

Rational certainty, on the other hand, arises
reason and is, therefore, apodictic certainty.

a

priori through

Such certainty is bound

up with the consciousness of the necessity (Pol., p.

544)^^ of judging

or assenting to a cognition on the basis of reason.

When we are

rationally certain of the truth of
a_

a

cognition we discern this truth

prior i through rational principles, rather than on the basis of mere

experience.
from

Vv^ithin

Because this representation of truth originates

a

priori

the mind itself, rational certainty rests upon the ^ priori

structure of the undt.'rstanding and reason.

Thus,

in accordance with

Kant’s Copornican l^evolution in philosopliy, the object must conform to
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the cognition and the cognition itself
is necessarily valid for

everyone.
One of Kant's most important contributions to
the theory of

certainty is the recognition of how subjective
reasons can justify

certainty in

a

cognition.

In his critique of

traditional metaphysics,

Kant shows that the a priori principles of morality
are themselves

part of the structure of (practical) reason.
upon which the subjective determination of
can produce rational, that is,

a

a

Thus, the principles

practical cognition rests

priori certainty

(D-4\?,

p.

734).

Hence, Kant presents the following classification of the types of

rational certainty (N 2454).^^

Rational Certainty
objective, = Logical
speculative
(apodictic

Mathematical
(Intuitive*

Practical

subjective, moral

‘Philosophical
(Discursive**)

* Synthetic

knowledge through reason resting upon the
construction of concepts in intuition (time and space)

** Synthetic knowledge through reason resting upon mere

concepts
1.

)

Practical or moral certainty rests on the moral use of

reason ^ priori

.

We are practically certain of that whicli is necessary

for the moral law and of which we can posit a priori through moral

reason.

argues

In the
tliat the

"Canon of Pure Reason",

§

3,

of the Critique, Kant

three instances of such moral certainty is the existence

of God, free will and the immortality of the soul.
ore the necessary conditions for

tlie

These three beliefs

moral use of reason in determining
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a

practical cognition (B856-857); hence, we are
rationally certain of

them.

However, there is no objective evidence for
these beliefs; the

moral law, as Kant argues, lies within the moral
subject himself.
Moral certainty pertains to or rests upon subjective
reasons.

Thus,

moral certainty is subjective; it allows the judger to
assert only
that "I am certain.
2.

)

.

."

(N 2484).^'^

Logical certainty, on the other hand, rests on principles

of the understanding in the conceptualization of any object
of exper-

ience whatsoever.

Such certainty pertains to theoretical cognitions

of objects which we can determine a priori

.

certainty are mathematical or philosophical.

The two types of such
In the first instance

mathematical cognitions of objects are determined on the basis of the
construction of mathematical concepts in the pure intuitions of time
and space, in which all objects of knowledge must be given to the human
mind.

Philosophical certainty pertains to synthetical principles which

make empirical knowledge possible.
Since logical certainty pertains to or rests upon objective
reasons, the judger may say, ”It is certain that

.

.

meaning

thereby that his certainty rests upon that which is objective ratlier
than merely subjective.

Though moral certainty is rationally certain,

the consideration of truth pertains only to the judger.

Although

nothing can move the morally reasoning judger from that in which he is

morally certain (God, freedom and immortality), the judger is conscious
that the certainty cannot be valid at the same time for all other
judgers.
certainty.

Thus, complete or objective certainty does not apply to moral

But in logical certainty, because it rests upon objective
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grounds, the judger is conscious that his cognition is also
valid at
the same time for all other judgers.

Thus, such certainty is apodictic

in the sense that it is impossible for any judger to judge
the opposite

of what one considers to be true.

Hence, the act of judging anything

as logically certain is apodictic in form,

for it would be accompanied

by the consciousness of the necessity of judging.

Apodictic certainty, then, provides an answer to Descartes’

philosophical scepticism, for it is impossible to doubt that which is
logically certain.

Mathematics is undubitable, since it rests upon

the structure of pure, human intuition; synthetic principles of

experience are indubitable, for they make experience possible.

Indeed,

since judgments of experience are determined by the a prior i synthetic

principles of the understanding, deception is impossible with regard
to them.

Kant

i-^rites

in his logic notes.

It is impossible that my judgments of experience can be
deceptive, for the assent is apodictic, although the proposition is objectively contingent (N 2474

And,

Assent can be apodictic, without the necessity of the
cognition being objectively apodictic. The former is only
the consciousness, that one cannot be mistaken in the
application of indubitably -certain rules, for example, in
experience (N 2479).^^
Finally, both empirical and rational (logical) certainty may

occur with regard to the same judgment of experience.
We are rationally certain of that which even without
Hence, it
experience we should have discerned a priori
is possible that our cognitions may concern objects of
experience and yet their certainty may be both empirical
and rational, namely, when we discern from a priori principles the truth of a proposition which is empirically
certain ( fvogik, "Einleitung, " IX
.
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The following example of this possibility
occurs in the Wiener Logik,

Our cognitions can conceive of objects of
experience and our
certainty can be either empirical or rational.
For example
the proposition of the power by means of
a lever has erapiril
cal certainty, but also rational certainty;
for if experience
does not teach us anything about it, still
I would know it
through reason (WL, p. 857 ). 18

§ 2

- Opinion,

Belief and Knowledge

Since assent consists in the possession of either
subjective
or objective reasons which may be either sufficient
or insufficient
for ceitainty, assent can take place in three different
ways:

the

judger’s reasons may be both subjectively and objectively
insufficient
for his considering the cognition to be true, or objectively
insuffi-

cient but subjectively sufficient, or both objectively and subjectively

sufficient.

These three possibilities respectively define the three

modes of assent, namely, opinion, belief and knowledge.

The following

table systematically defines these modes of assent by relating them to
tlie

kinds of certainty v^hich occurs in the act of opining, believing

or knowing.

MODE OF
ASSENT

NATURE OF SUBJECTIVE REASONS

NATURE OF OBJECTIVE REASONS

DEGREE OF
CERTAINTY

Opinion

Insufficient

Insufficient

No certainty
whatsoever

Belief

Sufficient

Insufficient

Subjectively
certain only

Knowledge

Sufficient

Sufficient

Since

,

tlie

Complete certainty (apodictic

modal functions of judgment express how the judger

considers his cognition to be true, we can expect that

tliese

functions
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express the logical form of opining, believing, and
knowing.

In N 2474,

Kant correlates each mode of assent with a modal form
of judgment.

What I opine, that I judge with a consciousness only as
problematic.
What I believe, assertoric, however, not as necessary (valid
for me).
What I know, as apodictic according to the laws of the understanding, even if the truth is merely empirical. ^9
This theme is reiterated throughout the student lecture notes; for

instance, from the Wiener I/)gik,
In opinion, our judgment is problematic. ...
In belief, we
judge assertorically, i.e., we explain ourselves for tlie truth
p. 850 and 851).
( WL,

And from the Busolt notes.
In opinion, we judge problematically,
in knowledge, apodictically (Bus., p.

in belief,

638

assertorically,

).

This correlation can be summarized as follows:

What
What
What

I
I
I

opine, I judge problematically
believe, I judge assertorically
know, I judge apodictically.

A discussion of the three modes of assent will illuminate the acts of

judging whose logical form is expressed by the unities of the modal
forms (IV. 3).
(I)

Opinion.

In opining,

the judger is conscious of the

insufficiency both subjectively and objectively, of his grounds for

maintaining the cognition.

Such assent is obviously uncertain, for

the judger is conscious that another judgment could just as well have

been entertained.

The logical form of opining is problematic, for

that which is opined is thought according to its own formal possibility
as containing nothing self-contradictory, and not as objectively

possible
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Kant suggests that ”the greatest part” of
our cognitions begin
by holding them as mere opinions (Pol.,
p. 541), ^2 v^pi^h are to be

critically tested to determine their truth.

However, Kant’s account

of the origjjis of opinion in scientific knowledge
is incomplete.

opinion is like

a

guess to begin an enquiry.

In the

An

"Introduction"

to the l£>gik (IX), the ether of "modern physics"
is given as an example

of

a

"mere matter of opinion."

But there is nothing in the definition

of opinion that prohibits quite uneducated or insignificant
guesses
from being the initial points of enquiry.

However, scientific enquiry

properly begins with significant guesses that relate to something

previously known.

In this way a scientist does not waste his time

testing hypotheses which do not relate to already existing theories.
Opinions, then, in science are based upon knowledge; they are

not just completely arbitrary guesses.

What distinguishes opinions

from assertions in science is that this knowledge is not sufficient to

determine

vs^hich

of

a

number of alternative hypotheses is true.

opinion is free only with respect to

a

Hence,

range of alternatives determined

by already known facts.

Kant himself was not unaware of the structure of scientific
enquiry.

In "The Canon of Pure Reason," Kant asserts,

I must never presume to opine, without knowing at least
something by means of which the judgment, in itself merely
problematic, secures connection with truth, a connection
which, although not complete, is yet more than arbitrary
fiction.
Moreover, the law of such a connection must be
For if, in respect of this lav-; also, I have nothing
certain.
but opinion, it is all merely a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth (B850).

But this passage, while focusing on the relationsliip bet\%'een prior
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knowledge and

a

subsequent opinion, leaves this relationship
obscure.

According to Kant, the relationship arises through
certain but justifies

a

a

law which is

connection which lies somewhere between

connection with the truth and an arbitrary fiction.

a sure

Kant is aiming

at a theory of a probable relation beti^een given
knowledge and sub-

sequent opinion.

A theory of probability is required to bridge
the

gap between a sure connection with the truth (probability
of 1) and
an arbitrary fiction (probability of 0).

Thus, by assessing the pro-

bability of an opinion with respect to prior knowledge,

a

scientist can

adjudicate between guesses as to which is the most significant.
However, the importance of providing

a

theory of probability

for scientific knowledge seems to have escaped Kant.

Moreover, Kant

cannot express the notion of probability as part of the logical form
of opinion.

Kant’s theory of the modal forms is merely qualitative

in the sense that it specifies the ways in which a cognition is judged.

A quantitative pragmatics, on the other hand, has been developed for

the notion of acceptance
IV. 2).

I

—acceptance

to a degree

—

^by

R. M. Martin (see

am suggesting that Kant, in order to provide an adequate

theory of the logical form of opining, should- have considered as the
unit of analysis

’S

problematically judges p to degree a’, for the

degree of probability of an opinion is important in assessing its worth
for future assertion.

According to Kant, one proceeds from problematical judging
(opining) to assertorical judging (asserting) to apodictic judging
(knowledge).

In the Critique,

Kant writes.
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is thus incorporated in the understanding
-*
4
step
by step— inasmuch as we first judge
something prohlematicallyj then maintains its truth assertorically
and
,
finally affirm it as inseparably united with
the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodictic
(BlOl).
*

•

In this progression,

one proceeds by fulfilling the logical criteria

of problematic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments
(see

IV. 3).

We

might have wished that Kant had outlined this procedure
by which these
criteria are fulfilled in a more concrete manner.

For instance, he

might have maintained that causal connections can be asserted
on the
basis of procedures similar to J. S. Mill^s methods.
failure in this regard is not

a

foiirial

However, Kant’s

incompleteness of his system,

for these considerations operate on the material level of cognition.

This incompleteness, therefore, is not relevant to the disclosure of
the logical form of judgments.

But, as

I

suggested in the preceeding

paragraph, Kant should have incorporated into his theory of the logical
fonm of opining

a

notion of entertaining to

a

degree relevant to

already accepted knowledge, even though the logic of probability may
be

a

material logic.
(II)

I

Belief.

Kant’s account of belief is more complex but,

believe, philosophically more incisive than his account of opinion

in scientific enquiry.

Belief is assent from grounds which are sub-

jectively sufficient but objectively insufficient to justify certainty
in the representation of truth.

Thus, my belief in something is

necessary only for me; belief gives rise only to subjective certainty
(valid for me

).

’Belief’ is a broad and ambiguous term.

But perhaps no

tendency is more pernicious and obstructive of an incisive philosophical
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theoiy of belief than viewing belief as
all forms of entertaining

a

a

proposition.

concept characteristic of
This tendency appears most

clearly in Bertrand Russell’s Analysis of
by many contemporary logicians.

and has been adopted

Russell states.

The whole intellectual life consists of beliefs,
and of the
passage from belief to another by what is called ’reasoning’.
Beliefs give knowledge and error; they are the vehicles
of
truth and falsehood. Psychology, theory of knowledge,
and
metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view we take of
our philosophical outlook largely depends. ^3

But belief is

a

special notion with its own meaning and use; it sejrves

to characterize a special way of entertaining a cognition.

Kant

s

It is to

credit that in his theory of belief he attempts to focus on the

central and distinguishing features of this concept.
receives

Thus, belief

special definition in terms of the sufficiency of subjective

a

grounds
Moreover, Kant classifies beliefs according to where they occur
in human cognition and of their respective validity and status.

According to Kant, beliefs are of two kinds;
(N 2487).

^

theoretical and practical.

Theoretical beliefs occur with regard to objective cogni-

tion for which the judger does not possess sufficient objective grounds,

but for which the judger has grounds which are subjectively sufficient
for him to assent to the cognition.

With regard to theoretical belief,

the judger accepts grounds concerning an object as subjectively valid
for his assent.

These beliefs occur v;ith regard to the present,

sensible experience of the judger, historical propositions, and theoretical cognitions of speculation that Kant calls "doctrinal beliefs" in
tlie

"Canon".
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As we have seen, V.l, we

have empirical certainty with

regard to the content of our experiences.
only through belief, for our experience,
is only subjectively valid for us.

Logik

But such certainty arises
Vv?hile

pertaining to objects,

This point is made in the Wiener

:

Belief is a subjectively sufficient, but objectively
insufficient assent.
Sense is at all times subjective
p.

852). 25

On the basis of present experience, the judger can maintain only that

the object exists in his experience, not that it must exist in the

experience of all judgers; hence, the existence of the object is
valid only for the judger.

Thus, empirical certainty is only belief.

Kant is refurbishing the distinction

knowledge made by Plato.

betv'^een

belief and

For both, belief concerns merely what occurs

in sensible experience; whereas knowledge possesses a priori elements.

Kant defines the difference be'tween empirical belief and knowledge

more acceptably than Plato in terms of the taking up of an empirical

cognition and maintaining it on the basis of objectively sufficient
grounds, or a priori grounds which are valid for all judgers.
Secondly, the beliefs in the existence of God and the

immortality of the soul may be considered theoretical (or doctrinal)
be liefs, for the objective grounds for these theoretical cognitions are

insufficient to compel certainty wliile the judger may possess subjectively sufficient grounds.

Theoretical beliefs occur with regard to

that which is objective when nothing objective can be cited that

completely justifies assent to the cognition; yet we regard ourselves
as possessing grounds wliich are subjectively sufficient to convince
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us of its truth.

Theoretical belief in the existence of God, for

instance, arises because of examples of purpose which
can be found in
nature.

But such examples provide no objective grounds for
asserting

the existence of an intelligent Creator; certainly Hume
showed this
in liis Dialogues Concer n ing Natural Religion

.

However, Kant argues

in the "Canon".
I know no other condition under which this
purposive unity
can supply me with guidance in the investigation of nature,
save only the postulate that a supreme intelligence has
ordered all things in accordance with the wisest ends
(B854).

But this assent to the existence of God, even though based on something
found in objects, is merely subjectively valid for the judgor who

makes it.

It is only

h^ who "knows no other condition" to explain the

phenomenon of apparent purpose in nature.
Belief, for Kant, is primarily

a

practical notion; its

primary meaning derives from its relation to action.
a

course of action, one has

a

certain end in mind.

In

reasoning out

However, the

sufficiency of reasons for this end cannot be objectively certain or
valid for all judgers; the end which the judger sets for himself in

practical cognition can only be subjectively -sufficient for him.
Everything which we accept for a purpose is for us only
subjectively sufficient i.e., I must accept that it is so,
otherwise I cannot proceed in my reasoning. Of course, I
cannot accept this as objectively valid, still it is for me
sufficient (D-W, p. 733).^^

—

Thus, the consideration of the truth of a practical cognition can be

no more than a belief for the judger.
In the "Canon",

Kant distinguishes beti'jeen practical cognitions

wliich are pragmatic and those which are moral.
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[The] practical point of view is either in
reference to
or in reference to morality , the former being
concerned
with optional and contingent ends, the latter with
ends that
are absolutely necessary.

skm

Once an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment
are hypothetical.ly necessary.
This necessity is subjectively
’
but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I know of no
othei conditions under whicli the end can be attained.
On
the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for everyone, if I know with certainty that no one can have knowledge
of any other conditions which lead to the proposed end.
In
the former case my assumption and the holding of certain
conditions to be true is a merely contingent belief; in the
latter case it is a necessary belief (B 851 - 852 ).

Pragmatic cognitions are those for which
better means to attain

a

a

judger can think of no

posited or self—chosen end.

The consideration

of the means to this end, while being subjectively necessary for the

judger himself, are only contingently necessary for him, because someone else may realize

a

better means for attaining the end, or even

better end for the judger to choose in his circumstances.
subjective sufficiency (belief) in

a

a

Thus, the

pragmatic cognition arises from

the positing of a subjectively considered course of action leading to
a

contingently posited end.
On the other hand, in morality, the end

in conformity to the moral law

— is

—that

one’s actions be

irrefragably established, and, hence,

is not contingent in the sense of being relative to the judger ’s sub-

jective circumstances and what he posits for himself.
his moral philosophy that the only condition under

Kant argues in

v>;hich

this end can

make moral action possible is that the judger posits the existence of
God,

freedom, and the immortal soul.

moraJ.ity and moral reasoning possible.

These three presuppositions make
Thus, just as Kant's transcen-

dental pliilosophy provides the grounds of certainty in science, the
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critique of practical reason provides the grounds upon
which certainty
in morals can he grounded.

Kant calls these moral beliefs Vernunft -

^lauhe, beliefs of reason, for they derive from the structure
of pure

practical reason itself.
Nevertheless, because moral principles are not found in
objects, but arise only through the moral use of reason by the judger
himself, the positing of beliefs of reason can be only subjectively
valid.

But the certainty that the judger can have in these beliefs

renders them absolutely unchangeable for him.
T am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since ray
moral principles would thereby be themselves overthrown,
and 1 cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent in my

own eyes (B856

).

In the Politz notes,

there is an almost moving passage describing

strength of these beliefs
The practical belief is often stronger than all knowledge.
In the latter, one still attends to counter arguments, but
this is not so in practical belief.
E.g., the belief in
God and another world is stronger than all knowledge,
because we have such a great interest in these. The practical conviction is the greatest possible.
The
practical belief is, therefore, firm, unchangeable conviction.
(Pol., 543). 27
.

.

.

We may summarize Kant’s classification of belief as follows:

tlie
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BeMef:

Theoretical

subjectively sufficient assent
subjectively certain (valid for
me

Practical

Empirical beliefs:
beliefs based upon
immediate experience
(empirically certain)

Pragmatic beliefs: beliefs
concerning contingent ends

Historical beliefs
"Moral beliefs

beliefs
based upon reasoiij
Vernunftglaube
~
~

Doctrinal beliefs:
objectively insufficient theoretical
cognitions which are
subjectively sufficient

:

Kant maintains that beliefs, according to their logical form,
are assertoric.

assertoric

In

We have already seen that empirical certainty is

form.

Belief in general brings into play the formal

features of assertorical judgment.

Assertoricity yields the thouglit

of the actuality or truth of a cognition, or of what is involved in
the judger’s asserting something.

Asserting, for Kant, involves the

positing the existence of something in accordance with the understanding
or reason (see IV. 3).

In belief,

the judger is making an assertion

about what he takes to be the case.

Moreover, in all cases of belief

the existence of something is being posited

immortal soul.

—God,

a free self,

and an

Furthermore, the positing is in accordance with the

laws of the understanding and reason.

Kant’s theory of belief illuminates the nature of asserting.
for asserting can now be seen to rest upon what is subjectively valid
for the judger.

Herein lies the feature that distinguishes asser-

torical from apodictic judgment.

An apodictic judgment rests upon
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objective grounds, whereas assertion is objectively
insufficient.
Knowledge is possible only with regard to what can be
apodictically

maintained as resting upon objective grounds valid for all
judgers.
Thus, even though the certainty with regard to beliefs of
reason is

unchangeable, one cannot have knowledge of these matters.
(Ill)

Knowledge.

The concern of the apodictic form of judgment

is the expression of knowledge of a cognition.

Knowledge is defined as

assent from reasons which are both subjectively and objectively sufficient.

Kant would look with displeasure on attempts to define knowledge

by means of true belief.

For Kant, the notion of true belief reaches

into far wider areas of human cognition than knowledge could hope to
enter.

The relationship between belief and knowledge must be viewed

in terms of the relationship between assertoric and apodictic judgments

(see IV.3):

In

acquiring knowledge, we take up what is asserted and

maintain it on the basis of the

a_

priori laws of the understanding.

But this procedure would be possible only for cognitions of which

the judger is empirically certain.

For Kant, the crucial notion involved in knowledge is objective

sufficiency which can be determined only with regard to the £ priori
laws which are valid for the understanding of all judgers.

Such

reasons are constitutive of the nature of objects and determine what
the mind brings a priori to experience.

posited
forni

a

Thus, the cognition is

prior i through the principles of the understanding, and the

of the judgment is apodictic.
Kant, as we have seen, maintains that apodictic assent can

take place with regard to an empirical cognition that is only
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contingent (N 2472, see nn. 16 and
19), if this cognition can also
be constituted on the basis of a prior
i principles.
one attains empirical knowledge of objects.

In such cases

Furtliermore, the a priori

knowledge of mathematics and philosophy also
involves assent resting
upon objective grounds.

Mathematics rests upon the

a

priori grounds

of the constructing concepts in pure intuitions,
v^hich is valid for
all judgers.

Synthetic,

a

priori knowledge in philosophy rests upon

the conditions of possible experience, which are, again,
valid for all

judgers.

Thus, the principles laid out in the ’’Transcendental
Analytic”

of the Critique constitute apodictically certain, philosophical
knowledge of objects.

CHAPTER

VI

KANT'S THEORY OF THE FORMS OF JUDGMENT:
SOME FINAL COMMENTS

§

1

- The

Problem of Completeness

This section will formulate precisely and explore
the question

whether Kant’s theory of logical grammar provides

a

terization of the formal mechanisms of judgment.

By the completeness

of the system

I

complete charac-

mean that all the forms and grammatical operations

necessary to characterize judgment can be stated or are derivable
in
the system.

This definition is meant to parallel the notion of

completeness for modern systems of logic in the sense that

a

logical

system must permit the derivation of all truths of that system.

The

problem of proving completeness is not foreign to Kantian thinking,
for Kant himself formulates it with regard to his system of categories.
The completeness of the system
requires that none of
the derivative concepts be lacking (Axxi).
.

.

.

The problem regarding Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment
is tv>;o-fold.

First,

do the given logical constants permit the logical

classification of every judgment?

Secondly, do the specified gramma-

tical operations allow the statement of all possible logical operations
for the given set of constants?

assumes only the presence of

a

Notice that the second question
set of logical constants; the set itself

could be incomplete in the sense of the first question.
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Philosophers sceptical of Kant’s claim that the table
of
judgments provides the ’’clue" for proving the
completeness of the

categorial system raise only the first question.

This question has

been argued by Klaus Reich in his famous dissertation,
Die Vollstandig -

bantischen Urteilstafel, where he attempts to reconstruct

a

Kantian proof for the completeness of the table of judgments
through
a

derivation of the table from the "I think" which accompanies all

judgments. 1

However, in III. 4,

I

argued that the omission of con-

junction obstructs the treatment of judgments and inferences that
occur in the system, yet conjunction is not derivable from the "I
think", for it fails to yield a specificable

relationship between judgments.

of thinking the

wa^^

Thus, there are grounds maintaining

that as regards Relation Kant’s classification is incomplete.

But whether Kant provides

a

formally adequate classification

of all judgments ultimately brings on the more speculative and meta-

physical issue of whether just one formal characterization of judgment
is adequate for science.

Just as alternative categorial systems and

systems of science are now known to be possible,
have alternative logical systems of judgment.

'

^

it seems possible to

Differing systems of

science might very well employ judgments constituting objectivity of

differing logical forms.

Thus, completeness in the first sense is a

metaphysical problem, which lies beyond the scope of the present
discussion.
It is,

therefore, wiser and of more logical interest to

accept Kant’s set of logical constants as partly characterizing

conception of judgment, perhaps

tliat

a_

conception most appropriate to
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Newtonian physics, and to raise the second question
of completeness.
Here it is logically feasible to ask for a
proof, for it makes sense
to question whether all valid immediate
inferences possible for the

given constants are or can he expressed by means of
the provided
system.

We have seen

threat to this completeness in the assimilation

a

of obversion to contraposition (IV. 4).

propositions without obversions.

This move leaves E,

and 0

Moreover, the contraposition of 0 is

unincorporated in the system because it fails to affect
modal form.

I,

change of

a

But the proof of completeness or incompleteness of Kant's

logical grammar cannot be

a

haphazard attempt to determine whetlier an

inference does or does not hold within the system, for it is always

possible to define
would explain why

feature of Kant's conception of judgment which

a

a

particular inference fails to he valid for this

conception of judgment.

Thus, the discovery that an inference tradi-

tionally thought to be valid is not derivable in the system could say
more about the special Kantian conception of judgment rather than the

incompleteness per se of the system of logical grammar.
A systematic proof of completeness is required.

Again, Kant

was not unaware of the need to prove completeness systematically, for
in the Critique

for

a

lie

maps out what he considers to be the basic strategy

proof of completeness,

^

the
[Completeness] is possible only by means of an idea
totality of the a_ priori knowledge yielded by the underexhibiting their interconnections in a system
standing
.

.

.

(B89).

To prove completeness

a

general, uni lying idea systematically relating
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the elements of the system is required.

According to Kant, this

systematic idea proves completeness in the
sense that it shows how
elements of the system are interconnected.

—

Kant never explicitly develops and identifies such

a

systematic idea for proving the completeness of the
doctrine of immediate inference.

Nevertheless, in his lecture notes we can find

a

systematic treatment of this doctrine that correlates each
kind of
immediate inference with a corresponding heading on the table
of
judgments.
VI. 1.1.

This correlation is as follows (N 3170):

TABLE OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCES
To Quantity
To Quality:

:

To Relation:
To Modality:

subalternation

Opposition—contrariety

—subcontrariety
—contradiction
conversion conversio simplici ter
—conversio per accidens
contraposition.

This treatment of the doctrine of immediate inference does not appear
in Meier, and is,

therefore, original with Kant.

The procedure paral-

lels his attempt to prove the completeness of the categorial system by

relating each category with

a

function of judgment; and thus, it may

be understood as an attempt to provide the required systematization
for proving the completeness of the doctrine of immediate inference.

Moreover, this correlation is natural, for the immediate inferences
O

concern operations with the forms of judgment

(

Logik, § 45).'

But if this correlation is Kant's attempt to demonstrate the

completeness of his doctrine, then the attempt must be judged

a

failure.

The systematization is arbitrary, and hence no systematization at all.

For

a

proper systematization there must be

a

single principle in terms
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of which the inferences are to be correlated with

Without such
a

a

a

particular heading.

principle of association, the display would be just

haphazard arrangement of the immediate inferences based upon
an

accidental correspondence between the headings of the forms of judgment and the kinds of immediate inference.
The obvious and natural principle is that each heading concerns
the logical constant that is being operated upon in the immediate

inference.
the Logik

We find this principle explicitly formulated in § 44 of

:

The essential character of all immediate inferences and
the principle of their possibility consists in a change
of the mere form of the judgment.

This principle is clearly at work with regard to Quantity and Modality,
for subalternation and contraposition are formal inferences involving,

respectively,

change of quantifier and of modal operator.

a

Moreover,

although there is no change of logical constants in conversion, the
interchange of subject and predicate is

judgment expressed by the copula.

a

change in the form of the

Kant's conception of logical form

accommodates the relation of one concept as subject to another as

predicat e in virtue of their copulation in

a

quantitative/qualitative

When this relationship occurs as it does in E and

relation.

I

propo-

sitions, the formal positions of subject and predicate can be

interchanged,

hence, Kant can speak of conversion as involving

a

change in the form of the judgment under Relation.
But

Quality.

til

is

principle fails with regard to opposition under

We must recognize an important logical distinction

bet^";een

the kinds of inferences listed under the other licadings and the
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inferences involved in the relations of
opposition.

Where the other

inferences concern only formal operations
with respect to the constants
of the logic, the immediate inferences
falling under opposition (see
II. 2)

are meta-linguistic inferences; that is, they
are inferences

bet^7een sentences in the logic's meta-language.

When we say that

from the truth of an A proposition we can infer the
falsity of an E

proposition, we are naming judgments within the logic and
using

sentences involving the truth-predicate.

These factors classify the

inference as meta-linguistic.
Kant is guilty of

a

mistake in associating opposition with an

immediate inference to be placed under Quality.

While it is true that

in proceeding from the truth of A to the falsity of E one effects
a

change in the form of the judgment, this change is of

a

fundamentally

different character than those involved with respect to Quantity and
Modality.

In the latter cases the change of form is a valid inference

within the logic for which truth is preserved for the judgments.

But

with respect to opposition one does not merely change the form of
judgment, but also its truth-value.

Thus, the inferences involved in

the relations of opposition fail to possess the "essential character"

of consisting in

a

change of the "mere" form of the judgment.

Placing opposition under Quality prohibits Kant from

systematically stating other forms of opposition that are present in
his logic.

In

IV. 4,

I

revealed the logic of judgments expressing

negative modalities and shov^ed how the relations of opposition can bo
defined for problematic and apodictic judgments.

Confining the theory

of opposition to just the assertoric judgments of affirmative or
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negative quality overlooks that the same relations can be
defined for

modal opposition.

Opposition, thus, is

a

type of inference which

overlaps the various headings of judgment, and, therefore, incorrectly

incorporated by Kant into his system of immediate inference.

Kant’s failure here is symptomatic of the underlying difficulty
in his treatment of immediate inference that we have already recognized.

The irony is that the immediate inference which should be associated

with Quality is obversion.

Obversion concerns formal, truth-preserving

operations within the logic itself between the qualitative forms of
judgment (see III. 2).

Thus, obversion parallels the structure of the

other immediate inferences concerning merely

a

change of logical form

in a judgment.
It is certainly desirable that Kant state a theory of obversion,

for, as we have seen (III. 2. 5), at least inferences from infinite to

negative judgments are valid.

Yet these inferences receive no official

recognition in Kant's treatment of immediate inference.

Moreover, by

placing a tlieory of obversion under Quality, we would have

a

means of

incorporating the mysterious converted obverse of the 0 categorical we
discovered in N 3187 (IV. 4), while still maintaining that "contra-

position” is an inference that changes the modal form of universal,

affirmative categoricals.
Thus, Kant failed to complete the doctrine of immediate

inference; his systematization of this doctrine reveals the inadequacy
and incompleteness of his own treatment.

Moreover, the completability

of Kant's system is unclear witliout a definitive pronouncement on Kant’s

behalf on

tlie

nature of obversion for his conception of judgment.
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Kant was lax in pursuing and developing

a

logically complete doctrine

of immediate inference even for his own conception of judgment.

§

2

- A Point About Logical Theory
I

shall conclude my study of Kant’s logic of judgmients with

some theoretical observations concerning the nature of Kantian logic.
In this section,

I

will investigate the relationship between

a

logic

of judgments and the requirements of a general or formal logic.

This

investigation will reveal an important point about the nature of
Kant’s logical system and systems that, like it, formalize the internal

structure of proposition.

Kant’s general logic, as we have noted, is

logic of judgments.

a

The fundamentals of the Kantian conception of judgment were presented

infonnally in IV. 1.

Judgment is defined by Kant as

a

means of repre-

senting that which is objectively or universally valid for all judgers.
The objectivity of judgment implies that judgment is the conceptual

representation of an object of which every judger can take cognizance.
This is Kant’s concl.usion after

judgment in the Critique

a

brief discussion of the nature of

.

Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object,
that is, the representation of a representation of it (B93).
The

foriTiS

object

m.ay

of this objectivity in the mediate representation of an

appropriately be called the forms of judgmient

,

for they are

forms which make judgment possible.
On the other hand, we saw in I.l that Kant also views general

logic as a theory of the structure of valid, deductive inference.

inferences are possible in virtue oi

tlie

logical form of

tlie

Such

piopositions
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involved in the argument.

Hencej we found Kant saying.

General logic
considers only the logical form [of
knowledge] in relation to any knowledge to other knowledge
.

.

.

(B79).

Thus, general logic attempts a theory of forms upon which valid,

deductive inference rests.

These forms may be called logical forms,

for they make deductive inference possible.

The adequacy of

a

theory of logical forms consists in its

ability to show the validity of arguments in any area of discourse.
Thus, these forms must permit the proof of all valid arguments.

Kant

himself formulates this requirement of adequacy for general logic; he
states,
PThe sole concern of general logic] is to give an exhaustive
exposition and a strict proof of the formal rules of all
thought (Bix).

The distinction between the forms of judgment and logical forms
is purely conceptual;

it is defined only in terms of whether a theory

purports to present the forms of judgments or of inferences.

The

interesting, philosophical question is. What relationship actually

exists between these two conceptions of or ways of defining forms?

Do

they provide identical sets of forms, does one set partially include

the other, or is one set

a

proper subset of the other, or do they

provide distinct sets?

According to Kant, the Analytic of general logic
consisting of three levels of analysis:
judgments, and of Inferences.

is a

unity

the theories of concepts, of

Through these levels of analysis, Kant

relates the theory of inference to that of judgments.

The latter

provides the logical forms of the theory of inference, just as the
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theor}^ of concepts provides material for
judgment.

Kant understands the forms of judgment
forms for

a

More exactly

be an adequate set of logical

theory of inference, which needs only to investigate the

valid inferences between judgments constituted by those
forms.
However, Kant’s theory of judgment pertains to the forms of
the conceptualization of an object.

Given this conception of judgment,

Kant cannot correctly persist in his conviction of the unity of
general
logic, for valid inferences can take place for

a

far broader range of

judgments than those countenanced by Kantian general logic.

Modern

logic has shown how to prove the validity of arguments which are

irreducible to syllogistic or immediate inference.

Such arguments

rest upon truth-functional sentential connectives or involve more than
two predicate constants or relations and multiple quantification.

The

famous "heads-of-horses” argument.

All horses are animals.
Therefore, all heads of horses are heads of animals,

which could not be treated in traditional logic, has become an
elementary exercise for the beginning student of modern logic.
The problem of discovering a generally adequate formal theory

of inference ultimately raises the question whether there are foundations upon which

logician develops

theory of logical forms can be justified.

a

a

When

a

formalized theory of inference, he represents the

logical constants upon which valid inference depends by means of
symbolic functions.

The definition of these symbols determines what

inferences are valid or invalid.

Kant represents quantification so that

subalternation is valid; whereas modern logic prohibits this inference
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bet\-^een

categoricals

Which system can he considered justified?

.

To answer this question in

whether there is

method ^ hy which

a

Kantian manner, we must know

a

a

logician can define the nature

of the logical constants upon which the validity of
arguments rest.

We must ask whether there is

a

criterion which determines what is

part of the logical form of an inference.

Kant’s own

ansv^?er

is that

logical forms rest upon the forms of judgment; hut Kant’s theory of

objectivity proves too narrow for

a

philosophical foundation of

a

theory of inference.
There is one area of formal logic, namely the propositional
calculus, for which

method and criterion are readily available.

a

This

calculus derives from the notion of the truth-functional sentential

connective.^

Truth-tables

foriTially

represent these connectives and

provide an effective procedure for determining the validity of arguments whose structure can be translated by means of truth-functions.
The formal theory of truth-functions is complete with respect to

proving all logical truths whose validity rests upon truth-functional
structure.

in a clear sense a truth -functional sentential

Thus,

connective is

logical constant in

a

a

formal theory of inference.

Moreover, the theory of truth-functions can be viewed as

analytic

a

priori

.

The method of setting up

consists in merely analyzing the notion of
table defining

a

unique truth value of

a

a

a

propositional calculus

truth-function.

connective

0,

A truth-

given the

exhaustive possibilities of truth values for its component sentences,
can he given

a

priori

,

and the adequacy of

a

set of such definitions

in the sense of expressing all possible truth-functions can be proved.
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pr ioi

GgaiiTj
a

i

ThuSj truth— functionality serves as an analytic

.

priori foundation for an important part of the theory of valid

inference:

the propositional calculus.

Unfortunately, as we have

seen, the propositional calculus is absent from Kant’s general logic.

Kantian general logic, on the other hand, deals with the internal
structure of

a

proposition.

However, the criterion of truth-functionality fails to define
a

logical constant with respect to

of

a

proposition.

a

tlieory of the internal structure

There are at least three possible views of quanti-

fication, none of which represents

a

truth-functional concept.

(1)

The Medieval view (see II. 1 &- .3): quantifiers indicate
the mode of supposition of the subject in a proposition.

(2)

The Kantian view:
quantifiers represent a special kind of
connection between t\N?o extensions in a subject-predicate
judgment.

(3)

The modern view:
which range over

a

quantifiers bind individual variables
domain of objects.

If a philosophical foundation could be found for determining the nature

of quantification and quality in the internal structure of

a

proposition

as truth-functionality is the foundation for the proposition calculus,

then the logician would know how to proceed in formulating the correct

formal theory of inference and how to decide which of the above views
are justified.

However, no satisfactory foundation in this sense has

yet been found in logic.
Moreover, the recognition of the three views of quantification

reveals that the theory of the internal structure of
is,

in a

Kantian sense, synthetic.

a

proposition

A set of definitions of the logical

of
constants for quantification, Quality, Relation and Modality, and
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the corresponding rules of inference is logicall}; compatible with

alternative systems of the same concepts.
internal structure of

a

Thus, the logic of the

proposition is essentially theoretical in

the sense in which the theory of truth-functions is not because of the

analytic

a

priori foundation of this theory.

The point

I

wish to make

concerning the nature of the Kantian system of logical functions is
that this system must he taken as synthetic of the concepts of Quantity,
Quality, Relation and Modality.
The synthetic character of logical theory was never explicitly

recognized by Kant, and his feelings toward the status of logical
theory is ambiguous.

Although the preponderance of evidence seems to

indicate that Kant felt that general logic is analytic

priori, Kant

a

never states that he considers general logic to be analytic

a

priori

.

The ambiguity in Kant’s view has been clearly perceived by Gottfried

Martin, who recognizes that Kantian logic must be considered synthetic.

According to Martin,
Kant retains the analytic character of formal logic in the
sense that [all true propositions in formal logic can be
proved from the principle of contradiction alone].
.

.

.

the development of modern logic has shown that
Kant’s fundamental distinction between mathematics and logic
The development has in our opinion
cannot stand.
shown that Kant did not go far enough. Kant recognized the
synthetic character of mathematics but retained the analytic
character of logic; I should like to say now that logic is
also a synthetic science (p. 88).
’'Hov^;ever]

,

.

.

.

If Kant’s theory of logical form had an analytic a priori foundation,

then views (1) and (3) above would be self— contradictory

.

In this sense

Kant evidently believed that his was the only logically possible system
of logical forms.

But this view is in error; thus, the theory of

168

inference for the internal structure of propositions
must be synthetic.

Martin is correct in his insight; however he does not

consequences with regard to Kantian thinking.
this recognition are,

I

full);

pursue its

The consequences of

believe, something special, and

I

wish to deal

with them now.
If logical theory is "in a Kantian sense"

a

synthetic science,

then we may raise the central question of Kantian philosophy with
regard to general logic
How are synthetic a p riori judgments (principles) possible in
general logic?

This general problem that Kant discovered underlying mathematics,

physics and metaphysics occurs in general logic as
To take this problem in

a

wel]..

Kantian sense is to ask for the

grounds by which to distinguish the true principles of logic from those
n

which are false.

The problem is to determine the logical system that

exists for human thinking as opposed to those that are merely empty
systems.

According to Kant, construction in intuition and the grounds

of the possibility of experience are the limitative factors for deter-

mining which mathematical and physical systems exists for human thought.
From among the logically possible systems, that is, those that are free

of contradiction, only Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics comply
with these limitations.

If we can parallel the synthetic

a

priori

problem as it exists in mathematics and physics for general logic, then
it must be possible to find the limiting factor of general logic that

distinguishes

a

Kantian system from the modern system of the predicate

calculus as that which does pertain to human cognition.
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It is insufficient for Kant to reply to
this problem by saying

that only those logical forms exist which are
constitutive of objectivity, for, as we have already noted (VI.
1), the possible systems of

science are themselves fluid.
argued, though not expressing

science

^ synthetic

synthetic

a_

priori

;

a

As Gottfried Martin has beautifully
tlie

point in quite this manner, no

priori precisely in Kant’s sense of being

that is, as involving the determination of

a

unique set of true synthetic
^ priori principles.
Moreover, Martin fails to observe that while being synthetic,
logic cannot be synthetic

a

priori precisely in Kant’s sense, for the

dimensions of the synthetic
^ priori problem in general logic outstrips the possibility of answering it in

a

strictly Kantian manner of

identifying the one actual system of logic for human thought out of

number of logically possible alternatives.

a

According to Kantian

thinking, while other systems of mathematics and physics are logically

possible, only those systems which are constructible or pertain to the

grounds of possible experience are, respectively, mathematically or

physicall y possible

(p.

23).

But to carry this same manner of reasoning

through with regard to general logic one arrives at
mulation.

It

makes no sense to ask which one of

a

possible systems (of logic) are logically possible.

a

nonsensical for-

number of logically
All are logically

possible in virtue of their freedom from contradiction.
words, any consistent system of logical forms exists as

In
a

other

logical

system of human thought.
These concluding remarks have been theoretical and philosophical
in nature,

I

and were meant only as an elaboration upon the insight that
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we discovered, and shai'ed with Gottfried Martin,
concerning the nature
of Kant’s system of general logic.

They raise the underlying problem

in Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment, rather
than try to solve
it.

And it is doubtful whether

a

solution can be provided

V'^ithin a

strict interpretation of Kantian presuppositions.

§

3

- A

Concluding Assessment
Kant brings to the logical theory of his own day

a

systematization which capsulized the Wolffian logic into its essential
elements and organized it along philosophical lines.®

Thus, Kant

eliminates such unnecessary division of judgment as the simple/com.plex
distinction, and his classification of judgments clearly identifies
the nature of logical functions and, most importantly, their gramma-

tical position in
a

a

judgment relative to other functions.

Kant reveals

sensitivity to logical problems in his attempt to distinguish singu-

lar judgments from generally quantified judgments according to their

logical form, and in his theory of modality.

This latter theory

represents Kant’s logical acumen into the requirements of
how the objectivit}^ of judgment is constituted.

a

theory of

He is correct in

noting, N 3111 (see 1.2), that without modality judgment is impossible,
and, hence, that assertoricity is itself

logic, Kant proves himself

a

of the standards of

\s?orthy

In his modal

modal form.
a

modern logician

by eliminating everything psychological from his formal treatment of

how a cognition is maintained by

a

judger.

Nevertheless, Kant is apparently unable to break out of the

presuppositions of his day regarding

sucli

topics as the treatment of
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obversion.

He evidently sees no problem in the contemporary
treatment,

but as we have seen, Kant himself needs

a

theory of obversion; its

omission causes him difficulty in his attempt to systematize
the
doctrine of immediate inference.
But the interest in the preceding investigation reaches beyond

the merely historical or the scholarly.

be

a

The discussion has proved to

vehicle for revealing important problems concerning the nature

of logical theory.
problems of
logic as

a

Kant shows an awareness of some of the underlying

philosophy of logic in his attempt to structure general

a

unity; and the problems he incurs in this attempt are

problems we have with us today.
Moreover, the unity of logic at which Kantian thinking aims

but which Kant was unable to attain sufficiently for the philosophical
grounding of the theory of inference, is not totally alien to concerns
in recent philosophy of logic.

inference upon
possible.

a

Kant attempts to base the theory of

theory of judgmental forms that make objectivity

In this attempt he is not far removed from those modern

logicians who develop the theory of logical forms on the basis of

theory of the formal mechanisms of reference to objects in
W.

V.

0.

develops

Quine is especially noteworthy in this regard.
tlie

formal theory of inference on the basis of

the mechanisms of objective reference.

a

a

domain.

Quine^
a

theory of

The possibility of this

philosophy of logical forms rests on Quine’s conviction that these

mechanisms are the mechanisms of quantification upon which valid
inference depends.

This unity between the mechanisms of reference and

the formal theory of inference is logically parallel to, though, of
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course, not parallel to in content, the Kantian unity
betv’een the

forms of judgment and the theory of inference.

Furthermore, Kant makes logical distinctions which present

challenge to the modern theory of reference.

a

Central to the Kantian

conception of judgment is

a

mechanisms of reference.

As we have seen in 11,3, quantification for

distinction between quantification and the

Kant fails to carry ontological commitment in the Quinean sense of

commitment to the existence of objects in

a

domain.

The mechanisms

of reference are revealed by Kant in the theory of modality (see

According to Kant, reference is

maintained or posited.

a

function of how

a

IV. 3).

cognition is

The assertoric and apodictic judgments serve

to posit a cognition objectively for all judgers, while the problematic

judgment does not.

The notion of

a

quantifier that expresses existence

or the positing of an object "outside” of
a

a

judger would be, for Kant,

confusion with regard to the role of logical functions in

Positing is an activity on the part of

a

a

judgment.

judger with respect to what

he entertains in his consciousness.

Those

v7ho

reject Quine’s existential interpretation of

quantification in terms of reference and

a

domain of objects^*^ will

find in Kant an original means of expressing existence.

how

a

theory of reference might be developed as part of

Kant shows us
tlie

pragmatics

of a logic.
Indeed, the most logically fruitful part of Kant’s theory of
the forms of judgment lies in his theory of modality.

This theory can

serve as a model on which to formalize theories of opinion, belief, and

knowledge,

for the Kantian theory makes the needed distinctions among

these concepts for a viable basis on which to present and
expand
the formalism already provided in this study.

FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER

I

§ 1
1.

This discussion is a summary of the definition of judgment given
by Kant in N 3044-3066, esp. N 3047, 3049-3052 (see below § 3 and
n. 13).
I shall return to the Kantian conceptions of judgment
and of objectivity in Chapter IV, § 1.

2.

The Norman Kemp-Smith translation (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,
1963) will be used throughout.
However, if I deem that corrections
of his translation be required, these will be indicated in a footnote.
Otherwise, page references to the Critique of Pure Reason
will appear in the text; the second edition, indicated by B, will
be used, unless the passage appears only in the first edition,
which will be indicated by A. The corrections of the Kerap-Sraith
translation will be based upon Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(Hamburg:
Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1956 ).~

3.

See Klaus Reich, Die Vollstandigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel,
Auf (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Richard SclToetz, 1948),
2.
30;
"Die Funktion kann also, wenn man will, als das "Gesetz"
p.
der Handlung oder Operation bezeichnet werden.
Bei dieser
Ausdrucksweise bemerkt man die Uebereinstimmung diese Begriffes
mit dem mathematischen Funktionsbegriff leicht." However, it does
not occur to Reich to formulate the structure of a logical function
on the model of a mathematical function as I shall in § 3.
.

4.

The respects in which Kant's table do differ, by his own admission,
from a classificatory table in general logic are:
that singular
quantification and infinite quality are made "co-ordinate" forms
However, as we shall see, this move does not introof judgment.
duce any new logical constant not already available in general
Furthermore, Kant drops a distinction a judgments under
logic.
Relation into Simple and Complex. This distinction is only
grammatical; there are no logical constants corresponding to such
Finally, Kant introduces
a division of judgments (see III. 3).
the assertoric form as a distinct modal constant of a judgment.
This was not done in the textbook which Kant himself used for his
But this move, as we shall see, is
lectures on general logic.
based upon considerations appropriate to the general logic of

judgments.
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5.

The idea that these forms of judgment are logical
constants is
also maintained by Hans Lenk, Kritik der Logischen
Konstanten
Kapitel I (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., IHHSX
^

6.

Quoted from Norman Kemp-Smith, A Commen tary to Kant’s 'Critique
of Pure Reason (New York; Humanities Press, 1%2
173.
’

),

p.

§ 2
7.

Reprinted in Translations from the Philosophical
0p_. cit , § 3.
Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. by Peter Geach and Max Black
(Oxford
Basil Blackwell, 1966), see p. 3.
.

:

8.

Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Kant’s Classification of the Forms of
Judgment," in Kant
Disputed Questions, ed. by Moltke S. Gram
(Chicago:
Quadrangel Books, 1967), p. 281.
:

9.

10.

Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1966), p. 78.
Further references to°this work
will be acknowledged in the text.
"Ohne modalitaet ist gar kein Urtheil moglich also ist das
modale Urtheil nicht unrein." For the division of judgments
into impure and pure, see Meier, Auszug § 309.
;

,

cit

(Oxford:

The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 356.

11.

Qp_.

12.

See also, Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics , ed. by
Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,
§
n.
4
where
Kant
that his procedure in transsays
1950),
20,
cendental logic is that of basing categorial analysis upon
logical distinctions.

§

.
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13.

Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass:
Logik the Prussian Academy
of Science edition, Ka nt s Gesammelte Schriften , vol. 16 (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter and Co., 19*247^ Translations of these notes
are my own; the original German will be given in a footnote with
Kant’s spelling preserved.
,

’

14.

’s Introduction to Logic, trans. by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
Philosophical Library, 1963). Quoted passages from
(New York:
the Logik, "Einleitung" will be taken from this translation;
Logik
translations from the body of the Logik ( Kant’s Werke
Physische Geogra phie , Padagogik , the Prussian Academy of Science
edition, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 9 [Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter and Co7, 1923]) are my own and the original German will
be given in a footnote.

Kant

:

,
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References to these notes will appear in the
text, abbreviated
as follows:
Bloraberg^Blom. , Philippi^phil.
Politz=:Pbl
Busolt=Bus., Dohna-Wundlacken=D-W, and the Wiener
Logik=WL
followed by the page reference in K ant^s
VorlesungiFT~V^iesungen
Logik the Prussian Academy of Science edition
Kant’s
Ge sammelte Schr iften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
and Co
T966)
Again, the original German will be given in a
footnote.'^

15.

^

,

Similar comments about formalization may be found in R.
M Martin ’
Trut±
D enotation, Chapter I (London:
Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1958) and Hao Wang, A Survey of Mathematical Logic
(Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Co., 1951 )7~pp. '^57-67

16,

.

There are cases where formalized distortion is desirable as
when True is assigned to p3q when the antecedent is false.
In
such cases distortion is innocuous, for one's material in this
case, say ordinary language, is silent with regard to tlie truthvalue of p=5q in this case.
Furthermore, are different types of
inexactness: vagueness and ambiguity to mention only two.
Problems presented by each of these would have to be handled
differently.
Finally, perhaps the most philosophical interesting
case of what may be called inexactness is inexactness within the
formal language-system itself.
Such a case arises when a concept
cannot be fully formalized in the sense that the formalization
characterizes this concept and nothing else, as in the case of
the formalization of the concept of integers.

17.

CHAPTER II
See Peter Stravs'son, Introduction to Logical Theory Chapter 6
(London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1952); I. M. Bochenski, Ancient
Formal Logic (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1963);
Jan -Lukasiewicz, Aristotle 's Syllogistic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1957 ). Lukasiewicz takes the functions of the
A and I categoricals as primitive and introduces those for E and
This seems to
0 through definition with propositional negation.
logic in
techniques
modern
bold
upon
the
of
innovation
based
be a
syllogistic.
rendering tlie Aristotelian

1.

§
2.

3.

,

1

”Im allgemeinen Urtheile wird die Sphaera eines Begrifs ganz
innerhalb der Sphaera eines andern beschlossen; im particularen
ein theil der ersteren unter die Sphare des andern; im einzelnen
ein Begrif, der gar keine Sphaeram hat, mithin bios als Theil,
unter die sphaeram eines andern beschlossen.” This passage is
used by Jasche, Logik , § 21.

”Die actus des Verstandes sind offenbar verschieden ob man
gleich sieiit, dass der eine Gebrauch des Verstandes eben so viel
gilt, als der andere."
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4.

Quoted from Philotheus Boehner, ^d^eval Logic
(Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1952), p. 23.

5.

’’Die

6.

0. Sickenberger, "Kants Lehre von Der Quantitat
des Urtheils "
Kantstudien II (1898). The following series of page references
in the text are to this article,

quantitaet betrift nicht die Begriffe, sondern ihr
Verhaltnis.”

,

9.
7.

8.

"Unter dem allgemeinen sind die besondern und einzelnen alle
enthalten, aber nicht unter dem besondern alle einzelne."
This point is explicitly observed by Meier, § 301: "Das
''besonderes Urtheil] ist entweder zugleich allgemein wahr, ein
nicht bloss besonderes Urtheil, oder nicht, ein bloss besonderes
Urtheil.

"Im bejahenden Urtheile wird das Subject unter der Sphare eines
Pradicats gedacht, im verneinenden wird es ausser der Sphare
des letztern gesetzt.” See also N 3068.
10.

"In den kategorischen
die Materie derselben
(des Einstimniung oder
Pradicat bestimmt und

11.

P.

12.

G.

13.

J.

14.

For

Urtheilen machen Subject und Pradicat
aus, die Form, durch welche das Verhaltniss
des Widerstreits ) zwischen Subject und
ausgedruckt wird, heisst die

T. Geach, Reference and Generality (Ithaca:
Press, 1962), p. 37.

Gornell University

Frege, "Function and Goncept," in Black and Geach, p. 30.

S. Mill, A System of Logic (London:
Ltd., 1965 ), I, 4, § 1.
a

Longmans, Green and Co.

discussion of this topic, see A. N. Prior, Formal Logic
(Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 163-164.

,

2nd ed.
15.

These principles are presented in Logik, "Einleitung, " Kapitel VII.
See also N 2172, 2174, 2176, 2178, 2181, 2185; for example,
"Das (logischo) Criterium der Warheit in der Logik ist
N 2172:
erstlich das der Moglichkeit nach dem Satz des Wiederspruchs,
zweitens der logischen Wirklichkeit nach dem Zureichenden Grundes.
Moglich und Gegrundet." And, N 2178: "(Also sind es drei
logischo (formale) Arten die Warheit zu finden: 1) principium
condictionis et identitatis; 2. principium rationis; 3. principium exclusi medii inter 2 contradictoria )"
.

16.

"(Das dritte princip ist das exclusi medii:
Falschheit das Gegonstheils Warheit bewiesen wird. )"

N 2178:

da durch die

178

17.

g 22, Anmerk
3, "In verneindenden Urtheilen afficirt die
Negation immer die Copula."

18.

Aristotle,
Interpretatione in The Basic Works of Aristotle
’
ed. by Richard McKeon (New York:
Random House, 1941)'^

.

.

§

3

19.

The following discussion is based upon Geach, Reference
and
Chapter 3, esp. pp. 51-52, 62-63, 71-72; and'^on
Ernest Moody, 1 ru th and Con sec|uence 3_n Mediaeval Logic (Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 20-21.

20.

"Ein jeder Begriff, als Theilbegriff ist in der Vorstellung
,
der Binge enthalten, als Erkenntnissgrund, d.i. als Merkmal sind
diese Binge unter ihm enthalten.
In der erstern Rucksicht hat
jeder Begriff einen Inhalt, in der andem einen Umfang.

"Inhalt und Umfang eines Begriffes stehen gegen einander in
umgekehrten Verhaltnisse.
Je mehr namlich ein Begriff unter
sich enthalt, desto weniger enthalt er in sich und umgekehrt.
"Anmerkung.
Bie Allgemeinheit oder Allgemeingultigkeit des
Begriffes beruht nicht darauf, dass der Begriff ein Theilbegriff,
sondern dass er ein Erkenntnissgrund ist."
This passage is paralleled by N 2902 and 2881.
21.

"Bie Erkenntniss ist Zweyfach, intuitus, Anschauung, conceptus
Begriff.
Intuitus ist eine einzelne Vorstellung, repraesentatio
singularis
Conceptus ist repraesentatio commun is, die
vielen Sachen gemein ist."
,

.

.

.

.

22.

"Ein jeder Begriff enthalt mehr mogliche Begriffe unter sich."

23.

"Bei alien Begriffen merken wir den Umfang (sphaera)."

24.

"Sphaera ist der Umfang eines Begriffes, und geht auf die Menge
der Binge, die unter dem Begriff enthalten sind." A simi].ar
passage occurs in Bohna-Wundlacken, p. 755.

25.

"Bas Urtheil ist entweder: a.) allgemein, wo das Pradicat mit
alien Begriffen die zur Sphaera des Subjects gehoren verglichen
wird b. ) wo es nur mit einigen verglichen wird, das ist ein
besondres Urtheil."
;

26.

See, for instance, W. V. 0. Quine, Methods of Logic, Rev.
Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1959), p. 77.
(New York:

ed.
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CHAPTER III
§

1

Begriff Caesar ein einzelner Begriff ist der
nicht
eine Menge unter sich fasst, sondern nur ein
einzelnes Ding

ist."

"Aber der Gebrauch eines conceptus kann singularis
seyn.
Denn
was von vielen Dingen gilt, kann auchauf einen
einzelnen Fall
angewendet Vv^erden.
Icb denke mir einen Menscben in individuo
e.i. ich gebrauche den Begriff des Menscben,
um ein ens singulare
zu haben. ...
Ich kann in meinem Urtbeil das Ding mit alien
einigen, und einem einzelnen Ding vergleichen. "

2.

’

See,

for instance, D. P. Dryer, Kant’s Solution for Verification
Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin, LtdT^' 1966),
p. 109; and Thomas Kaebao Swing, Kant's Transcendental Logic
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1%97, pp. 7-8.
Further'
references to Swing will be acknowledge in the text.

3.

jni

4.

For examples, see N 3080, ^gik,
Logik, p. 931.

5.

"Es ist ein Fehler in der Logik dass man algeraeine, besondere und
einzelne Begrife annimmt, denn es giebt solche nicht, aber der
Gebrauch derselben kann so eingeteilt werden. Demnach werden wir
nicht die conceptus, sondern, die judicia so einteilen, weil sie
die Verhaltnisse der Begriffe sind, denn ich kann einen Begrif
mit dem andern ganz vergleichen, oder nur einige Teile, oder
nur einen einzigen Teil.
Dieser Fehler ist aber so eingerissen,
dass man ihn nicht vermeiden kann."

6.

Methods of Logic, p. 216.

7.

"Also sind die indicia singularia den vniversalibus gleich zu
schatzen, und Umgekehrt ist ein indicium vniversale als ein
einzelnes Urteil in Ansehung der sphaera zu betrachten. Vieles,
so fern es an sich nur eines ist." The first part of this note
is well-known, but the phrase beginning "und Umgekehrt" appears
only in this note; it is not incorporated by Jasche in his use
of the note in § 20 of the Logik.

8.

See Prior, Formal Logic

§

9.

10.

,

p.

§

21, Anmerk.

1,

and Wiener

160.

2

See Logik § 22, Anmerk 3:
"In verneinenden Urtheilen afficirt
die Negation iinmer die Copula, in unendlichen wird nicht die
Copula, sondern das Pradicat durch die Negation afficirt."
,

.

See Prior, T’ormal Logic , p. 127.
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1.

Das \erhaltniss ist zwar desselbe, wie bey
einem bejahenden
Urteil, aber die negation ist doch immer da,
und folglicb sind
sievom bejahenden unterscbieden. Diese Sache scheint
in der
Logic eine subtilitaet zu seyn. Aber in der
Metaphysic wird es
vom W’icbtigkeit
.

12.

(Kant is here speaking of the infinite judgment
Men are
non-educated ) "Also ist die Bestimung des Begrifs der
Menschen
durcli die Schranken des Begrifs der Gelehrten."

13.

"Sage ich aber: anima est non mortal.is; so ich nicht bloss
dass die Seels nichts sterblicbes enthalte, sondern dass
sie
auch in der sphaera alles dessen, was nicht sterbliches
ist,
enthalten sey. Es ist also hierbey etwas besonders gesagt, dass
ich einen Begriff nahmlich nicht bloss von der sphaera eines
andern Begiiffes ausschliesse, sondern auch den Begriff unter
der ganzen ubrigen sphaera denke, die nicht unter dera Begriffe,
der ausgeschlossen ist, gehort." This passage is paralleled by
r
to
r
.y

N 3065.

14.

"Der Uberrest ist Unendlich, wenn man vom Unendlichen
einen bestimmten Theil wegnimmt."
N 3069:

,

15.

"Sie heissen judicia infinita, weil sie unbegranzt sind.
Sie
sagen nur immer, was nicht ist, und solcher praedicate kann ich
unzahlige rnachen, denn die sphaera der praedicate, die mit non
afficirt vom subjecte konnen gesagt werden, ist unendlich."

16.

N 3065:

"Das Llnendliche Urtheil zeigt
an
dass [ein
Subiect] ausser der Sphare desselben in dem unendlichen irgendwo
sei; folglicli stellt es die sphare des Pradicats als beschrankt
vor." See also N 3063.

17.

Immanuel Kant ^s Vorlesungen ilber die Metaphysik ed. by Karl H. L.
Pdlitz (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964),
See also Critique BllO.
Further references to the
pp. 49-50.
Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik will be acknowledged in the text;
the work itself will be referred to as Vorlesungen / Me taphy s ik

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

,

.

18.

Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I, Chapter 6, in McKeon. See also
Prior, Formal Logic, p. 125; and M. Thompson, "On Aristotle's
Square of Opposition," in Aristotle
A Collection of Critical
Essays ed. by J. M. E. Moravcsik (Garden City: Doubleday and
:

,

Co.,
19.

Inc.,

1967

),

pp.

58-59.

294:
"Man kann also alle verneinende Urtheile in
bejahende verx^andeln, wenn man die Verneinung von dem Verbin-

Meier,

§

dungsbegriffe weg zum Pradicate setzt."
20.

"Durch diese denkt man sich doch mehr als durch ein verneinendes.
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§ 3

21.

See, for instance, Kemp-Sraith, Commentary,
p. 193.

22.

und die Vorstellung dieser Art von Verknlipkung
beider
Urtheile unter einander zur Einheit des Bewusstseins
wird die
Consequenz genannt, welche die Form der bypotbetischen
Urtheile
ausmacht. ”

23.

”,Uie

24.

”Es Sind da 2 Erkenntnisse die als Grund and Folgen
miteinander
verbunden sind.” Also Wiener L ogik p. 933; ”Im bypotbetischen
Urtheile betrachte icb die Verbindung zweyer Urtheile. als Grund
’
und Folge."

.

.

Form der VerknUpkung in den bypotbetischen Urtbeilen
ist
zwiefacb:
die setzende ( modus ponens) oder die aufhebende (modus
tollens "

,

25.

"Der Grund ist das, worauf etwas ganz notbwendiger Weise folgt;
oder, der Grund ist das, worauf etwas nacb allgemeinen Regeln
folgt.

26.

This discussion of causal conditionality follows that of
Robert C. Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," APQ Monograph
Series, Monograph 2 (Oxford:
Oxford University Pr^s, 1968)
pp. 106-107.

27.

"Aller Grund ist zweifach: entweder ein Logischer oder ein
RealGrund.
Der logische Grund ist das, wodurch etwas gesetzt
Oder aufgehoben wird nacb dem Satz der Identitat. Der RealGrund aber ist das wodurch etwas gesetzt oder aufgehoben wird,
nacb dem Satz des Widerspruchs. Der erste ist analytisch, und
der andere synthetisch.
Der nexus logicus kann zwar auch
nacb dem Princ ipio contra dictionis oder nach dem Satz des Widerspruchs, weit deutlicher und leichter aber nach dem Principio
identitatis eingesehen werdem.
Icb leite den 'Begriff aus
dem andern her, nach der Ableitung, die durch die Analysis
geschieht.
Die folge liegt also im Grunde, und ist implicite
an und fiir sich selbst einerlei rait ihm, aber nicht explicite
Daher ist die Verschiedenheit nicht real, sondern nur der Form
nach.
Ein Realgrund ist, dessen Folge eine reale Folge ist."
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

28.

I

"Die Materie der disjunctiven Urtheile sind also verschiedene
Urtfieile, die aber in opposition betrachtet werden, so dass alle
Urtheile zusaramen genornmen, das ganze Urtheil ausmachen. Man
sieht wohl, dass sie bloss eine logische Eintheilung ausmachen."
See also N 3095, 3098, 3101, 3107.
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29.

"Die Disiunctiven Urtheile bestehen aus zwey, oder
mohreren
Urtbeilen, die ein Verhaltniss der opposition baben,
welche opposition abei contradictorisch seyn muss, es mussen also
die membra
contradictoriscb seyn, aber zusamrnen dem Conceptui diuerso gleicb
^
seyn."

30.

"Alle Glieder der Disjunction, ausser Einem, zusaramengenommen,
macben das contradictoriscbe Gegentbeil diese Einen aus. Es
findet also bier eine Dicbotomie statt, nacb welcher, wenn eines
von beiden wahr ist, das andre falscb sein muss und umgekehrt."

31.

"Es wird bier ent^veder 1) von der Wahrheit Eines Gliedes der
Disjunction auf die Falscbbeit der iibrigen geschlossen, oder
2) von der Falscbbeit aller Glieder, ausser Einem, auf der
Wabrbeit dieses Einen."

§ 4

32.

"Ein Urtbeil, welcbes aus einem bejabenden und vemeinenden auf
eine sebr versteckte Art zusammengesetzt ist, beisst ein
exponibeles Urtbeil ." See also, Logik, § 31 and N SllTr

33.

In N 3112 Kant gives tbe example "Only men are saved tbrougb
Gbristianity " I find it dubious that ’only’ represents an
exponible quantitative comparison, for it is equivalent to just
one universal, affirmative judgment, ’All things saved tbrougb
Gbristianity are men’.
.

"Da die Natur der exponiblen Satze lediglicb von Bedingungen
der Spracbe abbangt, nacb welcben man zwei Urtbeile auf einmal
in der Kurze ausdr'dcken l<ann
so gebort die Bemerkung, dass es
in unserer Spracbe Urtbeile geben kbnne, die exponirt werden
mussen, nicbt in die Logik, sondern in die Grammatik." See
also Politz, p. 580.

34.

:

GHAPTER IV
§
1.

1

"Der Modalitat nacb, durcb welcbes Moment sind das Verbaltniss
des gangen Urtbeils zum Erkenntnissvermogen bestimmt ist, die
Urtbeile entweder problematiscbe oder assertoriscbe oder
apodictiscbe, " and "Dieses Moment der Modalitat zeigt also nur
die Art und Weise an, wie im Urtbeils etwas bebauptet oder
verneint wird."
;

2.

z.E. alle Menscben sind Notbwendig unsterblicb, bier
.
ist notbwendig die limitation, die die Art und Weise zeigt wie
icb et\'7as bebaupte oder vemeine."

’’.

.
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3.

Urtl:ieil 1st die Vorstellung
der Einheit des
u
Verhallnisses des Erkentnisgrundes zum
moglichen Erkentnisse
eines obiects."

K 3052:
del-

"ludicium est repraesentatio unitatis
obiectlvao (in
Irkentnis eines obiects ) in conscientla
variorum conceptuum
Bewustseyns) 1st allgemeinguitig und

notbweidlg"®

N 30S5:
"Urtheil; Die Vorstellung der Art, wie
verschidenen
Begiifre objective (fur jedermann) zu einem
Bewustseyn gehoren.
*(d, i. um ein Erkentnis des objects auszumacben. )"
§

4.

2

Kemp-Smith translates ’wirklicb’ as ’real’; the more suitable
translation, which Kemp-Smith himself employs at all other
times
is

’actual’.

5.

"Die problematiachen sind mit dem Bewusstsein der blossen
Moglichkeit, die assertorischen mit dem Bewusstsein der Wirklichkeit, die apodiktischen endlich mit dem Bewusstsein der
Nothwendigkeit des Urtheilens begleitet."

6.

Arthur Lovejoy, "Kant’s Classification of the Forms of Judgment"
p.

7.

279.

Quoted from P. Hauch, "Die Entstehung der Kantischen Urteilstafel,"
Kantsstudien, XI (1906), p. 204; "Man hat
noch eine andere
Eintheilung der Satze, die von gewissen sehr allgemeinen Bestiramungen herruhrt, welche man dem Bindewortchen beylegt. Diese
Bestimmungen beruhen uberhaupt auf dem Unterschiede des Moglichen,
Wirklichen und Notwendigen.”
.

10.

’

.

.

8.

For example, R. M. Martin, Toward ^ Systematic Pragmatics
(Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959); and his
Inte ns ion and Decision (Englewood Cliffs;
Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963~)7 Chapter II.

9.

An Introduction to the
Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief
University Press, 1962).
tv^o
Cornell
Notions (Ithaca;
Logic of the
:

Nicholas Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht-Holland
Further references
D. Reidel Publishing" Co. ,n)968), ChapteF~XIV.
to Rescher are from this work and will be acknowledged in tlie
text.
11.

von Wright, An Essay on Modal Logic (Amsterdam:
Holland Publishing Co., 1951), see "Preiace."

G.

H.

North-
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§ 3

12.

Problema tische Urtheile sind solchcj deren niaterie gegeben 1st
dem moglichen Verhaltnis zwischen praedicat und subiect."

rait

13.

”Der assertoriscbe sagt von logiscber Wirklicbkeit oder Wabrhcit,
wie etvva in einem hypothetischen Vernunftschluss das Anlecedens
im Obersatze problematiscb, im Untersatze assertorisch vorkoramt,
und zeigt an, dass der Satz mil dem Verstande mach dessen Gesetzen scbon verbunden sei." Kamp-Smith translates this passage:
”lhe assertoric deals with logical reality or truth. Thus, for
instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent is in the
major premiss problematic, in the minor assertoric, and what the
syllogism sicj ] shows is that the consequence fs^J] follows
in accordance with the laws of the understanding."
;

14.

Logik

15

”...

‘

§

,

30, Anmerk

.

3;

Wiener Logik, p. 934.

in [dem assertoricsh] lege ich dem Object ausser mir,
und nicht in Gedanken, ein Pradicat bei."

§ 4

16.

"C ontingens ist das, wovon das Gegentheil raoglich ist."

17.

"Ein nothwendiges apodictisches verneinendes Urtheil ist die
Unmoglichkeit.

18.

"Ein allgemein bejahendes Urtheil wird contraponirt, wenn man
sein Pradicat in einen verneinenden Begriff verwandelt, und das
vorige Subject von demselben allgemein verneinet. Alle wahren
allgemein bejahenden Urtheile konnen contraponirt werden, das ist,
wera ihr Pradicat nicht zukommt, denen kommt auch ihr Subject
nicht zu."

19.

Da findt eine solche metathesis,
"Per judicia contraposita
d. h. Versezung der terminorum statt, wo die Qualitaet mit
verandert wird, es wird nehmlich ein negativer Saz. Die
Quantitaet aber bleibt, weil nur ein algemeiner Saz contraponirt
werden kann."

20.

"Die per contrapositionem iudicii gehoren zur modalitaet; aus
einem assertorischen ein apodictisch Urtheil zu machen."
"Bei der contraposition betrift die Veranderung bios
Pdlitz
Modalitaet."
die

.

:

21.

Kant is illustrating a passage in Meier, § 351: "Wenn man in
den besonders verneinenden Urtheilen, die Verneinung zum Predicate
setzt, so werden sie besonders bejahende Urtheile, und konnen also
alsdenn schlechtweg umgehehrt werden."

185

t*Gnn wGnn das Pradicat als dasjsnigej was das
Subject unter
sich enthalt, mithin die ganza Sphere verneint wird; so muss
auch ein Theil derselben verneint werden, d.i, das Subject.”
See alsOj N 3170, 3189 and Pdlitz p. 585 and Wiener Lopik

p.
23.

939.

”A11 Korper sind theilbar (assertorisch ). Was also nicht
theilbar ist, ist kein Korper (apodictisch Urtheil, well es
sich wiederspricht, ein Korper und nicht theilbar zu sein, und
ein Satz, dessen Gegensteil sich wiederspricht, apodictisch
ist.

)

(Man kann auch einen empirischen Satz zum Beispiel brauchen.
e.g. Alle Menschen sind sterblich.
Denn, diesen Vorausgesetzt,
ist der Satz: was nicht sterblich ist, ist nicht Mensch,

apodictisch ausgedrukt.

)"

CHAPTER V

1.

"Das Urtheil, wodurch etwas als wahr vorgestellt wird
ist
subiective:
das Vor\%/arhalten. ”
See, also, Dohna-Wundlacken,
"rpurwahrhalten] ist das Urteil ira Verhaltnis under der
p. 731:
Beziehung auf das Subjekt."

2.

"rFiirwahrhalten] betrift nur die Urtheilskraft in Ansehung der
subiectiven Criterien der Subsumtion eines Urtheils unter

.

.

.

obiective Regeln."
3.

For a discussion of these reasons see N 2495 and Logik,
"Einleitung, ” Kapitel IX.

4.

"Practisch hinreichend vorwarhalten in Absicht auf das Interesse,
"Ich
und zwar von jederraann." See also Wiener Logik, p. 851:
kann einen subjectiven Grund haben, etwas fur wahr zu halten, doch
so, dass dieser bestandig ist, aber fur mich nicht auf jede Zeit
hinreichend, sondern nur auf die Lage, worin ich mich befinde.”

5.

"Gewissheit ist ein hinreichendes bev-;ustseyn Wahrheit.” Certainty
"Die
is the cognition of truth; for example, Meier, § 155:
Gewissheit (certitudo subiective spectata ) ist das Bewusstsein
der Wahrheit, oder die klare Erkenntniss der Wahrheit."

—

6.

"Bei der Gewissheit ist es iiberhaupt nicht moglich, das gegentheil
anzunehmen.

7.

See N 2455 and Dohna-Wundlacken, pp. 734-735.
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.

9.

Ein etnpirisch Erkenntniss ist ein Erkenntniss
durch den
Verstand uber Objecte die durch Sinnlichkeit
vorgestelt werden.
Alle empirisclie Gewisheit geht also auf das
Verhaltniss der
sinnlichen Vorstellungen und biebei mussen wir es
bewenden
lassen." See also, Wiener Logik, p.
856, and N 2485.
See Politz, p. 544:
"Die Empiriscbe Gewisheit ist assertorisch
Also, Logik "Einleitung," Kapitel IX.

"

,

10.

"Empirisch kann ich von einer Sache gewiss seyn
nicht dass sie Nothwendig sey."

ll*

die rationale [Gewissheit ist] apodiktisch, d.h. die
Gewisheit einer Erkenntniss die mit dem Bewustsein der Nothwendigkeit verbunden ist."

12.

Die Gewissheit, die zur Kenntnis des Gebots oder Verbots einer
Handlung gehdrt, ist die moralische."

13.

See also Dohna-Wundlacken, pp. 734-735.

14.

See, for instance, N 2484:
"Ich bin moralisch gewiss, nicht:
es ist moralisch gewiss." Also, Dohna-Wundlacken, p. 734:
"Da
kann isch nur sagen: ich b in gewiss. Aber bei der Gewissheit:
es
ist gewiss, dies ist allgemeingultig.

15.

"(es ist unmoglich, dass ich bei meinera Erfahrungsurtlieil kbnne
betrogen sein; da ist das Vor\'^ahrhalten apodictisch, obgleich
der Satz obiective zufallig ist. )

16.

"Das Furiv'ahrhalten kan apodictisch sein, ohne dass das Erkentnis
obiective apodictisch ist. Jenes ist nur das Bewustsein, dass
man sich unmoglich in der Anwendung ungezweifelt-gewisser Regeln
habe irren konnen, z.B. in der Erfahrung.
Es ist gewiss, dass
es Erfahrung sei."

17.

Quoted from Abbott, p. 61.

18.

"Unsere Erkenntniss kann Gegenstande der Erfahrung begreifen,
und urisere Gewissheit kann doch entweder empirisch, oder rational
Z.B. der Satz von der Potenz vermittelst des Rebels hat
seyn,
empirische Gewissheit, aber auch rationale. Denn wenn die
so \'7urde ich es schon
Erfahrung uns auch von ihr nichts lehrte
durch die Vernunft erkennen konnen."

•

•

dass sie dasey ’

.

See also Politz, p. 544.

:
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19.

”Was ich meine, da urtheile ich (mein Von^ahrhalten mit
)
Bewustsein (nnr fur) problematisch. ... Was ich glauhe, assertorisch, aher nicht als nothwendig (gilt fur mich).
Was
ich weiss:
als apodictische nach Gesetzen des Verstandes; wenn
gleich die Warheit hlos empirisch ist, so ist doch das von^arhalten
apodictisch^ d.i. allgemein nothwendig (gilt fur
.

.

.

.

alle.
20.

.

.

)"

”Beym Meinen ist unser Urtheil prohlematisch" and ’Beym Glauhen
urtheilen wir assertorisch, d.h. wir erklaren uns fiir die
Wahrheit
;

.

21.

22.

”Beim meinen, urtheile ich Prohlematisch, heim Glauhen
Assertorisch, heim Wissen apodiktisch.”
"Von Meinungen fangen wir grostenteils hei unsern Erkenntnissen
an.

cit

(London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 231.
See Reseller, p. 40.

23.

C^.

24.

"Aller Glauhe 1st entweder theoretisch
oder practisch."
The following discussion of belief is gleaned from N 2487 and
the student lecture notes.

25.

"Glauhen ist ein subjectiv zureichendes, aher objective
unzureichendes Furv^?ahrhalten.
Subjectiv ist allemahl der Sinn."

26.

"Alles, was wir aus Zweeken annehmen, ist fur uns nur suhjektiv
hinreichend - - (d.h. ich muss annehmen, dass dies so sei, sonst
komme ich mit meiner Vernunft hier nicht fort dies kann ich nun
freilich nicht also objektiv geltend annehmen, doch ist es fur
mich hinreichend. )

.

,

.

.

.

—

27.

"Der praktische Glauhe ist oft fester als alles Wissen. Bei
].ezterm hort man noch nach Gegengrunden aher heim praktischen
Z.E. Der Glauhe an Gott und eine andere Welt ist
Glauhen nicht.
fester als alles Wissen, well wir dabei soviel Interesse haben.
Der
Die praktische Ueberzeugung ist die grostmoglichste.
Ueberzeugung."
unwandelbare
feste
eine
ist
also
Glauhe
praktische
.

.

.
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CliAPTER VI
1

§

1.

Reich’s reconstruction has recently come under attack. See Hans
Lenk, Kritik der logischen Konstanten Kapitel
1; and Gottfried
Martin j Kant s Metaph}^sics and Theo ry of Science (see following
note), pp. 86-88. Martin is concerned“with thF’possihility of
proving completeness of the table; his conclusion is that Reich
is unable to avoid crucial criticisms of the very possibility of
such a proof.
,

’

2.

for instance, Gottfried Martin, Kant’s Metaphysics and
Theory of Science P. G. Lucas, trans. (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1955), pp. 82 and 97. Further reference to
this work vs'ill be acknowledged in the text.

See,

,

3.

Verstandesschliisse gehen durch alle Klassen der logischen
Functionen des Urtheilens und sind folglich in ihren Hauptarten
bestimmt durch die Momente der Quantitat, der Qualitat, der
Relation und der Modalitat.”

4.

”Der wesentlich Character aller unmittelbaren Schlusse and das
Princip ihrer Mdglichkeit besteht lediglich in einer Veranderung
der blossen Form der Urtheile, wahrend die Materie der Urtheile,
das Subject and Pradicat, unverandert dieselbe bleibt."

’’Die

§ 2
5.

6.

I use ’’method" in a Kantian sense, see Critique
Bx-xiv.
According to Kant, for a discipline to have a method is its
guarantee of being one "the secure path of a science."
,

See the discussion of the foundation of logical truth in
H. von Wright, "Form and Content in Logic," in Logical Studies
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 6-7.
(London:

G.

7.

See the interpretation of the synthetic ^ priori problem developed
by D. P. Dryer, Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics
Chapter 1, esp. p. 29: "In asking how metaphysics is possible
as knowledge, he is primarily asking how metaphysics can be
verified, viz. how it can be made out which conclusions in metaphysics are true and which are false."
,

§3
8.

9.

Near the end of Logik "Einleitung, " Kapitel II, we find evidence
of Kant’s regard for the Wolffian logic: "The general Logic
of Wolff is the best we possess.” Quoted from Abbott, p. 11.
,

See, for instance, Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge:
Press, 1960), esp. Chapter V.

The M.I.T.

189

10

.

v“l962'),®pp!"ls2!253!’

Quantification," Inquiry.

WORKS CITED
I.

Primary Sources

Kant,

Immanuel.
London:

Critique of Pure Reason.
Trans, by Norman Kemp-Smith.
Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,' 1963.

Immanuel Kant s Vorlesungen
Karl H. L. Pdlitz.
Darmstadt:
•

^

liber die

Metapbysik.
Ed. by
Wissenschaftlicbe ~Bucbgesell-

scbaft, 1964.

Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nacblass
Logilc
The Prussian
Academy of Science edition, Kant’ s Gesammelte Schriften.
Vol. 16.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1924^
.

:

Kant
Abbott.
.

’

s

.

Introduction to Logic
Trans, by Thomas Kingsmill
New York:
Philosophical Library, 1963.
.

Kant’s Vorlesungen
Vorlesungen liber Logik
The Prussian
Academy of Science edition, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften.
Vol. 24.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1966.
.

:

.

Kant ’s Werke
Logik, Physische Geographie , Padagogik
The
Prussian Academy of Science edition, Kant
Gesammelte Schriften
Vol. 9.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1923.
:

.

.

’

.

Kritik der re inen Vernunft
Meiner, 1956.
.

.

Verlag von Felix

Hamburg:

Ed. by Lewis White
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
The Bobbs-nMerrill Company, Inc., 1950.
Beck.
Indianapolis:
.

.

Halle:
Meier, George Friedrich. Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre
(Reprinted in the Prussian
Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752.
Academy of Science edition, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften,
.

Vol. 16.

II.

Other Sources

In The Basic Works of Aristotle,
Aristotle. De Inte rprets tione
New York: Random House, 1941.
edited by Richard McKeon.
.

190

191

Prior Analytics
by Richard McKeon.
•

.

In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited
New York: Random House, 1941.

Bennett, Jonathan.
Kant’s Analytic
Press, 1966.

Cambridge:

.

Bochenski, I. M. Ancient Formal Logic
Publishing Company, 1963.

.

Cambridge University

Amsterdam:

North-Holland

Boehner, Philotheus.
Medieval Logic
An Outline of its Development
from 1250 to c. 1400
Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1952.
:

.

Dryer, D. P,
Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966.

.

London;

’’Begriffsschrift.”
Frege, Gottlob.
In Translations from the
Phil osophic al Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach
Oxford;
Basil Blaclcwell, 1966.
and Max Black.
In Translations from the
’’Function and Goncept.”
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach
Basil Blackwell, 1966.
Oxford:
and" Max Black.
.

M

Reference and Generality
Geach, Peter Thomas.
Ithaca
Some Medieval and Modern Theories
University Press, 1962.
:

.

:

Examination of
Gornell

"Die Entstehung der Kantischen Urteilstafel.
Hauck, P.
XI (1906 ), pp. 196-208.

’’

Kantstudien,

Knowledge and Belief: An Introduc tion to the Logic
Hintikka, Jaakko.
Cornell University Press, 1962.
Ithaca:
of the Two Notions.
Critique of Pure Reason
A Commentary to Kant
Press, 1962.
Humanities
New York:
Second Edition.

Kemp-Srnith, Norman.

’

Kneale, William and Martha Kneale.
The Clarendon Press, 1962.
Lenk,

’

The Development of Logic

.

’

Oxford:

Philosophische
Kritik der Logischen Konstanten
Hans.
bis zur Gegenwart
Idealismus
vom
rmen
Urteilsfo
der
Begrlindengen
1968.
Co.,
and
Gruyter
Berlin: W^teF~de
:

"Kant’s Classification of the Forms of Judgments."
Lovejoy, Arthur 0.
Disputed Qu estions^ edited by Moltke S. Gram.
Kant:
^ In
Quadrangle Books. 1967
Ghicago
:

Standpotot; of
Lukasiewicz, Jan. Aristotle’s Syllogist ic From
The Clarendon
Second Edition. Ox lord
Modern Formal Logic
Press, 1967.
;

.

.

192

Marcus, Ruth Earcan.
” Interpreting Quantification.”
(1962 ), pp. 252-259.

Inquiry

V

Martin, Gottfried. Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science.
Trans,
by P. G. Lucas.
Manchester: Manchester Unlv^sitv Press
1955.

Martin, Richard M.
Intension and ^cision: A Philosophical Study.
Englewood Gliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963.
•

Toward a Systematic Pragmatics
Publishing Gompany, 1959.
.

.

Amsterdam;

North -Holland

Truth and Denotation: A Study in Semantical Theory.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

London

.

Mill, John Stuart.
A System of Logic:
Rationcinative and Inductive.
London:
Longmans, Green and Go. Ltd., 1965.

Moody, Ernest A.
Truth and Gonsequence in Mediaeval Logic
Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Gompany, 1953.
.

Prior, A. N.
Formal Logic
Press, 1962.

.

Second Edition.

Quine, Willard V. 0. Methods of Logic
Ho].t, Rinehart, Winston, 1959.
.

Word and Object

.

.

Gamhridge:

Oxford:

The Glarendon

Revised Edition,

New York;

The M.I.T. Press, 1960.

Reich, Klaus.
Die Vollstandigkeit der kantischen Urteilsta fel 2.
Berlin: Verlagshuchhandlung von Richard Schoetz,
Auflage.
1948.
.

Topics in Philosophical Logic
Rescher, Nicholas.
D. Reidel Publishing Gompany, 1968.
Russell, Bertrand. Analysis of Mind
Unwin, Ltd., 1921.

.

London:

Dordrecht-Holland

.

George Allen and

"Kant's Lehre von der Quantitat der Urteils.”
Sickenherger, 0.
Kantstudien II (1898), pp. 90-99.
,

"A Theory of Gonditionals." APQ Monograph
Stalnaker, Robert G.
Oxford University Press, 1968,
Oxford:
Series, Monograph 2.
98-112.
pp.

Introduction to Logical Theory
Strawson, Peter F.
and Go. Ltd., 1952.

.

London:

Methuen

193

Swing, Thomas Kaehao.
Kan t
Transcendental Logic.
University Press, 1969.

New Haven:

Yale

Thompson, Manley.
"On Aristotle’s Square of Opposition."
In
Aristotle edited by J. M. E. Moravcsik. Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1967.
,

Wang, Hao.

A Survey of Mathematical Logic
Publishing Company, 1962.

M

.

von Wright, Georg H.
Essay on Modal Logic
Holland Publishing Company, 1951.
"Form and Content in Logic."
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.
.

Amsterdam:

.

North-Holland

Amsterdam:

Logical Studies

.

North-

London:

SUMMARY OF SYMBOLS AND
SPECIAL FORMULAS
(F)
(S)

0p(^ y)
0p(^ y)

(T)

Sf

= Up

1(3

>0p(^

27

Y.)

47

Functions of Judgment
Quantifiers: V, q, 7Functions of Quality:
Sign of Limitation: *.
The Copula:
(is).
Functions of Complex Judgments:
(0),
Modal Functions: Probj, Assj, Apj.

II. 1 & III.l

II.

III.
II.

III.
IV.

Theory of Extension
(Def. Cont.):
the content of A =df.

P(P is encompassed
within A)
the compass of A -df. P(P is encompassed under A)
(Def. Ext.):
(Ax.): (-(A)(EP)(P is encompassed under A)
the compass of ~P =df. Q(It is false that Q is
(Def. Nega-Ext):
encompassed under P)

Rules of Immediate Inference
>q(A, B)
Subalternation: V(A, B)
simp
Conv
>(is)~(V(B, A))
Conversion:
1) (is)~(V(A, B))
(
>(is)-(q(B, A))
B))
(is)-(q(A,
simp
Cony
2)
(
>(is)-(q(B, A))
B))
accid
(is)~(V(A,
per
)
( Conv
)
)~(0(A,
B))
>(is
(is)*(0(A, B )
Limitation:
(HP):
((?)(c., 6),ct
>6
(MT);
>“a
(C)(a, S), ~e
(MPT):
(V)(a, 3), a
>-3
(MTP):
>6
(v)(a, b), ~o
.

.

,

.

.

.

(MPT):
(MTP):

(V)(a,
(V)(o,

(Contraposition
S

B,
6,

Y.
Y>

•••),

K

>(~B, ~y> •••)
>Y
~B, •••!

43
43
44
70

27
36
36
36
78
85
88
88

88
89
89

)

AsSj (is)-(V(A, B))
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>S Apj (is)~(V(~B, A))
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